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Abstract. This paper studies inference in models of discrete choice with
social interactions when the data consists of a single large network. We provide
theoretical justification for the use of spatial and network HAC variance estima-
tors in applied work, the latter constructed by using network path distance in
place of spatial distance. Toward this end, we prove new central limit theorems
for network moments in a large class of social interactions models. The results
are applicable to discrete games on networks and dynamic models where social
interactions enter through lagged dependent variables. We illustrate our results
in an empirical application and simulation study.
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1 Introduction
Threshold models of social influence are the subject of a large theoretical literature
in the social sciences (Ellison, 1993; Granovetter, 1978; Jackson, 2008; Morris, 2000).
These are models of social interactions with binary decisions, which have been used to
study, for example, product adoption (Godinho de Matos et al., 2014), risky behavior
(Bauman and Ennett, 1996), health choices (Christakis, 2004), protests (González,
2017), and voting (Bond et al., 2012). The empirical content of these and related
models has long been of interest in the econometric literature (Brock and Durlauf,
2001; Manski, 1993). Much of this work has focused on static models with cross-
sectional data, where social interactions only operate within groups and the number
of groups is large. This paper instead studies inference in static and dynamic models
when the data consists of a single large network. The motivation for using network
data is that it can be used to more accurately model social interactions, which is often
heterogeneous by nature. For example, students in different classrooms may interact,
and even within classrooms, they may only interact with a subset of their classmates.
The goal of this paper is to provide theoretically justified inference procedures for
models of discrete choice with social interactions. We consider spatial and network
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) variance estimators, which
have seen increasing use in applied work for inference in the single network setting.
Our main theoretical results are new central limit theorems for static and dynamic
models of social interactions and conditions under which the HAC estimators are
consistent, or possibly conservative, for the variance. These results hold under an
asymptotic approximation that sends the size of a single large network to infinity.
The motivation for large-network asymptotics is that network data commonly
consists of observations on a single network, as opposed to many independent groups.
This is theoretically challenging because social interactions inherently induce autocor-
relation between different network subunits. Inference thus requires a large-sample
theory under which the amount of “independent information” in a network grows
with the network size. This is analogous to limit theory in time series that sends the
number of time periods to infinity rather than the number of time series.
There are few inference procedures presently available in the single-network set-
ting. In the medical literature, network autocorrelation is often ignored in practice,
and i.i.d. standard errors are commonly used (Lee and Ogburn, 2019). In economics,
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the strategy of clustering on subnetworks is quite common. By this we mean divid-
ing a single network into many subnetworks using, say, geographic boundaries or a
community detection algorithm (e.g. Blondel et al., 2008), and then clustering stan-
dard errors on the subnetworks. However, there is often a sizeable share of links that
bridge clusters, which implies agents can interact across subnetworks. This renders
implausible the assumption necessary for the validity of clustered standard errors,
that subnetworks are independent. HAC estimators provide a viable alternative, as
they do not rely on partitioning or independence of clusters. Instead, they account
for correlation between each agent and the alters within a neighborhood of the agent,
which can be thought of as defining agent-specific, overlapping clusters.
To provide a clearer sense of the practical import of our results, consider the study
of Conley and Udry (2010) on social learning among pineapple farmers in Ghana.
Their main specification is a logistic model of the probability that a farmer’s agri-
cultural inputs change in response to above- or below-expectation returns from his
network neighbors’ crop yields. For the purposes of constructing clustered standard
errors, it is unclear how to reasonably divide the network using geographic bound-
aries, as there are only three villages in their data. The authors instead use a spatial
HAC estimator, which is valid when the data is spatially autocorrelated. We pro-
vide conditions for validity of the estimator when the data is potentially network
autocorrelated, for example when the errors of network neighbors are dependent.
The spatial HAC estimator requires data on agents’ spatial positions, but this is
not always available. For instance, rather than physical space, the underlying space
may correspond to a latent social space, whereby socially similar agents are more
likely to form connections. Given network data, we can instead define an alternate
notion of “distance,” namely path distance, which is the shortest number of links it
takes to travel from one agent to another in the network, and use this in place of
spatial distance to construct a network HAC estimator. This idea has been used
in practice (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2015; Eckles et al., 2016). We provide conditions
under which the estimator is valid.
Our results apply to static and dynamic models of social interactions. In dynamic
models, an agent’s action is a function of her network neighbors’ lagged actions.
Such models are useful when a short time series on a large network is available.
We discuss how our results can be used for parametric and nonparametric inference
in dynamic models. Static models instead allow actions to depend on neighbors’
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contemporaneous actions. They formally correspond to discrete games of complete
information, which are useful when the data consists of a single network snapshot. In
the existing literature, Xu and Lee (2015) propose a simulated method of moments
estimator and Li and Zhao (2016) characterize the identified set using subnetwork
moments. We discuss how our results can be used to conduct inference using their
procedures.
We illustrate our results in a simulation study and empirical application. The
simulation evidence shows that the normal approximation works well, and inference
using the HAC estimators properly controls size, whereas naive i.i.d. standard errors
can be highly anti-conservative. In the empirical application, we reanalyze data from
Conley and Udry (2010) and find that both spatial and network HAC estimators
deliver similar standard errors.
Finally, we would like to highlight several technical contributions.
1. To our knowledge, all existing results on HAC estimators require first-order
stationarity conditions that essentially require moments to be centered at their
conditional expectations. This holds in GMM-type settings. However, it is
not satisfied in moment inequality models and often violated in nonparametric
settings, for example nonparametric inference on the conditional choice prob-
ability. For the spatial HAC, we provide two positive results. The first is a
general (albeit strong) sufficient condition under which first-order stationarity
holds asymptotically for any network moments, whether centered or not. In
this case, the spatial HAC is asymptotically conservative, which appears to be
a new result. Second, our results justify use of the generalized spatial HAC
proposed by Leung and Moon (2019), which is consistent regardless of whether
stationarity holds.
2. To prove our CLTs, we first establish a general CLT under high-level “stabiliza-
tion” conditions, which is a modification of a result due to Leung and Moon
(2019). The difference is we consider an increasing domain setting to obtain
consistency of the spatial HAC, whereas they study a quasi-infill setting.1 To
1Specifically, under our asymptotics, positions are scaled to be sufficiently spread out in space,
which is the usual increasing domain asymptotics used to analyze spatial HAC estimators. Under
the asymptotics of Leung and Moon (2019), positions are instead sampled from a bounded region,
but preferences are scaled so that agents increasingly prefer nearby alters as the network size grows.
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derive primitive conditions for stabilization in our setting, we follow the method-
ology in Leung and Moon (2019), drawing on results in branching process the-
ory. While the conditions we derive are qualitatively similar to those used in
Leung and Moon (2019) to establish CLTs for strategic models of network for-
mation, our results are not special cases of theirs. They consider applications
to network formation and network regressions, but their results do not apply to
social interactions models.
3. Our results on the validity of the network HAC require an exogenous network
in the static model. We provide intuition suggested by our proof strategy on
why endogeneity is difficult to allow in general.
Related Literature. To our knowledge, the only prior work on network HAC
estimators is a recent paper by Kojevnikov et al. (2019). Kojevnikov (2019) proposes
novel bootstrap procedures for network data. Both papers assume the data satisfies
a new conditional ψ-weak dependence notion modified from the time series literature
but do not discuss applications to models of social interactions. We utilize a different
notion of weak dependence proposed by Leung and Moon (2019) and apply branching
process results to verify weak dependence in our applications. See Remark 4.1 for
further comparison of our approach and theirs.
There is a large literature on spatial autoregressive models, of which the widely
used linear-in-means model of social interactions is a special case. For relevant re-
sults on spatial HAC estimators, see for example Conley (1999), Conley and Molinari
(2007), Jenish (2016), and Kelejian and Prucha (2007). In the context of network for-
mation, Boucher and Mourifié (2017) and Leung and Moon (2019) show that spatial
HAC estimators can be used for valid inference.
A growing literature in econometrics studies models with strategic interactions
and many agents. Menzel (2015a) and Shang and Lee (2011), among others, consider
inference on discrete games of complete information. Unlike our setting, there is no
network structure; instead, social interactions enter payoffs through a vector of ag-
gregate statistics, such as the average action of all agents. Li and Zhao (2016) and
Xu and Lee (2015) study settings with networked interactions and complete informa-
tion. Eraslan and Tang (2017) and Xu (2018) derive results for corresponding games
of incomplete information. Large-network asymptotics are different in this setting
because actions are i.i.d. conditional on observed characteristics and the network.
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Kuersteiner and Prucha (2018) develop large-sample theory for a dynamic version of
the linear-in-means model where social interactions enter through lagged dependent
variables. He and Song (2018) propose inference methods for nonparametric measures
of diffusion in dynamic models with binary outcomes.
Outline. The next two sections respectively introduce dynamic and static models
of social interactions with binary outcomes. Then §4 presents the HAC estimators
and conditions for their asymptotic validity. We state formal conditions for central
limit theorems in §5 for the static model and §6 for the dynamic model. Next, §7
discusses results from a simulation study and empirical application using data from
Conley and Udry (2010). Finally, §8 concludes.
Notation. If f is a density function or random vector, let supppfq be its support.
Given n i.i.d. vectorsX1, . . . , Xn andH Ď t1, . . . , nu, letXH be the submatrix pXi : i P
Hq and X´i “ pX1, . . . , Xi´1, Xi`1, . . . , Xnq. We use boldface letters to denote the
entire collection X “ pXiqni“1 (as opposed to X to avoid confusing this with a generic
draw). For a symmetric nˆ n matrix A, we let Aij denote the ijth entry, Ai denote
the ith column, and A´i denote A with the ith row and column deleted. Also for H
defined previously, let AH be the submatrix pAij : i, j P Hq and AH,i “ pAij : j P Hq.
For all of these submatrices and subvectors, rows and columns are ordered in the
same way as the original matrices and vectors.
Throughout this paper we will only be concerned with undirected networks with
no self-links. Accordingly, we represent a networkA on n agents as an nˆn adjacency
matrix with zeros on the diagonals. The ijth entry Aij , which we call the potential
link between i and j, takes values in t0, 1u. The degree of an agent i in A is řj Aij . A
path in A from agent i to j is a sequence of distinct agents starting with i and ending
with j such that for each consecutive k, k1 in this sequence, Akk1 “ 1. The number
of agents in this sequence minus one is the length of this path. The path distance
between two agents is the length of the shortest path that connects them, assuming
one exists; if one does not, then it is defined as 8. The K-neighborhood of an agent i
in A, denoted NApi, Kq, is the set of all agents j for which ℓApi, jq ď K. Note that
this includes i. Finally the component of an agent i in A is the set of all agents j for
which ℓApi, jq ă 8.
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2 Dynamic Model of Social Interactions
A large literature in microeconomics and computer science studies dynamic models
of social influence (Ellison, 1993; Kempe et al., 2003; Montanari and Saberi, 2010;
Morris, 2000). In these models, a subset of agents are initially seeded as adopters
(choosing action 1), and then agents myopically best respond in subsequent periods
to the number of neighbors who are adopters. For example, if the share of period t´1
adopters in i’s neighborhood exceeds some threshold τi, then agent i might adopt in
period t. This section introduces an econometric version of the model with observed
and unobserved heterogeneity. Models of this sort are widely used in applied work in
economics, marketing, and network science.2 They are useful when the econometrician
observes a short time series of a large network.
2.1 Model
The econometrician observes a set of agents Nn “ t1, . . . , nu connected through
a time-invariant network A. Agents interact over a small number of time periods
t “ 0, 1, . . . , T for 0 ă T ă 8. Associate each agent i and period t with a binary
outcome Y ti and type τ
t
i . We decompose τ
t
i “ pX ti , αi, εtiq, where X ti is a vector
of observed covariates, αi a fixed effect, and ε
t
i an idiosyncratic error. We assume
Xi ” pX0i , . . . , XTi , αiq is i.i.d. across agents, and independent of εti for any t, while
the errors are i.i.d. across agents and time periods.
Outcomes are realized according to myopic best-response dynamics: for all agents
i and periods t “ 1, . . . , T ,
Y ti “ 1
 
UpSti , τ ti q ą 0
(
, (2.1)
where Up¨q is a real-valued function representing net utility. The first term Sti is a
finite-dimensional vector of statistics given by
Sti ” SpY ăt, τďti , τďt´i , Ai, A´iq
for a vector-valued function Sp¨q with Y ăt “ pY sj : j P Nn, s ă tq, τďti “ pτ si : s ď tq,
and τďt´i the collection of τ
ďt
i ’s excluding i (see the definition of the ´i subscript in
2E.g. Ameri et al. (2017), Banerjee et al. (2013), Christakis and Fowler (2007), Iyengar et al.
(2011), Katona et al. (2011), and Park et al. (2018).
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the introduction). Hence, Sti can capture peer effects through lagged outcomes and
types of other agents in the network. As a function of τďt´i , S
t
i can also depend on the
unobserved subvector of neighbors’ types, which can generate network autocorrelation
in unobservables.
Example 2.1. A typical payoff specification is the linear in parameters model
UpSti , τ ti q “ pX ti q1β1 ` β2
ř
j AijY
t´1
jř
j Aij
` αi ` νti .
Social interactions enter through the average outcome of neighbors in the previous
period. The idiosyncratic term νti might simply equal ε
t
i, or it might be autocorrelated.
For example, the errors may be jointly normal across agents with nonzero covariances
for linked pairs. Alternatively, we could have
νti “
ř
j Aijε
t
jř
j Aij
` εti,
where the first term captures exogenous peer effects in the errors and induces con-
temporaneous network autocorrelation between the νti ’s. In the latter case, S
t
i is a
two-dimensional vector consisting of this term and the term multiplying β2.
Example 2.2. A large literature dating back to at least Granovetter (1978) studies
threshold models of behavior, where for each agent i, Y ti “ 1 if and only if the share of
neighbors choosing action one in the previous period exceeds a threshold ξti (Jackson,
2008; Schelling, 1978). This is captured in our framework by setting
UpSti , τ ti q “
ř
j‰iAijY
t´1
jř
j‰iAij
´ ξti .
If ξti only depends on own type τ
t
i , then in this model, S
t
i is a scalar corresponding
to the average lagged outcome on the right-hand side. In practice, heterogeneity in
the threshold is often of interest, since this determines the extent of diffusion, so a
typical exercise would be to parametrize it as a function of type and estimate the
parameters.
Both of these examples restrict the dependence of Sti on the network. We next
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impose this restriction more generally. Let N´
A
pi,Mq “ NApi,Mqztiu, which is i’s
M-neighborhood, excluding i herself. Let Y ătH “ pY sj : j P H, s ă tq, and recall the
notation for submatrices in the introduction.
Assumption 2.1 (Local Interactions). There exists M P N such that, for all n P N,
i P Nn, and t “ 1, . . . , T ,
Sti “ SpY ătN piq, τďti , τďtN piq, AN piqq for N piq ” N´A pi,Mq.
This states that Sp¨q is only a function of its arguments through the M-neighbors of
i, which is clearly satisfied in the previous examples for M “ 1.
Model (2.1) governs the evolution of the process from period 1 onward. It remains
to specify a model for the initial condition. This model need not be known in practice
to use our results, but we will need to impose some (nonparametric) restrictions for
weak dependence in order to establish a CLT. If this process is observed shortly after
its inception, it is reasonable to draw Y 0i from a single-agent discrete choice model,
e.g. Y 0i “ 1tUp0, τ 0i q ą 0u, where we zero out the regressors that are functions of
lagged dependent variables because there is no previous time period. Alternatively,
the initial condition might be viewed as the long-run outcome of a dynamic process.
This can be reasonably approximated by a static model of social interactions, which
is discussed in §3. Since this nests the single-agent discrete choice model, we will
assume a general static model for the initial condition, whose formal statement is
postponed to §6.
2.2 Network Moments
We next define the class of dynamic network moments, objects for which we seek to
prove a CLT and construct variance estimators. Let Yi “ pY ti qTt“0, τi be defined in the
analogous way, and Y´i, τ´i be defined according to the notation in the introduction.
We consider moments that are averages of agent statistics ψi, namely
1
n
nÿ
i“1
ψi for ψi ” ψpYi, Y´i, Ai, A´i, τi, τ´iq,
where ψp¨q is Rm-valued. The main technical contributions of this paper are twofold.
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In §6, we provide conditions under which, as nÑ8,
1?
n
nÿ
i“1
Σ
´1{2
n pψi ´ Erψisq dÝÑ N p0, Imq and lim inf
nÑ8
λminpΣnq ą 0, (2.2)
where Σn is the variance and Im the m ˆ m identity matrix. In §4, we show that
spatial and network HAC estimators are valid estimators forΣn. The formal sequence
of models along which we take these limits is defined in §2.4.
We consider agent statistics ψp¨q satisfying the following K-locality condition.
Recall the notation introduced prior to Assumption 2.1.
Assumption 2.2 (K-Locality). There exists K P N such that, for any n and i P Nn,
ψi “ ψpYi, YN piq, AN piq,i, AN piq, τi, τN piqq for N piq ” N´A pi, Kq.
This states that, for some positive constant K, the agent statistic of i is only a
function of its arguments through the agents in i’s K-neighborhood. We first walk
through two basic illustrative examples and then discuss network moments useful for
inference on social interactions.
Example 2.3. Consider ψi “ Y ti for some specified time period t. Then the network
moment corresponds to the average outcome or empirical choice probability at time
t. A related example is the average outcome over all observed time periods, where
ψi “ T´1
řT
t“0 Y
t
i . Both of these satisfy Assumption 2.2 for K “ 0 because they are
only functions of the first argument of ψp¨q.
Example 2.4. Assumption 2.2 also encompasses subnetwork moments, such as the
number of dyads (linked pairs) such that both agents choose action 1 in period t. This
corresponds to ψi “
ř
j AijY
t
i Y
t
j , which satisfies Assumption 2.2 for K “ 1, since it is
only a function of i’s neighbors.3 Another example is the number of intransitive triads
(triplets with only two links) such that all agents choose action 0. This corresponds
(up to scale) to ψi “
ř
j
ř
k AijAjkp1 ´ Aikqp1´ Y ti qp1´ Y tj qp1´ Y tk q, which satisfies
Assumption 2.2 for K “ 2, since k may be a 2-neighbor of i.
3Note that the network moment is then n´1
ř
i,j AijY
t
i Y
t
j . We always scale by n
´1 because
our assumptions will ensure a sparse network, which implies that
ř
j Aij “ Opp1q for any i. See
Remark 5.1.
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We next provide examples of network moments useful for parametric and nonpara-
metric inference on social interactions.
2.2.1 Method of Moments
In practice, a common exercise is to parametrize payoffs Up¨q and the conditional
distributions of αi and ε
t
i given X
t
i . For example, consider a two-period version of
Example 2.1 with αi “ 0 for all i and νti „ N p0, 1q. We can estimate the model
using a probit regression of Y 1i on pX1i ,
ř
j AijY
0
j {
ř
j Aijq. However, the usual probit
likelihood may not be a true likelihood because the errors νti are potentially net-
work autocorrelated. Nonetheless, we can treat this as a pseudo-likelihood, as in
Poirier and Ruud (1988).
To obtain a normal limit for the pseudo-MLE estimator, we need the average of
the scores to obey a CLT, in addition to the usual regularity conditions. Here we take
ψi to be the score for agent i. This satisfies Assumption 2.2 for K “ 1 because the
regressors are a function of i’s 1-neighbors. The information matrix equality does not
hold, since this is a pseudo-likelihood, but a consistent estimate of the asymptotic
variance can obtained using the sandwich formula with the variance of the scores
estimated using either our proposed spatial or network HAC.
Since the model is fully specified up to a vector of parameters θ, we can also
apply simulated method of moments using, for example, the moments introduced in
Examples 2.3 and 2.4. This consists of computing their empirical analogs from data
and matching them to simulated analogs. For inference, our results can be applied to
construct GMM standard errors that account for network autocorrelation using the
sandwich formula.
2.2.2 Nonparametric Inference
We next consider nonparametric inference on the average structural function (ASF),
a parameter which provides a nonparametric measure of social interactions. Partition
pSti , τ ti q “ pX˜ ti , α˜i, ε˜tiq, where X˜ ti contains all observed quantities, α˜i all time-invariant
unobservables, and ε˜ti all time-varying unobservables that are independent across
time. Thus we rewrite UpSti , τ ti q “ UpX˜ ti , α˜i, ε˜tiq. Using this representation, the ASF
is given by
µpxq “ ErUpx, α˜i, ε˜tiqs,
11
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where x is a vector of constants. Then if X˜ ti includes some function of the lagged
outcome of neighbors, µpxq´µpx1q provides a nonparametric measure of peer effects.
The ASF is typically not point identified in this context (Chamberlain, 2010), so
we use the partial identification approach of Chernozhukov et al. (2013). Let X˜i “
pX˜ ti qTt“0, whose support is required to be discrete. Define
X tpxq “
!
X˜i : X˜
t
i “ x, X˜ri ‰ x @r ă t, r “ 1, . . . , T
)
,
X‰pxq “
!
X˜i : X˜
t
i ‰ x @t “ 1, . . . , T
)
.
Note that X tpxq is the set of values of X˜i for which the tth component first equals x
at time t. Then
 
X‰pxq,X 0pxq, . . . ,X T pxq( partitions the support of X˜i. Let
Yˆipxq “
Tÿ
t“1
1tX˜i P X tpxquY ti , Pipxq “ 1tX˜i P X‰pxqu,
µℓpxq “ ErYˆipxqs, and µupxq “ µℓpxq ` ErPipxqs. Chernozhukov et al. (2013) show
that
µℓpxq ď µpxq ď µupxq
and that the bounds collapse to a point at a rate exponential in T .
To use these bounds in practice, we construct sample analog estimators
µˆℓpxq “ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
Yˆipxq and µˆupxq “ µˆℓpxq ` 1
n
nÿ
i“1
Pipxq.
Given a joint CLT for these estimators, we can apply the method of Woutersen (2006)
asymptotic version of the GMS test (Andrews and Soares, 2010, p. 135) to construct
confidence intervals for the ASF using a HAC estimate of the variance.
As a first step to apply our CLT, we need to verify that the analog estimators
fall within the set of moments satisfying Assumption 2.2. The agent statistic is ψi “
pYˆipxq, Pipxqq. By definition, Yˆipxq is a function of the outcome time series through
tpY ti , X˜ ti quTt“0. By Assumption 2.1, X˜ ti (in particular the subvector corresponding to
observed components of Sti) is a function of outcomes only through the 1-neighborhood
of agent i. Hence, Yˆipxq satisfies Assumption 2.2 forK “ 1. The same argument holds
for Pipxq.
12
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2.3 Network Formation
This section introduces a (nonparametric) stochastic model of network formation.
The model need not be known in practice, but it is used to prove our asymptotic
results. Readers interested in inference methods can skip ahead to §4.
We assume each agent i is endowed with a network type pρi, µiq, which is a time-
invariant subvector of τ ti . Additionally, each agent pair pi, jq is endowed with a time-
invariant pair-specific random utility shock ζij , i.i.d. across pairs and independent of
all other model primitives. For all i, j P Nn with i ‰ j, potential links in A satisfy
Aij “ 1 tV p‖ρi ´ ρj‖, µi, µj, ζijq ą 0u , (2.3)
where ‖¨‖ is a norm on Rd and V p¨q a real-valued latent-index function, which we will
later assume is eventually decreasing in its first argument (Assumption 5.2).4 In our
applications, V p¨q is an unknown function because the usual object of interest is some
feature of Up¨q. Likewise, network types may be unobserved by the econometrician.
The second and third arguments of V p¨q contain agent-specific characteristics that
may influence link formation. If V is monotonic in any of these elements, then this
captures what Graham (2017) refers to as degree heterogeneity, where agents with
more attractive characteristics µi are likely to have more connections (high degree).
Alternatively, V p¨q could depend on µi, µj through 1tµi “ µju, which captures ho-
mophily in µi. Homophily refers to the widely observed tendency for similar individ-
uals to associate.
The first argument of V p¨q requires homophily in positions ρi. This aspect of the
model lends it a spatial dimension, which is essential for showing validity of the spatial
HAC estimator. Under additional weak dependence conditions stated in §6, spatial
homophily implies that the correlation between ψi and ψj is smaller when ‖ρi ´ ρj‖
is larger.
Note that the space on which agents are located need not correspond to physical
space. They may be homophilous in other social dimensions, in which case we can
define distance in terms of their social, rather than geographic, characteristics. In the
case where positions are unobserved by the econometrician, the model is a nonlinear
version of a latent space model commonly used in social network analysis (Hoff et al.,
2002; Breza et al., 2017). In these models, agents are positioned on a latent “social
4Since Aij is an undirected network, we assume V p‖ρi´ρj‖, µi, µj , ζijq “ V p‖ρi´ρj‖, µj, µi, ζjiq.
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space,” and connections form at a higher rate among socially similar agents. In this
case, clearly a spatial HAC cannot be computed, since positions are unobserved, but
our results show that the network HAC can be used instead.
Remark 2.1. The setup allows for correlation between µi and αi (for example), in
which case the network is endogenous. If agents are homophilous in µi, then this
captures unobserved homophily, a well-known hindrance to identifying social inter-
actions (Shalizi and Thomas, 2011). For example, identification of peer effects in
product adoption is confounded by peers with similar product preferences αi forming
connections at a higher rate.
Remark 2.2. The model does not allow for strategic interactions in link formation,
meaning that V p¨q is not a function of A. Most papers in the econometric literature
that address the problem of network endogeneity use similar models with no strate-
gic interactions, viewing them heuristically as reduced-form approximations (e.g.
Auerbach, 2018; Hsieh and Lee, 2016; Johnsson and Moon, 2019). Leung and Moon
(2019) prove a CLT for static models of network formation with strategic interactions.
In principle, our CLTs can be generalized to their model, but we do not pursue this
generalization because it mildly complicates the proofs in predictable ways without
providing any new intuition.
2.4 Large-Network Asymptotics
This section formalizes the sequence of models along which we take limits in our
asymptotic results. Recall that ρi, defined in the previous subsection, is a time-
invariant subvector of τ ti for any t and τi is the time series of i’s type pτ ti qTt“0. Take
the same time series but omit ρi from each τ
t
i , and call the result Zi. Recall from
the introduction that we define ρ “ pρiqni“1, and similarly define Z and ζ. Then the
model is fully characterized by the tuple
pU, λ, V,ρ,Z, ζq, (2.4)
where Up¨q is the payoff function in (2.1) and V p¨q the latent index in the network
formation model (2.3). The new term λp¨q concerns the initial conditions model; being
a static model with strategic interactions, initial outcomes will be determined by a
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selection mechanism λp¨q, whose formal definition we postpone to §5.
To establish the validity of spatial HAC estimators, we need positions ρi to be
sufficiently removed from each other asymptotically, which is the usual assumption
of increasing domain asymptotics that is standard in spatial econometrics.
Assumption 2.3 (Increasing Domain). Let ρ˜1, ρ˜1, . . . be i.i.d., continuously dis-
tributed vectors in Rd with density f bounded away from zero and infinity. Let
ωn “ pn{κq1{d for some universal constant κ ą 0. Define ρi “ ωnρ˜i for all i. The
observed outcome time series is realized according to the nth model of the sequence
tpU, λ, V,ρ,Z, ζqunPN.
Under this sequence, we derive a CLT (2.2) in §6 and asymptotic properties of the
HAC estimators in §4.
Remark 2.3. In spatial econometrics, it is typically assumed that positions ρi are
non-random and separated by a universal minimum distance (e.g. Conley, 1999;
Jenish and Prucha, 2012). Assumption 2.3 is a slightly different model that follows
the spatial graphs literature (Penrose, 2003) and is also sometimes used in spatial
statistics (Lahiri and Zhu, 2006). Both assumptions have the same implication, that
in the limit, any ball of fixed radius centered at an agent’s position contains only an
asymptotically finite number of other agents’ positions. If ωn diverges faster (slower)
than the stated rate, then this ball will be asymptotically empty (save for the central
agent); if it diverges slower, then it will contain an infinite number of agents in the
limit.
3 Static Model of Social Interactions
This section introduces a static analog of the model studied in §2, which is useful
when the econometrician observes a snapshot of a large network. As before, we let
Nn “ t1, . . . , nu denote the set of agents, which are connected through an undirected
network A realized according to the model in §2.3. Each agent i is endowed with a
type τi “ pXi, εiq, i.i.d. across agents, where Xi is observed by the econometrician and
εi unobserved. Agents take a binary action, and payoffs may depend on the actions
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taken by others in the network. Agent i’s observed action satisfies
Yi “ 1 tUpSi, τiq ą 0u (3.1)
where the net payoff function Up¨q depends on i’s type and a finite-dimensional vector
of statistics
Si ” SpY´i, τi, τ´i, Ai, A´iq.
This captures strategic interactions through its dependence on Y´i. Model (3.1) states
that observed actions are realized according to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium;
agents choose the action that maximizes payoffs given the actions of others in the
network.
Example 3.1. Bramoullé et al. (2009) study a network analog of the standard linear-
in-means model (Manski, 1993), which is a model with continuous outcomes. Out-
comes depend on the average outcome of peers (endogenous peer effects) and the
average characteristics of peers (exogenous peer effects). The analogous specification
for discrete choice is
UpSi, τiq “ S 1iθ1 `X 1iθ´1 ` εi, Si “
˜ř
j‰iAijYjř
j‰iAij
,
ř
j‰iAijXjř
j‰iAij
¸
(Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Xu, 2018). The first component of Si is the average action
taken by neighbors. We can also consider type-weighted versions of the average
action or nonlinear functions of Y´i and Ai such as the minimum or maximum action
(Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005).
Model (3.1) is entirely analogous to the dynamic model (2.1) but with contem-
poraneous rather than lagged dependent variables entering Si. Hence, we can also
consider analogs of Examples 2.1 and 2.2 in the static setting. In all of these examples,
strategic interactions only operate through network neighbors of the ego i. We next
impose this restriction more generally. Recall that N´
A
pi, 1q is the 1-neighborhood of
i, excluding i herself.
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Assumption 3.1 (Local Interactions). For all n and i P Nn,
Si “ SpYN piq, τi, τN piq, Aiq for N piq ” N´A pi, 1q.
This states that Si is only a function of its arguments through agents connected to i.
Unlike the typical linear-in-means model for continuous outcomes, the nonlinearity
of the discrete choice model typically gives rise to multiple equilibria (Brock and Durlauf,
2001). This is obvious when n “ 2 and the two agents connected, since this is a 2ˆ 2
game of complete information. With multiple equilibria, the econometric model is
incomplete in the sense that a reduced form does not (yet) exist (Tamer, 2003). To
complete the model, we follow the empirical games literature and introduce a selection
mechanism. Whether this is required to be known to the econometrician depends on
the inference procedure, as discussed in the next subsection. Recall that τ “ pτiqni“1.
Let EpA, τ q Ď t0, 1un be the set of Nash equilibria, i.e. the set of binary outcome
vectors such that, for each Y P EpA, τ q, the ith component Yi satisfies (3.1) for each
i.
Assumption 3.2 (Selection Mechanism). (a) A Nash equilibrium exists for any net-
work size n, i.e. |EpA, τ q| ě 1. (b) There exists a selection mechanism λpA, τ q with
range EpA, τ q such that Y “ λpA, τ q for any n.
Part (b) defines the selection mechanism as a reduced form mapping from the model
primitives to the observed equilibrium outcome. Note that if Up¨q does not vary in Si,
then |EpA, τ q| “ 1, since this is simply a discrete-choice model with no strategic inter-
actions, in which case λp¨q is trivial. In economic terms, λp¨q represents the process by
which agents coordinate on a Nash equilibrium to play in the observed data. A simple
example is a function that picks an element of EpA, τ q uniformly at random. This is
an econometric model used by Bjorn and Vuong (1984) and Soetevent and Kooreman
(2007).5 Another example is myopic best-response dynamics.
Example 3.2. As discussed in §2, the microeconomic literature on dynamic models
5To see how this is formally represented in our notation, without loss of generality let the first
component of εi, for each i, be a random variable γi uniformly distributed on r0, 1s that is payoff-
irrelevant. That is, it does not enter Up¨q. Partition the unit interval into |EpA, τ q| equally sized
intervals and arbitrarily order the elements of EpA, τ q. Then let λp¨q be the function that selects the
kth equilibrium if γi (for any arbitrarily chosen i, say i “ 1) lies in the kth interval of the partition.
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of social influence predominantly considers models in which agents react myopically
to the decisions of their peers in the previous period. Formally, fix A, τ and an
arbitrary Y 0 P t0, 1un. Generate Y 1 P t0, 1un by setting
Y 1i “ 1
 
UpSpY 0´i, τi, τ´i, Ai, A´iq, τiq ą 0
(
for each i P Nn, and likewise generate Y 2, Y 3, . . . . This process is often referred to
as myopic best-response dynamics. It is well known that if Y 0 “ p1, . . . , 1q, then
under a game of strategic complements, this process converges to the “largest” Nash
equilibrium Y ˚ in a precise sense (e.g. Jia, 2008, p. 1279–80). In that case, this
process constitutes a mapping λp¨q from the primitives pA, τ q to a unique outcome
Y ˚ P EpA, τ q.
3.1 Network Moments
Similar to §2.2, we consider network moments that are averages of Rm-valued agent
statistics of the form
1
n
nÿ
i“1
ψi for ψi ” ψpYi, Y´i, Ai, A´i, τi, τ´iq.
Our objective is to establish a CLT (2.2) and validity of the HAC estimators under
increasing domain asymptotics, as in the dynamic case (Assumption 2.3). We assume
ψp¨q satisfies Assumption 2.2, now under the new notation of the static setting. This
condition simply states that ψi is only a function of its arguments through i’s K-
neighborhood inA, which is satisfied for a wide variety of network moments useful for
inference on social interactions. The remainder of this subsection provides illustrative
examples.
Example 3.3. A trivial example of a network moment is n´1
řn
i“1 Yi, which is the
empirical choice probability and satisfies Assumption 2.2 for K “ 0. A weighted
version of the choice probability moment is used in the simulated method of moments
estimator of Xu and Lee (2015) discussed in §3.1.1. Another example is subnetwork
moments
1
n
nÿ
i1“1
¨ ¨ ¨
nÿ
iℓ“1
1tYH “ yH , AH “ aHu,
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where H “ ti1, . . . , iℓu, yH P t0, 1uℓ, aH is a connected network on H , and AH is the
subnetwork of A on H . Its expectation is proportional to the probability that agents
in H form subnetwork aH and choose outcomes yH . As discussed below, this satisfies
K-locality and can be used to construct moment inequalities for structural inference
on Up¨q.
3.1.1 Method of Moments
The next two subsections discuss applications to parametric inference on Up¨q that
utilize moments falling within the scope of Assumption 2.2. Xu and Lee (2015) con-
sider a linear latent index model
UpSi, τiq “ θ1
ř
j‰iAijYjř
j‰iAij
`X 1iθ´1 ` εi,
where θ1 captures endogenous peer effects. They assume θ1 ě 0, which implies that
observed outcomes constitute a Nash equilibrium of a supermodular game. It is well
known that the set of equilibria forms a complete lattice and therefore that there exists
a “largest” equilibrium. For estimation, Xu and Lee (2015) assume the following.
Assumption 3.3. (a) Realized outcomes correspond to the “largest” Nash equilibrium.
(b) pX,Aq K ε. (c) The distribution of ε1 given X1 is known up to θ.
Part (a) is equivalent to assuming that λp¨q is given as in Example 3.2. By assuming a
particular selection mechanism, this enables simulation of the model moments. Part
(b) assumes an exogenous network.
The authors propose to estimate θ using simulated method of moments (SMM)
based on the conditional choice probability, namely n´1
ř
i ψi for
ψi “ pYi ´PθpYi “ 1 |X,AqqhpXi, X´i, Ai, A´iq.
Here, Pθ refers to the probability under the model with structural parameters given
by θ “ pθ1, θ´1q, and hp¨q is a vector-valued instrument function that converts to
unconditional moments. In practice, the conditional probability can be simulated
due to Assumption 3.3. For inference, they propose to use the parametric bootstrap.
For the SMM estimator to have a normal limit, a key property to verify is a central
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limit theorem for the moments themselves (this is assumption (d) of the authors’ The-
orem B.1). Xu and Lee (2015) establish a CLT for the moments by invoking a CLT for
near-epoch dependent data due to Jenish and Prucha (2012). Using our CLT instead
requires significantly weaker restrictions on the network formation model.6 Addition-
ally, our CLT applies to other network moments that can be used for estimation,
such as subnetwork moments. Finally, our results enable the use of HAC variance
estimators for inference. This consists of taking the usual GMM sandwich formula
but replacing the sample variance of the moments in the middle of the sandwich with
one of our HAC estimators.
For our CLT to apply to these moments, we need to verifyK-locality (Assumption 2.2).
This holds, for example, under the restriction
hpXi, X´i, Ai, A´iq “ hpXi, XN´
A
pi,1q, Aiq,
in which case Assumption 2.2 is satisfied for K “ 1. The restriction states that
the instruments only depend on the observed types and links involving neighbors
of i. In their simulation study, Xu and Lee (2015) choose hpXi, X´i, Ai, A´iq “
p1, Xi,
ř
j‰iAijXj{
ř
j‰iAijq, which satisfies this condition. This choice is likely mo-
tivated by the intuition in Bramoullé et al. (2009) that the average covariates of peers
is an instrument for the endogenous peer effect.
3.1.2 Set Inference
Without imposing restrictions on equilibrium selection, θ is typically partially iden-
tified, and the identified set can be characterized in terms of moment inequalities
(Beresteanu et al., 2011; Galichon and Henry, 2011). For discrete games on networks,
Li and Zhao (2016) propose moment inequalities that provide a conservative charac-
terization of the identified set. These are based on subnetwork moments of the form
PpYH “ yH | XH , AHq for H Ď Nn, which gives the conditional joint distribution of
outcomes of agents in H given the subnetwork AH .
The main identification result of Li and Zhao (2016) constructs a function Gp¨q
such that
PpYH “ yH | XH , AHq ´GpyH , XH , AH ; θ0q ď 0 (3.2)
6In particular, we do not require their Assumption 7, which states that if two agents are linked,
then their spatial distance must fall below some universal constant.
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for any yH P t0, 1u|H| when θ0 is the true parameter. The bound Gp¨q can be computed
via simulation, while the conditional probability can be estimated nonparametrically,
provided a law of large numbers holds.
While Li and Zhao (2016) focus on estimation, we next discuss how their bounds
may be used for inference on θ0. Since their bounds come from conditional moment
inequalities, we can apply a procedure due to Andrews and Shi (2013). To correct
for autocorrelation, we need to use the asymptotic version of their test, consisting
of steps 1 and 2 in their section 9, with a valid variance estimator in place of the
sample variance. Asymptotic validity requires a CLT for the network moments, and
our results can be applied for this purpose.
The procedure of Andrews and Shi (2013) first converts to unconditional moment
inequalities by multiplying moments with real-valued instrument functions hpXH , AHq,
which can be done without loss of generality by using a large enough set of functions
(see their section 3.3). Define
mpyH ; θq “ E rp1tYH “ yHu ´GpyH , XH , AH ; θqqhpXH , AHqs .
Then by (3.2), we have mpyH ; θq ď 0 when θ is the true parameter.
Consider the “sample analog” of these moments
mˆpyH ; θq “ 1
n
nÿ
i1“1
¨ ¨ ¨
nÿ
iℓ“1
p1tYH “ yHu ´GpyH , XH , AH ; θqqhpXH , AHq,
whereH “ ti1, . . . , iℓu; see footnote 3 for discussion of the n´1 scaling. Its expectation
is proportional to mpyH ; θq, where the constant of proportionality does not depend
on n or θ. Since AH has finite support, we can consider instrument functions of the
form
hpXH , AHq “ h˜pXHq1tAH “ aHu,
where aH is a network on H .
The sample moments can be rewritten as n´1
ř
i ψi for
ψi “
nÿ
i2“1
¨ ¨ ¨
nÿ
iℓ“1
p1tYH “ yHu ´GpyH , XH , AH ; θqqhkpXH , AHq,
where H “ ti, i2, . . . , iℓu. To apply our CLT, we need to verify Assumption 2.2. If
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we use any subnetwork moment(s) in which aH is a connected network, then the
assumption holds for K “ ℓ.
4 Variance Estimators
We postpone formal conditions for CLTs for the static and dynamic models to §5 and
§6, respectively. This section is concerned with the properties of spatial and network
HAC estimators for the variance Σn in (2.2). The notation used is applicable to
either the static or dynamic model. The first two subsections discuss the validity of
these estimators under first-order stationarity conditions. To our knowledge, such
conditions are always used to establish consistency of HAC estimators in time series
and spatial econometrics. However, they are typically only satisfied in GMM-type
settings and not, for example, in moment inequality models or many nonparametric
models. The third subsection is concerned with inference when first-order stationarity
fails.
4.1 Spatial HAC
The standard spatial HAC estimator is given by
Σˆρ “ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
nÿ
j“1
pψi ´ ψ¯qpψj ´ ψ¯q1Kppρi ´ ρjq{hnq,
where hn P R` is the bandwidth, Kp¨q a real-valued kernel function with domain Rd,
and ψ¯ “ n´1řni“1 ψi, the vector of network moments of interest. In cases where Erψ¯s
is a known constant, for example zero in GMM models, we can replace ψ¯ in the HAC
estimator with this constant. In practice, it is common to use a product kernel, which
has the form
Kppρi ´ ρjq{hnq “
dź
k“1
K˜ppρik ´ ρjk{hnqq,
where d is the dimension of ρi, ρik is the kth component of ρi, and K˜ is a real-
valued kernel function with domain R. A typical choice for K˜p¨q is the Bartlett kernel
K˜pxq “ p1´ |x|q1t|x| ď 1u. For other examples, see e.g. Andrews (1991), p. 821.
In practice, it is best to show robustness of the standard errors across a reasonable
range of bandwidths, as in Conley and Udry (2010). For example, one can recompute
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the HAC estimator for several bandwidth values in a neighborhood of some reference
value. This value may be obtained from domain knowledge, say by examining the dis-
tribution of distances. Alternatively, one can calibrate hn by Monte Carlo simulation
with a parametric submodel. Data-driven choice of hn is an important but difficult
topic for future research and will not be addressed in this paper.
We next study the theoretical properties of Σˆρ. To our knowledge, all existing
results on the validity of HAC estimators, whether for time series, spatial processes,
or network settings, require first-order stationarity (Andrews, 1991; Conley, 1999;
Kojevnikov et al., 2019). In our setting, this corresponds to the following.
Assumption 4.1 (First-Order Stationarity). Erψ1s “ Erψ1 | ρ1s.7
This says that the absolute value of an agent’s position is mean independent of her
agent statistic. Its technical purpose is that the long-run covariance aggregates over
covariances of agents i and j conditional on their positions. This covariance is a func-
tion of Erψi | ρis, which needs to be consistently estimated. Under Assumption 4.1,
this is possible using the sample mean ψ¯.
Example 4.1. Assumption 4.1 typically holds in GMM-type settings. For example,
consider the moments in §3.1.1. We have
Erψi | ρis “ E
“
YihpXi, X´i, Ai, A´iq | ρi
‰´ E“EθrYi |X,AshpXi, X´i, Ai, A´iq | ρis,
(4.1)
where Eθr¨s is the expectation under the model with structural parameters given by
θ and Er¨s is the expectation under the true model. Also,
E
“
YihpXi, X´i, Ai, A´iq | ρi
‰ “ E“ErYihpXi, X´i, Ai, A´iq | ρi,X,As | ρi‰
“ E“ErYi | ρi,X,AshpXi, X´i, Ai, A´iq | ρi‰
“ E“ErYi |X,AshpXi, X´i, Ai, A´iq | ρi‰,
where the last line holds if positions only enter payoffs through the network A;
7In spatial econometrics, the usual stationarity condition is that Erψi | ρs does not depend on
i. This is analogous to ours except conditional on the set of positions, since they are treated as
fixed (e.g. Conley, 1999; Jenish, 2016). Our asymptotic results are unconditional, which is why the
assumption is slightly different.
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Assumption 3.3(b) suffices for this. If θ is the true parameter, then ErYi | X,As “
EθrYi | X,As, so (4.1) “ 0 and Assumption 4.1 holds. A similar argument can be
used to verify the assumption for the application in §2.2.1.
Assumption 4.2 (HAC Kernel). Kp0q “ 1; Kpxq “ 0 for all x P Rd such that
‖x‖ ą 1; ş|Kpxq| dx ă 8; K is continuous at zero; and K˚ ” supx|Kpxq| ă 8.
This assumption imposes standard restrictions on the kernel. Now, let λminpMq
denote the smallest eigenvalue of the matrix M and ‖M‖ the max norm of M .
Theorem 4.1. Suppose hn “ Opn1{p3dqq and hn Ñ 8. Under Assumptions 4.1 and
4.2 and the conditions required for a CLT (Theorems 5.1 and 6.1 in the static and
dynamic cases, respectively), ‖Σˆρ´Σ˜n‖ pÝÑ 0 for some sequence of matrices tΣ˜nunPN
such that λminpΣn ´ Σ˜nq ě 0 for all n. If there exists a constant vector c such that
Erψ1s “ c for any n, then Σn “ Σ˜n for all n.
Proof. See §SA.3.1 for the formal proof and a proof sketch.
The second conclusion of the theorem states that Σˆρ is consistent if Erψ1s does not
vary with n. This is satisfied if ψp¨q is a moment function used for GMM estima-
tion, since then Erψ1s “ 0. More generally, if the moment is centered at the right
conditional expectation, usually both Assumption 4.1 and Erψ1s “ c hold. The ap-
plications in §2.2.1 and §3.1.1 are centered.
When moments are not centered, typically Erψ1s varies with n, and the first
conclusion of Theorem 4.1 shows that Σˆρ is asymptotically conservative in this case,
which appears to be a new result. However, this also requires first-order stationarity
to hold, which is often violated when moments are uncentered. In moment inequality
models (§2.2.2 and §3.1.2) and often in nonparametric models, moments are typically
not centered, so the results here are inapplicable. We discuss alternatives in §4.3.
4.2 Network HAC
Next we study the network HAC estimator for Σn used by Acemoglu et al. (2015)
and Eckles et al. (2016). This essentially consists of taking the usual spatial HAC
estimator and replacing spatial distance with path distance. Recall from §1 the defi-
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nition of path distance ℓApi, jq. Let hn P R` be a bandwidth and K : RÑ R a kernel
function. The network HAC estimator is given by
ΣˆA “ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
nÿ
j“1
pψi ´ ψ¯qpψj ´ ψ¯q1KpℓApi, jq{hnq.
For consistency, the bandwidth hn will be required to grow essentially at a logarithmic
rate. In practice, it is best to either show robustness of the standard errors across
a reasonable range of bandwidths in some neighborhood of a reference value, as in
Conley (1999). This value may be obtained from domain knowledge, say by examining
typical path lengths in the network. Another reference value is simply setting hn “
log n, which is used in our simulation study. Finally, one can calibrate hn by Monte
Carlo simulation with a parametric submodel.
The basic idea behind our proof for the validity of the network HAC estimator
is as follows. In our model, agents are homophilous in positions, which implies that
agents that are close in path distance should also be close in spatial distance. This
suggests we can use the former to approximate the latter and expect ΣˆA « Σˆρ.
Remark 4.1 (Related Literature). A recent paper by Kojevnikov et al. (2019) prove
consistency of ΣˆA for the variance of a class of moments satisfying a novel notion
of network weak dependence they call “conditional ψ-weak dependence.” This is a
modification of a concept in the time series literature using path distance in place of
temporal distance. The condition is distinct from stabilization, the weak dependence
conditions used in our CLTs, which do not condition on the network.8 We view these
as complementary contributions, since they consider applications for which stabiliza-
tion cannot be used but do not consider applications to social interactions models.
Additionally, Kojevnikov et al. (2019) impose general conditions on the network struc-
ture without assuming a specific model of network formation. We instead assume a
particular (nonparametric) model of network formation, which enables us to derive
lower-level conditions.
Assumption 4.3 (First-Order Stationarity). Let N be any random variable supported
on the natural numbers, independent of all other primitives. Suppose the number of
8See Appendix SA.7 for the formal stabilization conditions. These are taken from
Leung and Moon (2019), which are, in turn, modifications of assumptions first proposed in the
literature on geometric graphs (Penrose, 2003).
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agents is given by N , and let ψN1 denote agent 1’s statistic (in either the static or
dynamic model), XN “ pXiqNi“1, and AN the network. Then ErψN1 s “ ErψN1 |
XN ,AN , Ns.
The simplest way to understand the assumption is to consider the case where N “ n
a.s., which is the model originally specified in §2 and §3. Then this reduces to Erψ1s “
Erψ1 |X,As, which is analogous to Assumption 4.1. As with the latter assumption,
stationarity is satisfied in GMM-type settings or more generally when moments are
centered at their conditional (on X,A) expectations. This includes the applications
in §2.2.1 and §3.1.1. Whether consistent variance estimators can be obtained when
Assumption 4.3 fails is an open question.
For technical reasons, we need stationarity to hold not only for models where
N “ n but also for N „ Poissonpnq, which is why the statement of Assumption 4.3
is more complicated. This does not seem to rule out any applications of interest.
Similar to the spatial HAC setting, the technical purpose of this assumption is that
the long-run covariance aggregates over the conditional covariances of agents i and
j. Hence, it is a function of Erψi | X,As, which needs to be consistently estimated.
Under Assumption 4.3, this is possible using the sample mean ψ¯.
In order to approximate spatial with path distance, we require the following
intermediate-level condition on the network formation model.
Assumption 4.4 (Path Distance). (a) There exists c ą 0 such that
PpℓApi, jq ą c‖ρi ´ ρj‖ | ℓApi, jq ă 8q “ Opn´3{4q.
(b) For any c ą 0,
lim
ǫÑ8
lim sup
nÑ8
PpℓApi, jq ą ǫ | ℓApi, jq ă 8, ‖ρi ´ ρj‖q1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ă cu “ 0 a.s.
This assumption concerns the relationship between spatial and path distance. Part
(a) states that, for connected agents, their path distance is not asymptotically much
larger than spatial distance with high probability. Part (b) requires the path distance
of connected agents to be asymptotically bounded if their spatial distance is likewise
bounded.
This seems to be a reasonable condition since agents are spatially homophilous, so
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agents that are spatially distant should be similarly distant in the network. However,
verification of this condition is challenging because the relationship between spatial
and path distance is a complicated graph-theoretic problem. To our knowledge, in
random graph theory, the requisite results have only been developed for the random
geometric graph model, which is a widely studied spatial graph model (Penrose, 2003).
In this model, two agents connect if and only if their spatial distance falls below some
fixed threshold. In Appendix SA.2, we draw on recent theoretical results to verify
Assumption 4.4 for this model.
While no corresponding results are presently available for more general spatial
graphs, it seems reasonable to conjecture that Assumption 4.4 holds for the general
class of models in §2.3 under the regularity condition that the linking probability
decays exponentially with distance, a condition we require anyway for a CLT in
Assumption 5.2. The basis of our conjecture is that proving a result under smooth
exponential decay is usually expected once the corresponding result has been proven
for a hard threshold decay, like the random geometric graph. For instance, compare
limit theory forM-dependence, where neighbors beyond distance M are uncorrelated
with the ego, and α-mixing, where the covariance instead may decay smoothly with
distance.
Assumption 4.5 (Network Exogeneity). For any n P N, ε K A |X.
This is another new condition not required by the spatial HAC. In the static case, it
rules out network endogeneity, since A must be independent of unobservables given
observables. Thus, unobserved homophily is not permitted.9 In the dynamic case,
recall that Xi collects the observed covariates and the fixed effects, while εi collects
the idiosyncratic errors. Then Assumption 4.5 implies that the errors are independent
of the network, but network endogeneity is still allowed through dependence between
the fixed effect and the network.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose hn Ñ 8 and log hn{ logn Ñ 0. Under Assumptions 4.2–
4.5 and the conditions required for a CLT (Theorems 5.1 and 6.1 in the static and
dynamic cases, respectively), ‖ΣˆA´Σ˜n‖ pÝÑ 0 for some sequence of matrices tΣ˜nunPN
9The framework of Kojevnikov et al. (2019) also seems to rule out network endogeneity, since er-
rors terms must be weakly dependent conditional on the network. Under endogeneity, the conditional
dependence structure appears very difficult to characterize.
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such that λminpΣn ´ Σ˜nq ě 0 for all n. If there exists a constant vector c such that
Erψ1s “ c for all n, then Σn “ Σ˜n for all n.
Proof. See §SA.3.2 for the formal proof and a proof sketch.
The conclusions are the same as those of Theorem 4.1. When moments are centered,
typically first-order stationarity and Erψ1s “ c hold, in which case the result deliv-
ers consistency. On the other hand, if Erψ1s varies with n, then the estimator is
asymptotically conservative.
Remark 4.2 (Bandwidth Rate). The bandwidth is required to grow at a sub-
polynomial rate, unlike the spatial HAC. Actually, inspection of the proof shows that
the result holds if hn diverges at a rate that is polynomial in n with sufficiently small
degree, but the degree depends on the dimension of ρ1, which is unknown. Thus, a
sub-polynomial rate is the price to pay for not observing positions.
Remark 4.3 (Network Endogeneity). Assumption 4.5 is important to establish Theorem 4.2.
It serves to ensure that disconnected agents are uncorrelated, i.e. Covpψi, ψj |X,Aq “
0 if ℓApi, jq “ 8. If this covariance were non-zero, then the network HAC would be
biased because it cannot account for the covariance between pairs of disconnected
agents, since the kernel weight multiplying pψi ´ ψ¯qpψj ´ ψ¯q1 in ΣˆA would be zero.
It may seem intuitive for this covariance to be zero, and it certainly is true when
the network is exogenous. However, without exogeneity, the problem is that we are
conditioning on the endogenous network A, which can induce nonzero correlation
between the agents.
Remark 4.4 (Positive Semidefiniteness). In our simulation study, ΣˆA is always pos-
itive semidefinite, but in general, this is not guaranteed in finite sample. To ensure
positive semidefiniteness, we can modify the estimator using a correction proposed
by Kojevnikov (2019). Let QnΛnQ
1
n be the eigendecomposition of ΣˆA, c a positive
constant, and In the n ˆ n identity matrix. Define
Σˆ
`
A
” QnmaxtΛn, cInuQ1n,
where “max” refers to the element-wise maximum. Then Σˆ`
A
is positive semidefinite
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because the smallest eigenvalue is at least c ą 0 by construction. Consistency requires
cÑ 0 as nÑ8 (see the proof of Proposition B.2 in Kojevnikov, 2019). In practice,
we might choose, say, c “ 0.1.
4.3 Inference Without Stationarity
The theorems in the previous subsections justify the use of HAC estimators in GMM-
type applications, such as §2.2.1 and §3.1.1, or more generally, settings where the
moments are centered at the right conditional expectations. However, there are im-
portant settings where moments are uncentered, for example moment inequality mod-
els, which include the applications in §2.2.2 and §3.1.2. Another application in which
moments may be uncentered is nonparametric inference, for example, on the condi-
tional choice probability ErY1 | X1s, or other such moments.
We next discuss two ways in which nonstationarity can be addressed. First, we
note that the generalized spatial HAC proposed by Leung and Moon (2019) can be
applied to our setting, an estimator that is consistent when both Assumption 4.1
and Erψ1s “ c fail to hold. Second, we derive new general (albeit strong) sufficient
conditions under which arbitrary moments (whether centered or not) obey spatial
first-order stationarity asymptotically. Combined with Theorem 4.1, the latter result
enables the use of the spatial HAC in a larger set of environments, with the caveat
that it is conservative rather than consistent (since Erψ1s will typically vary with n).
We are unable to prove corresponding results for the network HAC, since it appears
difficult to derive general sufficient conditions for an asymptotic version of stationarity
(Assumption 4.3) outside of GMM-type models.
Generalized Spatial HAC. In settings where Assumption 4.1 fails to hold, we
can use the generalized spatial HAC estimator proposed in §6.1 of Leung and Moon
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(2019). This is given by
σˆ2 ´ αˆαˆ1, where (4.2)
σˆ2 “ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
ψiψ
1
i `
1
n
nÿ
i“1
ÿ
j‰i
`
ξiξj ´ θˆpρiqθˆpρjq
˘
K ppρi ´ ρjq{hnq ,
αˆ “ ψ¯ ` 1
n
nÿ
i“1
ÿ
j‰i
`
ψi ´ θˆpρiq
˘
Kppρi ´ ρjq{hnq, and
θˆppq “
řn
i“1 ψiK˜pn´1{dpp´ ρjq{bnqřn
i“1 K˜pn´1{dpp´ ρjq{bnq
,
where K˜p¨q is a kernel function and bn a bandwidth for the kernel estimator θˆpρ1q
of Erψ1 | ρ1s. Thus, we avoid having to impose stationarity because we estimate
Erψ1 | ρ1s directly, nonparametrically. Consistency of the generalized spatial HAC
requires hdn “ Opn1{4q, hn Ñ 8, and θˆppq to be uniformly consistent and converging
faster than the n´1{4 rate, as usual. Under these requirements and high-level stabi-
lization conditions, Leung and Moon (2019) prove consistency. Our CLTs verify these
conditions and hence imply consistency for social interactions models.
Remark 4.5. This estimator differs slightly from Leung and Moon (2019) due to
the n´1{d scaling in θˆp¨q and the rate condition on hn. The scaling addresses the
problem that we want to estimate Erψ1 | ρ1s by averaging over the agent statistics
of agents with positions near ρ1. However, positions are drifting apart as n diverges,
since ρi “ ωnρ˜i. Fortunately, since ωn drifts at rate n1{d, we can simply scale down
positions by this rate, converting ρi to ρ˜i{κ1{d, the latter of which has bounded support
and does not depend on n. The bandwidth hn has a different rate because, in this
paper, we model positions as ωnρ˜i, whereas they model positions as simply ρ˜i, which
may be more reasonable when agents are closely located in space. This modification
has no effect on the consistency proof, since the required high-level conditions (stated
in Appendix SA.7 and verified in our CLTs) are the same as those of Leung and Moon
(2019) except we change positions from tρ˜iuni“1 to tωnρ˜iuni“1.
Asymptotic Stationarity. We next provide general sufficient conditions applicable
to any network moment under which it asymptotically satisfies first-order stationarity,
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i.e. |Erψ1s ´Erψ1 | ρ1 “ ωnps| “ opn´1{3q for any p.10 The conditions are strong, but
they are useful for understanding what widely used stationarity conditions essentially
require when moments are not centered. Recall the definition of Zi from §5.1 in the
static setting and §2.4 in the dynamic setting.
Assumption 4.6. (a) Z1 K ρ1. (b) f is the uniform distribution on some bounded
subset of Rd for which the origin is an interior point.
Part (a) says that positions are independent of all other attributes, and (b) implies
that agents are not more clustered in some regions of space than others.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose the CLT assumptions hold (Theorems 5.1 and 6.1 in the static
and dynamic cases, respectively). Under Assumption 4.6, there exists a sequence of
constants tcnunPN such that |Erψ1 | ρ1 “ ωnps ´ cn| “ opn´1{3q for any p P supppfq.
Proof. See Appendix SA.4.
Combined with Theorem 4.1, this establishes that the spatial HAC is asymptotically
conservative for any network moment under Assumption 4.6.
The remainder of this subsection discusses Assumption 4.6. Certainly it is a strong
condition, but it clarifies what stationarity generally demands in spatial settings when
moments are uncentered. The reason we need (b) is that, if some subset of supppfq
had higher density, then agents positioned in that region would tend to have higher
degrees because there are more nearby alters in that region, as well. Hence, degree
would not be mean-independent of position, and we would expect other network
statistics to similarly depend on an agent’s position. We need (a) for the same reason;
if an agent’s position were correlated with some attribute of the agent, then agents
with the right positions would have desirable realizations of the attribute and thus
tend to have high degrees. In either case, the absolute value of an agent’s position
would influence her outcome, whereas, by definition, stationarity demands that only
her relative position matters.
Thus, Assumption 4.6 implies that positions play no role in degree heterogeneity.
By this we mean the following. In general from specification (2.3), variation in µi
10The proof of Theorem 4.1 uses exact stationarity (Assumption 4.1), but an inspection of the
proof shows that asymptotic first-order stationarity suffices.
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and ρi can increase or decrease i’s degree, but Assumption 4.6 rules out variation
due to ρi. Thus, positions only generate homophily, not heterogeneity in degree. Of
course, µi can still do either. Consequently, under Assumption 4.6, the network can
still be endogenous with respect to the outcome equation due to correlation between
the error in the outcome equation and µi.
5 CLT for the Static Model
In this section, we state formal conditions for a CLT for network moments defined
in §3.1. The first two subsections present and motivate our main conditions for
weak dependence and the third states regularity conditions. The weak dependence
conditions are analogous to those used by Leung and Moon (2019) to prove a CLT for
static models of network formation with strategic interactions. Their proof strategy
is to verify high-level “stabilization” conditions for a normal approximation (their
Theorem C.2) by constructing a dependency neighborhood for each observation, what
they call the relevant set, and then using branching process techniques to bound the
sizes of these neighborhoods. We use the same methodology for both the static and
dynamic model, but the arguments need to be modified for the social interactions
setting.
Additionally, rather than applying their Theorem C.2, we verify the high-level
conditions of our Theorem SA.7.1, which is similar to Theorem C.2 but makes two
modifications. First, we use an increasing domain setup (Assumption 2.3), whereas
Leung and Moon (2019) use a quasi-infill setup (see footnote 1). Second, Theorem
C.2 provides a closed-form expression for the limit variance, whereas our theorem
does not, which allows us to dispense with a high-level continuity condition.
5.1 Strategic Interactions
The first key condition required for a CLT is a restriction on the strength of strategic
interactions. For motivation, consider the standard linear-in-means model as studied
in Bramoullé et al. (2009). The outcome equation is given by
Yi “ α `
ÿ
j
AijYjβ `
ÿ
j
AijX
1
jδ `X 1iγ ` εi,
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where A may be row-normalized. For this model to have a reduced form,
|β|λmaxpAq ă 1, (5.1)
is required, where λmaxpAq is the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix A˜. This
is evidently a restriction on the magnitude of peer effects. It ensures equilibrium
existence and weak dependence.
We impose an assumption analogous to (5.1). While it may appear superficially
more complicated, this is unavoidable due to the nonlinearity of the model. First we
require some definitions. Let
Rci “ 1
"
inf
s
Ups, τiq ď 0X sup
s
Ups, τiq ą 0
*
. (5.2)
The significance of this indicator is that its expectation equals
P
`
sup
s
Ups, τiq ą 0
˘´P` inf
s
Ups, τiq ą 0
˘
, (5.3)
(assuming measurability). This is our analog of β in (5.1). It measures the strength
of strategic interactions, since it corresponds to the average causal effect on choosing
action 1 of changing Si from its “lowest” to its “highest” possible value.
The next assumption imposes a restriction on (5.3) in relation to the network
topology. Recall that i’s position ρi is a subvector of her type τi. Let Zi be the
subvector of τi that omits ρi (so that τi “ pρi, Ziq), dz the dimension of Zi, and
Φp¨ | pq the conditional distribution of Zi given ρi “ p. Define
ϕpp, z; p1, z1q “ E “AijRcj | ρi “ p, Zi “ z, ρj “ p1, Zj “ z1‰ . (5.4)
For any h : Rd ˆ Rdz Ñ R, define the mixed norm
‖h‖m “ sup
pPRd
ˆż
Rdz
hpp, zq2 dΦ˚pzq
˙1{2
,
where Φ˚p¨q is a distribution given in the next assumption. Let f¯ “ suppPRd fppq.
Assumption 5.1 (Strength of Interactions). There exists a distribution Φ˚p¨q on Rdz
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such that, for any p, p1 P Rd and z P Rdz ,
ż
Rdz
ϕpp, z; p1, z1q dΦpz1 | p1q ď
ż
Rdz
ϕpp, z; p1, z1q dΦ˚pz1q.
Furthermore,
‖h‖m ă 1 for hpp, zq ” κf¯
ż
Rd
ˆż
Rdz
ϕpp, z; p1, z1q2 dΦ˚pz1q
˙1{2
dp1.
The first part of the assumption is a regularity condition on the conditional distri-
bution of Zi. The substantive requirement is ‖h‖m ă 1. To see how this assumption
restricts (5.3), note that, for any n,
E
«ÿ
j‰i
AijR
c
j
ˇˇˇ
ˇZi “ z, ρi “ ωnp
ff
ď κf¯
ż
Rd
ż
Rdz
ϕpp, z; p1, z1q dΦ˚pz1qdp1, (5.5)
using a change of variables and the fact that nω´dn “ κ. Clearly ‖h‖m is an upper
bound on the right-hand side, so a necessary condition for Assumption 5.1 is that
the left-hand side is strictly less than one. The interpretation of the left-hand side
becomes clearer in the special case where the network is exogenous in the sense that
Aij K Rcj . Then ‖h‖m ă 1 implies„
P
`
sup
s
Ups, τjq ą 0
˘´P` inf
s
Ups, τjq ą 0
˘
ErAijs ă 1 (5.6)
for any n, since the left-hand side of (5.5) equals the expectation of the left-hand side
of (5.6). This is transparently a restriction on the strength of strategic interactions,
requiring it to be bounded below the inverse of the expected degree. The intuition is
that, when mean degree is higher, an agent’s action can impact more neighbors, so
weak dependence requires weaker strategic interactions.
To see more clearly how (5.6) compares with (5.1), note that λmaxpAq ď maxi
ř
j Aij .
Hence, a sufficient condition is
|β|max
i
ÿ
j
Aij ă 1,
which has precisely the form of (5.6). Whether A is row-normalized, our condi-
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tion and (5.1) have similar behavioral implications, as discussed in Remark A.1 of
Leung (2019a). Finally, it should be noted that both (5.1) and Assumption 5.1 are
restrictions on the effect of Si on Yi only in a partial-equilibrium sense. The general
equilibrium effect can be substantially larger, as seen in the simulation study of Leung
(2019b) in the context of network formation.
Conditions similar to Assumption 5.1 have been utilized by Xu and Lee (2015)
and Xu (2018) for social interactions models. Leung (2019b) and Menzel (2015b)
use analogous conditions for weak dependence in network formation and matching
models, respectively. The former paper discusses similarities between this condition
and related assumptions for temporal and spatial autoregressive models.
5.2 Equilibrium Selection
Whereas in the linear-in-means model, (5.1) is enough to guarantee equilibrium
uniqueness, in our setting multiple equilibria are possible under Assumption 5.1. By
Assumption 3.2, the selection mechanism λp¨q can be any function of A and τ , which
can potentially induce strong dependence between the outcomes of agents distant in
the network. For this reason, we require a restriction on λp¨q for weak dependence.
We leave the formal statement of the assumption to Appendix SA.1. Our goals here
are (1) to motivate why a restriction is needed and (2) note that the assumption
is satisfied under variants of myopic best-response dynamics, such as those used to
define the dynamic model.
To illustrate why we need to restrict λp¨q, let us take an extreme example. Sup-
pose types are realized such that A has two components (disconnected subnetworks).
By definition, agents in separate components are infinitely far apart in terms of path
distance. Under Assumption 3.1, the set of Nash equilibria for the full game is the
Cartesian product of the set Nash equilibria on each component alone, since payoffs
in one component do not depend on actions in the other component. In this respect,
they appear to be two separate games. Nonetheless, it is easy to construct examples
of λp¨q such that the realization of equilibria is correlated between components. For
example, suppose types are realized such that there are two possible equilibria in each
component. Consider an equilibrium selection mechanism that chooses one equilib-
rium over the other in each component, depending on the realization of agent 1’s
type τ1. Then the same underlying random vector determines equilibrium selection
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in both components, so their outcomes are correlated. In the cross-sectional setting,
this problem is analogous to having a selection mechanism simultaneously determine
equilibrium realizations across a set of distinct games, a scenario implicitly ruled
out when researchers assume separate realizations of the same game are independent
(Epstein et al., 2016).
In the previous example, all agents effectively coordinate on equilibria accord-
ing to the realization of a common signal τ1. For weak dependence, we must rule
out coordination between “distant” agents. In order to formalize what we mean by
“distant” and state the required condition (Assumption SA.1.1), we need several new
definitions that have to be motivated at length, which we defer to Appendix SA.1.
In brief, the basic idea of the condition is to only allow agents within certain sub-
network neighborhoods to coordinate on their equilibrium actions. Such a restriction
holds under variants of myopic best-response dynamics. This is an interesting class of
selection mechanisms to consider because they are widely used in theoretical work to
model diffusion, as discussed in §2, and they define the other of our main applications,
the dynamic model.
To define these dynamics more formally, suppose an initial vector of outcomes Y 0
is chosen randomly, and then agents iteratively best-respond according to Example 3.2
until convergence. Under a game of strategic complements, the process necessarily
converges to a Nash equilibrium (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Otherwise, conver-
gence requires Y 0 to lie along an improving path (Jackson and Watts, 2002). In ei-
ther case, this constitutes a selection mechanism because it maps pA, τ q to a unique
Nash equilibrium.
5.3 Regularity Conditions
We next formalize the sequence of models along which we take limits. Similar to §2.4,
the static model is given by the tuple
pU, λ, V,ρ,Z, ζq, (5.7)
where Up¨q is the payoff function in (3.1), λp¨q the equilibrium selection mechanism
given in Assumption 3.2, V p¨q the latent index in the network formation model (2.3),
ρ “ pρiqni“1, Z “ pZiqni“1 with Zi defined prior to Assumption 5.1, and ζ is the matrix
of ζij’s. We can then directly import Assumption 2.3 using this new notation.
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Several regularity conditions are used to establish the CLT. The first imposes a
restriction on the network formation model, requiring the linking probability to decay
exponentially quickly in spatial distance. Exponential decay is useful for a CLT in the
same way that mixing coefficients are usually required to tend to zero with distance
at an exponential rate.
Assumption 5.2 (Network Formation).
(a) There exists pµ¯, µ¯1q such that V pδ, µ, µ1, ζq ď V pδ, µ¯, µ¯1, ζq for any δ P R`, and
pµ, µ1, ζq P suppppµi, µj, ζijqq.
(b) supppζijq Ď R, and for any δ, µ, µ1, V pδ, µ, µ1, ¨q is strictly monotonic.
(c) Let V˜ ´1pr, ¨q be the inverse of V pr, µ¯, µ¯1, ¨q. There exist c1, c2 ą 0 such that
Φ˜ζ
´
V˜ ´1pr, 0q
¯
ď c1e´c2r,
where Φ˜ζp¨q denotes the complementary CDF of ζij.
Parts (a) and (b) are common regularity conditions; (a) says the µi’s have a bounded
impact on the latent index V p¨q. Part (c) is the main restriction, which limits the
nonlinearity of V p¨q and the tail mass of the distribution of ζij. It holds, for example,
if V p¨q is linear in its arguments and ζij has exponential tails. Note that PpAij “ 1 |
δij “ rq ď Φ˜ζpV˜ ´1pr, 0qq. Hence, part (c) implies that connection probabilities are
exponentially decaying with distance. This is a typical requirement in latent space
models (Breza et al., 2017; Hoff et al., 2002).
Remark 5.1 (Sparsity). Under the increasing domain asymptotics of Assumption 2.3,
the previous assumption implies that the observed network is sparse in the sense that
the expected number of links involving any arbitrary agent is Op1q.11 This is a com-
monly used definition of network sparsity that captures the stylized fact that, in most
real world social networks, the number of connections involving the typical agent is
small relative to the network size (Chandrasekhar, 2016).
11The expected number of links is Er
ř
j Aijs ď nErAijs ď nErΦ˜ζpV˜
´1pωn‖ρ˜i ´ ρ˜j‖, 0qs ď
κf¯C
ş
rě0
c1e
´c2r dr “ Op1q for some constant C that appears from a change of variables to hy-
perspherical coordinates..
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For the next assumption, define
T “ tpp, zq : p P Rd, z P supppΦp¨ | pqqu. (5.8)
Assumption 5.3 (Non-Degeneracy). Either ϕpp, z; p1, z1q “ 0 for any pp, z, p1, z1q, or
for Φ˚p¨q defined in Assumption 5.1,
inf
pp,zqPT
ż
Rd
ż
Rdz
ϕpp, z; p1, z1q dΦ˚pz1q dp1 ą 0.
If ϕpp, z; p1, z1q “ 0 everywhere, then this simply means there are no strategic inter-
actions, which is the uninteresting case. To interpret the other case, note that when
the network is exogenous, so that Rci K A, then by (5.5),
κf¯
ż
Rd
ż
Rdz
ϕpp, z; p1, z1q dΦ˚pz1q
ě ErRci | Zi “ z, ρi “ ωnpsE
«ÿ
j
Aij
ˇˇˇ
ˇZi “ z, ρi “ ωnp
ff
.
Hence, a sufficient condition is for the infimum of the right-hand side to be strictly
positive. Note that if interactions exist, then necessarily ErRci s ą 0, so the sufficient
condition strengthens this slightly by requiring it to hold conditional on type, for
all types. Additionally, it requires a non-degenerate network in the sense that the
limiting expected degree of any agent, conditional on their type, is positive.
For the last regularity condition, let ρm “ pρiqm`2i“1 , tHnunPN be a sequence of
subsets of Rd, and ψmi pHnq be i’s agent statistic under a modified version of model
(5.7) where instead of ρ as our set of positions, we instead have pρiqm`2i“1 XHn.12 The
original model is a special case where m “ n´ 2 and Hn “ Rd for all n.
Assumption 5.4 (Bounded Moments). (a) There exists a finite constant C such
that Er|ψm
1
pHnq|8 | X1 “ x,X2 “ ys ă C for any n sufficiently large, m P rn{2, 3n{2s,
x, y P Rd, and sequence of subsets tHnunPN of Rd. (b) There exists c ě 0 such that
|ψm1 pHnq| ď cmc a.s. for any m,n P N.
12To be clear, the modified model is the same as the original model, except we draw types as
follows. First, we generate the set of positions pρiq
m`2
i“1 X Hn. Then independently across each
element ρj in this set, we draw Zj from Φp¨ | ρjq. Assumption SA.5.1 in the appendix is the same as
Assumption 5.4 but with the formal data-generating process completely spelled out.
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Part (b) says that agent statistics are uniformly bounded by a polynomial in the
network size. This is easily satisfied by the moments in §3.1.1 and §3.1.2 if in-
strument functions are uniformly bounded. Part (a) essentially requires uniformly
bounded 8th moments for agent statistics but is slightly stronger for technical reasons.
Many of the moments in the applications are uniformly bounded, including §2.2.1 and
2.2.2, in which case part (a) is automatic. For subnetwork moments (used in §3.1.2),
Assumption SA.5.1 holds under Assumption 5.2 by Lemma I.17 of Leung and Moon
(2019).
5.4 Main Result
Before stating the main result, we need some additional notation. Let ψn`1i be i’s
agent statistic in a model with n ` 1 agents. Consider counterfactually removing
agent n` 1 from the model, and let A´ and τ´ be the network and type vector with
agent n ` 1 removed. Let Y ´ “ λpA´, τ´q be the equilibrium outcome vector in
the resulting model with the remaining n agents. Let ψ
´pn`1q
i be i’s agent statistic
constructed from pY ´,A´, τ´q. Define the add-one cost Ξn “ ψn`1n`1 `
řn
i“1pψn`1i ´
ψ
´pn`1q
i q, which is the total change in the sum of all agent statistics from adding a
single agent n`1. Let Σn “ Varpn´1{2
řn
i“1 ψiq and Im be the mˆm identity matrix.
Recall that λminpΣnq denotes the smallest eigenvalue of Σn. Finally, recall that agent
statistics are vectors of dimension m.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose c1Ξn is asymptotically non-degenerate for any c P Rmzt0u.
Also suppose the model satisfies Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, weak dependence conditions
(Assumptions 5.1 and SA.1.1), and regularity conditions (Assumptions 5.2–5.4). If
ψp¨q satisfies Assumption 2.2, then as nÑ8,
1?
n
nÿ
i“1
Σ
´1{2
n pψi ´ Erψisq dÝÑ N p0, Imq and lim inf
nÑ8
λminpΣnq ą 0
under the sequence given in Assumption 2.3.
Proof. See Appendix SA.5 for the formal proof and a proof sketch.
Assumption SA.1.1 is discussed in §5.2 and Appendix SA.1. Non-degeneracy of the
add-one cost essentially just requires a non-trivial choice of agent statistics. When
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agent n ` 1 is added to the model, the “direct effect” on the total statistic is that it
increases by the value of her agent statistic ψn`1n`1, which should be non-degenerate.
However this also has an “indirect effect” on the statistics of other agents i given
by ψn`1i ´ ψ´pn`1qi , for example due to strategic interactions. Non-degeneracy would
fail, for instance, if the direct and indirect effects exactly cancel, which is unlikely to
happen for non-trivial statistics.
6 CLT for the Dynamic Model
We first formalize the model for the initial conditions Y 0 “ pY 0i qni“1. This is simply
given by the static model in §3. That is, agents choose their period-0 actions best-
responding to the contemporaneous actions of her peers in that period. We view this
as an approximation of the long-run outcome of the dynamic model (cf. §5.2). Define
τ 0 “ pτ 0i qni“1. Let U0p¨q be the payoff function in period 0, which may potentially
differ from Up¨q, and let S0p¨q be the analog of Sp¨q (statistics that capture strategic
interactions). Let EpA, τ 0q be the set of outcomes Y 0 such that each component Y 0i
satisfies
Y 0i “ 1
 
U0pS0i , τ 0i q ą 0
(
for S0i ” S0pY 0´i, τ 0i , τ 0´i, Ai, A´iq. (6.1)
Assumption 6.1 (Initial Condition). (a) |EpA, τ 0q| ě 1. (b) There exists a function
λpA, τ 0q with range EpA, τ 0q such that the realized initial condition satisfies Y 0 “
λpA, τ 0q.
This is just a restatement of Assumption 3.2 with period-0 types.
Define the add-one cost analogously to §5.4: Ξn “ ψn`1n`1 `
řn
i“1pψn`1i ´ ψ´pn`1qi q,
which is the total change in the sum of all agent statistics from removing a single
agent n ` 1. Also recall that Σn “ Varpn´1{2
řn
i“1 ψiq and Im is the mˆm identity
matrix.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose c1Ξn is asymptotically non-degenerate for any c P Rmzt0u.
Also suppose
• the best-response model satisfies Assumption 2.1,
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• the initial conditions model defined in Assumption 6.1 satisfies Assumptions
3.1, 5.1, 5.3, and SA.1.1, using U0p¨q, S0p¨q in place of Up¨q, Sp¨q, and
• regularity conditions (Assumptions 5.2 and 5.4) hold.
If ψp¨q satisfies Assumption 2.2, then as nÑ8,
1?
n
nÿ
i“1
Σ
´1{2
n pψi ´ Erψisq dÝÑ N p0, Imq and lim inf
nÑ8
λminpΣnq ą 0
under the sequence given in Assumption 2.3.
Proof. See Appendix SA.6.
The assumptions imposed on the initial conditions model are the same as those im-
posed on the static model for a CLT. Primitive sufficient conditions for Assumption 5.4
are discussed following its statement in §5.3. As in the static case, non-degeneracy of
the add-one cost essentially just requires that the choice of ψp¨q is nontrivial; see the
discussion following the statement of Theorem 5.1.
7 Numerical Illustrations
This section illustrates the performance of the HAC estimators in an empirical appli-
cation and simulation study.
7.1 Empirical Application
We revisit the study of Conley and Udry (2010) on the diffusion of an agricultural
technology through a network of farmers. They show that as farmers learn to use a
new technology (pineapple production), they respond to information from their social
contacts. In particular, they find that when the returns from a network neighbor’s
crop yields are above or below expectation, they adjust their agricultural inputs
accordingly. Their main specifications are logistic models of the probability that a
farmer’s agricultural inputs change in response to the shares of network neighbors
with above- or below-expectation yields in the previous period.
We replicate Table 4, column B of their paper. The outcome is an indicator for
whether farmer i adjusts her inputs in period t. There are four main regressors of
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interest comprising Sti , which are the share of good / bad news events from network
neighbors who choose the same / different inputs as farmer i last period. We include
the same controls in their specification, including a full set of village and planting
round dummies.
The authors use a spatial HAC estimator out of concern for potential spatial
autocorrelation in the errors. Our theoretical results show that the estimator also
accounts for forms of network autocorrelation. If spatial positions are unavailable,
our theory shows that the network HAC can be used instead.
Table 1 reports point estimates and spatial and network HAC standard errors
for a range of bandwidths using the Bartlett kernel. The four main regressors of
interest correspond to the first four rows in the table. The remaining rows are control
variables. Conley and Udry (2010) use a bandwidth of 1500 and say that the results
are similar for 1000 and 2000. This is replicated in our table. The path distances used
in the network HAC are obtained from the data on farmers’ advice networks used to
construct the main regressors. Across the three villages, average path distance ranges
from about 0.5 to 2 and the maximum distance from 3 to 8, so we report bandwidth
values in the range of 0 to 3.
From the table, we see that the results are not generally sensitive to bandwidth
choice for positive values of the bandwidth. The table shows that spatial and network
standard errors are similar, which is consistent with our theory. For comparison, we
report a bandwidth of zero, which corresponds to i.i.d. standard errors. Depending on
the coefficient, these standard errors can be conservative or anti-conservative relative
to the HAC standard errors.
7.2 Monte Carlo
We simulate a dynamic probit model with two periods and period-1 payoffs given by
UpS1i , τ 1i q “ β1 ` β2X1i ` β3
ř
j AijY
0
jř
j Aij
` ν1i ,
where νti „ N p0, 1q. To estimate the model, we use a standard probit regression. As
discussed in §2.2.1, to account for autocorrelation in the errors and regressors, we
estimate the variance using the sandwich formula H´1SH´1, where H is the Hessian
and S is a HAC estimate of the variance of the scores.
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Table 1: Application Results
Spatial HAC Network HAC
βˆ 1000 1500 2000 0 1 2 3
success -0.084 1.033 0.947 0.841 0.980 1.000 0.921 0.822
awaysuccess 1.637 0.797 0.781 0.736 0.968 0.789 0.782 0.738
failure 4.322 1.910 1.934 1.922 1.758 1.963 1.995 2.021
awayfailure -5.898 2.695 2.566 2.476 2.374 2.583 2.518 2.361
geoabsx 0.146 0.080 0.070 0.065 0.091 0.092 0.078 0.071
new 1.973 0.938 0.885 0.822 0.869 0.978 0.811 0.778
exten -1.345 0.667 0.672 0.693 0.695 0.837 0.882 0.865
wealth 0.182 0.131 0.133 0.137 0.137 0.136 0.142 0.142
abu1 1.592 1.081 1.098 1.151 0.933 1.207 1.242 1.275
abu2 2.145 1.298 1.228 1.257 1.030 1.406 1.258 1.211
rpent -0.286 0.836 0.734 0.687 0.808 1.042 0.763 0.565
n “ 107. Parameters are listed in the same order as Table 4 of Conley and Udry (2010).
The second column displays point estimates of the logit regression. The remaining
columns to the right display standard errors. The “Spatial” (“Network”) columns report
standard errors using the spatial (network) HAC estimator with the indicated bandwidths.
Village and planting round dummies are included but not reported.
We are faced with the task of generating network autocorrelation in the errors
while still maintaining the assumption of standard normal marginals, so that the
probit can be used for estimation. Toward this end, we use the following modification
of Example 2.1:
νti “ ωi
˜ř
j Aijε
t
jř
j Aij
` εti
¸
,
where εti
iid„ N p0, 1q and ωi is a constant. The first term is the average error of net-
work neighbors, which captures exogenous peer effects in unobservables and generates
autocorrelation. We choose the weight to ensure standard normal marginals for νti :
ωi “ p1` p
ř
j Aijq´1q´1{2.
Let covariates follow an AR(1) model X1i “ 0.5X0i ` uti, where uti iid„ N p0, 1q and
X0i
iid„ expp1q. We set the true β to p0.5,´0.3, 1q. Initial conditions Y 0i are given by
the same outcome model as period 1, except we set β3 to zero and replace period-1
types pX1i , ε1i q with period-0 types pX0i , ε0i q. To generate the network, we use the
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random geometric graph model
Aij “ 1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď 1u1ti ‰ ju.
Recall from §2.4 that positions are given by ρi “ ωnρ˜i. We draw ρ˜i iid„ Upr0, 1s2q
and set the scaling factor ωn to pn{p5πqq1{2. This choice of ωn ensures that the
limiting expected degree is five, which generates a giant component (Penrose, 2003).
Additionally, this model clearly induces geographic homophily, and as a consequence
A typically has a high clustering coefficient. All of these are well-known to be realistic
network features (Barabási, 2015).
We compute standard errors four different ways. The first three use HAC estima-
tors, all with the Bartlett kernel. For the standard spatial HAC, we set hn “ n1{p3dq
(here d “ 2), and for the network HAC, hn “ log n. The third uses the generalized
spatial HAC from §4.3, for which we set hn “ n1{p4dq. For θˆpxq in the generalized spa-
tial HAC, we use a kernel estimator and choose bn “ plogn{nq1{p2p`dq for smoothness
p “ d{2 ` 1, which achieves a n´1{4 uniform convergence rate in the i.i.d. case. The
fourth way of computing standard errors, which we term “oracle” standard errors, is
by simulating the true variance of the probit estimator using 7500 simulation draws.
This is used to assess the quality of the HAC estimators and our CLT.
We report results for n “ 500, 1k, 2k. The point estimates are all extremely close
to the truth on average for all sample sizes. Table 2 displays standard errors, averaged
across 15,000 simulations. Column “GS HAC” corresponds to the generalized spatial
HAC. The table shows that all HAC standard errors are quite close on average to
the target oracle standard errors. They can be slightly anti-conservative in smaller
samples, which is a common issue with HAC estimators.
Table 3 reports rejection percentages from two-sided t-tests at the 5 percent level
of the null hypothesis that β equals its true value, using the previous standard errors.
The oracle standard errors control size well across all sample sizes, which illustrates
the accuracy of the normal approximation. For the spatial and network HAC, rejec-
tion rates are fairly close to the nominal level, although there is a tendency toward
overrejection. The network HAC happens to perform the best, while the generalized
spatial HAC has the greatest tendency to overreject. The spatial HAC has better
performance than the latter, at least when first-order stationarity holds. However,
the story will be different when stationarity fails, as we will see below. While the
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network and generalized spatial HAC are not guaranteed to be positive definite in
finite samples, they are positive definite in all of our simulation draws. Finally, the
third column, labeled “Naive,” reports t-tests computed using i.i.d. standard errors,
and we see that rejection rates can be many times higher than the nominal level.
Table 2: Probit: Standard Errors
Spatial HAC Network HAC GS HAC Oracle
500 1k 2k 500 1k 2k 500 1k 2k 500 1k 2k
β1 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.18 0.13 0.09
β2 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.03
β3 0.26 0.19 0.14 0.27 0.19 0.14 0.26 0.18 0.13 0.30 0.20 0.15
Cells are averages over 15k simulations. “GS HAC” corresponds to the generalized spatial
HAC and “Oracle” to true standard errors (obtained by simulation).
Table 3: Probit: Rejection Percentages for Two-Sided t-Test
Spatial HAC Network HAC GS HAC Oracle Naive
500 1k 2k 500 1k 2k 500 1k 2k 500 1k 2k 500 1k 2k
β1 8.0 7.1 6.9 7.5 6.5 6.3 8.4 7.6 7.3 5.0 5.2 4.9 14.6 14.1 14.7
β2 6.0 5.5 5.2 6.3 5.6 5.3 6.0 5.5 5.1 5.0 4.7 4.9 5.3 5.2 5.2
β3 7.8 7.1 6.8 7.3 6.6 6.3 8.2 7.5 7.2 4.8 5.3 4.9 13.6 13.9 13.7
Rejection percentages for two-sided t-tests at the 5% level, obtained from 15k simulations. “GS
HAC” corresponds to the generalized spatial HAC, “Oracle” to true standard errors (obtained
by simulation), and “Naive” to i.i.d. standard errors.
The moments used in pseudo-maximum likelihood are centered, since they are
conditionally mean zero. Hence, by Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, the HAC estimators are
asymptotically exact, as confirmed by the probit results. We next report results for
the weighted average period-1 outcome n´1
ř
i Y
1
i X
1
i , which is generated from the
same data-generating process as the previous tables. This is clearly not centered and
not first-order stationary. However, an asymptotic analog of Assumption 4.1 does
hold by Theorem 4.3. Thus, our results predict that the spatial HAC is conservative
while the generalized spatial HAC is exact. We have no predictions for the network
HAC.
Table 4 displays standard errors and rejection percentages for the level-5% two-
sided t-test of the null that ErY 1i s equals its true value. The true value is computed
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from 7500 simulation draws, and the values displayed in the table are averages over
15,000 separate simulation draws. “Oracle” standard errors are obtained by simulating
the variance of n´1
ř
i Y
1
i X
1
i from 7500 separate simulation draws.
From the table, we see that both the spatial and network HAC SEs are quite
conservative, being about twice as large as the oracle SEs. In contrast, the general-
ized spatial HAC SEs produce rejection percentages close to the nominal level. The
network HAC is also asymptotically conservative and comparable to the spatial HAC.
This is interesting because network first-order stationarity (Assumption 4.3) does not
apparently hold, so this is a case not covered by our theory.
Table 4: Weighted Outcome: Rejection Percentages and Standard Errors
Spatial HAC Network HAC GS HAC Oracle
Reject % 1.34 0.57 0.27 1.08 0.37 0.17 6.31 5.81 5.35 4.81 4.95 4.49
SE 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02
First row displays rejection percentages for two-sided t-tests at the 5% level. Second row displays
standard errors. Results obtained from 15k simulations. “GS HAC” corresponds to the generalized
spatial HAC and “Oracle” to true standard errors (obtained by simulation).
8 Conclusion
The increasing availability of network data has enabled researchers to better study
heterogeneous interactions and subject to empirical inquiry a large body of theoretical
work on the impact of network topology on the diffusion of behaviors, products, and
information (Jackson et al., 2017). The central challenge of drawing valid inference
from network data is that it typically consists of autocorrelated observations from a
single large network. This is an inherent problem in models with social interactions,
since by definition, an agent’s outcome is a function of her neighbors’. Consequently,
standard procedures that assume i.i.d. data can produce highly misleading inference.
In the context of discrete choice models, we show that spatial and network HAC
estimators can be used to correct for network autocorrelation. In an empirical appli-
cation to Conley and Udry (2010), the spatial and network HAC estimators deliver
similar results, which supports the theory. Our simulation study illustrates the po-
tential for naive i.i.d. standard errors to be highly anti-conservative and demonstrates
the accuracy of the normal approximation and HAC estimators.
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Our main technical results are CLTs for static and dynamic models of social in-
teractions and consistency results for the HAC estimators. In the existing literature,
first-order stationarity conditions are always required for HAC estimators to approx-
imate the variance. We also provide results for the spatial HAC in settings where
stationarity fails to hold, which include models defined by moment inequalities and
many nonparametric models. For the network HAC, its validity when first-order sta-
tionarity fails is an open question. The advantage of the network HAC is that it does
not require additional information on spatial/social positions. On the other hand, for
it to be valid in static models, we require the network to be exogenous (orthogonal to
the errors in the outcome model), whereas no such assumption is needed for the spa-
tial HAC. When exogeneity fails, the dependence structure of the data conditional
on the network is difficult to characterize, and it is an open question whether the
network HAC is valid in this setting.
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Supplemental Appendix
SA.1 Decentralized Selection
This section states a restriction on the selection mechanism referenced in §5.2 that is
used to prove the CLTs. Recall from (5.2) the definition of the indicator Rcj . Define
an artificial directed network D on Nn such that Dij “ AijRcj . Let Ci be the strongly
connected component of D that contains agent i.13 Define i’s strategic neighborhood
as
C`i ” CiY
"
k P Nn : max
kPCi
Ajkp1´Rciq “ 1
*
. (SA.1.1)
This adds to Ci the set of agents k linked to a member of Ci such that either
infs Ups,Xk, εkq ą 0 or sups Ups,Xk, εiq ď 0. These are agents that choose action
1 or 0, respectively, regardless of the choices of other agents in the network. Let
C` “ tC`i : i P Nnu be the collection of strategic neighborhoods. (In fact this is the
set of weakly connected components of D.)
If C` is a strategic neighborhood, under Assumption 3.1, it has the unique prop-
erty that
YC` P EpAC`, τC`q @Y P EpA, τ q. (SA.1.2)
In other words, for any Nash equilibrium vector Y , if we remove all agents not in C`
from the game, then the subvector YC` is still a Nash equilibrium in the resulting
game. A formal proof is given in Lemma B.2 of Leung (2019a); see §2.1 of that paper
for a detailed discussion. This property is typically not satisfied for most subsets of
agents due to strategic interactions; removing an agent outside of a given set will
usually affect the optimality of the actions of agents within the set.
The implication of (SA.1.2) is that strategic neighborhoods effectively function
as distinct subgames, even though they can have overlapping agents.14 Our next as-
sumption requires that these neighborhoods do not coordinate in the sense illustrated
13A strongly connected component C is a set of agents such that there exists a directed path from
i to j and vice versa for every i, j P C. A directed path of length m is a sequence of unique agents
k1, k2, . . . , km such that Dkq,kq`1 “ 1 for any q “ 1, . . . ,m´ 1.
14The overlapping agents are those j for which Rcj “ 0, which implies they choose the same action
regardless of the actions of agents in any strategic neighborhood of which j is a member.
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in §5.2. For C` P C` and λp¨q defined in Assumption 3.2, let λpA, τ qˇˇ
C`
be the re-
striction of the range of λp¨q to EpAC`, τC`q, the set of Nash equilibria on C`. Thus if
Y is the observed equilibrium outcome, so that Y “ λpA, τ q, then λpA, τ qˇˇ
C`
“ YC` .
Assumption SA.1.1 (Decentralized Selection). Let λp¨q be defined in Assumption 3.2.
There exists a selection mechanism λ1p¨q, such that for any network size n and strate-
gic neighborhood C` P C`, λpA, τ qˇˇ
C`
“ λ1pAC`, τC`q.
This states that the process in which agents in C` coordinate on a Nash equilibrium
subvector YC` P EpAC`, τC`q according to λp¨q only depends on the subnetwork AC`
and types τC` of agents in C
`. Myopic best-response dynamics trivially satisfy this
property because agents’ best responses only depend on the types of their neighbors
when the initial condition is chosen in a manner that only depends on C`.
SA.2 Path and Spatial Distances
We state primitive conditions for Assumption 4.4 under the following random geo-
metric graph (RGG) model:
Aij “ 1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď 1u1ti ‰ ju @ i, j P Nn,
where positions are uniformly distributed, so that f „ Upr0, 1sdq. To our knowledge,
the only graph-theoretic results available for proving Assumption 4.4 pertain to this
model (see Kartun-Giles and Kim, 2018, section II.B for related literature). However,
we conjecture that similar results hold for the larger class of random graphs considered
in our paper, since Assumption 5.2(c) implies connection probabilities are exponen-
tially decaying with ‖ρi ´ ρj‖, whereas the RGG model requires a hard threshold at
1 (or any other constant).
Given that ρi “ ωnρ˜i (§2.4), the RGG model is equivalent to a rescaled model in
which positions are instead drawn uniformly from r0, n1{dsd and Aij “ 1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď
κ1{du. The latter model is studied in Friedrich et al. (2013), who provide bounds
on path distances in terms of social distance. We draw on their results to prove
Assumption 4.4. Some of their results utilize the “Poissonized” RGG model, which
is the same as the RGG model, except it replaces the set of n positions tρiuni“1 with
tρiuNn`2i“1 , where Nn „ Poissonpnq is independent of tρiuiPN „ f .
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Lemma SA.2.1. Under the RGG model, Assumption 4.4(a) holds.
Proof. Fix c1 ą 0. By the law of total probability,
PpℓApi, jq ą c‖ρi ´ ρj‖ | ℓApi, jq ă 8q ď Pp‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď c1 log n | ℓApi, jq ă 8q
`PpℓApi, jq ą c‖ρi ´ ρj‖ | ℓApi, jq ă 8, ‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ą c1 log nq.
Consider the second probability on the right-hand side. If this were instead under the
Poissonized model, then by §3.3 of Friedrich et al. (2013), for c1 chosen large enough,
it would be Opn´3q. Then by applying Lemma 1 of that paper, we have that the term
is Opn´2.5q under the original (not Poissonized) model. Next, the first probability
on the right-hand side is Opprn lognqdq “ Opn´p1´ǫqq for any ǫ ą 0. Therefore,
Pp‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď c1 logn | ℓApi, jq ă 8q “ Opn´p1´ǫqq for ǫ “ 0.25.
Lemma SA.2.2. Under the RGG model, Assumption 4.4(b) holds.
Proof. Our argument follows the last paragraph of the proof of Lemma 20 of
Friedrich et al. (2013). Let Q be the cube centered at ρi with side length c and Q
1 the
cube centered at ρi with side length 2c with the same orientation as Q. Then Q
1zQ is
an annulus, and we can apply a crossing components argument. For the case d “ 2,
see the use of Lemma 3.3 in Bradonjić et al. (2010) for a detailed argument, which
modifies Lemma 10.5 of Penrose (2003); see in particular Figure 3(c) for intuition.
For the general case, Friedrich et al. (2013) use Proposition 10.6 of Penrose (2003).
In words, the crossing component argument shows that for any agent j connected
to i such that ρj P Q, there exists a path in A from i to j completely contained
in Q1 with probability approaching one. Then since the shortest path is at least as
long, it is bounded by the size of this path. But this path should be bounded in
length, since it is contained in Q1, which has bounded size. Formally, by Lemma 14
of Friedrich et al. (2013), ℓApi, jq is bounded above by a constant with probability
approaching one, which proves the claim.
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SA.3 Proofs for Variance Estimators
SA.3.1 Spatial HAC
Proof Sketch. Consider the generalized spatial HAC in (4.2), which is consistent for
the variance, as discussed in that section. We can replace occurrences of θˆppq in the
estimator with ψ¯ without affecting consistency due to Assumption 4.1. We then show
that the resulting modification of σˆ2´ αˆαˆ1 can be rewritten as Σˆρ´ pαˆ´ ψ¯qpαˆ´ ψ¯q1.
The second term is clearly asymptotically positive semidefinite and can be shown to
converge to some n-dependent constant, which we call Σn ´ Σ˜n.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Consider the generalized spatial HAC in §4.3 with θˆppq
replaced with ψ¯. Define σˆ2 “ vˆ ` cˆ and αˆ “ ψ¯ ` δˆ, where
vˆ “ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
ψiψ
1
i,
cˆ “ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
ÿ
j‰i
pψiψ1j ´ ψ¯ψ¯1qK ppρi ´ ρjq{hnq ,
δˆ “ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
ÿ
j‰i
pψi ´ ψ¯qKppρi ´ ρjq{hnq,
Kp¨q is a kernel function satisfying Assumption 4.2, and the bandwidth hn is a di-
verging sequence satisfying hn “ Opn1{p3dqq. The estimator is given by
σˆ2 ´ αˆαˆ1.
Assumption 4.1 allows us to use ψ¯ as a
?
n-consistent estimator for Erψ1 | ρ1s in place
of θˆpρ1q used in Leung and Moon (2019). We can then weaken the bandwidth rate
from hn “ Opn1{p4dqq to hn “ Opn1{p3dqq.
Some algebra shows that
σˆ2 ´ αˆαˆ1 “ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
nÿ
j“1
pψi ´ ψ¯qpψj ´ ψ¯q1Kppρi ´ ρjq{hnq ´ δˆδˆ1. (SA.3.1)
Following verbatim the argument in the proof of Theorem G.1 in Leung and Moon
(2019), we have that there exist σ2n, αn, δn such that |σˆ
2 ´ σ2n| pÝÑ 0, |αˆ´ αn| pÝÑ 0,
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and |δˆ ´ δn| pÝÑ 0, and |Σn ´ pσ2n ´ αnα1nq|Ñ 0.15 Therefore, using (SA.3.1),
1
n
nÿ
i“1
nÿ
j“1
pψi ´ ψ¯qpψj ´ ψ¯q1Kppρi ´ ρjq{hnq “ Σn ` δnδ1n ` opp1q. (SA.3.2)
Since δnδ
1
n is positive semidefinite and the left-hand side is exactly Σˆρ, the first claim
of the theorem follows.
For the second claim, let N „ Poissonpnq be independent of all other primitives.
As in Assumption 4.3, let ψNi be i’s agent statistic under the (static or dynamic)
model where the number of agents is N . Recall the definition of the add-one cost
Ξn from §5.4, and let ΞN be its analog in the model with N , rather than n, agents.
Then, as defined in the proof of Theorem G.1 of Leung and Moon (2019),
δn “ ErΞNs ´ ErψN`1N`1s,
which is the indirect effect on the total agent statistic from removing agent N`1 from
the model. Since Erψ1s “ c for all n, it follows that ErΞN | Ns ´ ErψN`1N`1 | Ns “ 0
a.s., and therefore, δn “ 0 for all n. Consistency of Σˆρ then follows from (SA.3.2).
SA.3.2 Network HAC
Proof Sketch. We prove Theorem 4.2 by decomposing ΣˆA into two terms: a leading
term with the summands multiplied by 1t‖ρi´ ρj‖ ď bnu and a remainder term with
the summands multiplied by 1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ą bnu for a certain polynomially diverging
sequence tbnunPN. The leading term is shown to converge to the target. The remainder
term is shown to be opp1q because agents that are spatially distant (‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ą bn)
cannot also be close in terms of path distance (i.e. ℓApi, jq ď hn, as required by the
HAC kernel weight). The logarithmic rate of hn is important for the latter argument.
A more detailed sketch of the argument for the remainder term is given in the proof
below. We next expound on the leading term.
The leading term almost has the form of a spatial HAC estimator, since 1t‖ρi ´
ρj‖ ď bnu satisfies the conditions for a kernel function, but unfortunately we also
have the network-dependent termKpℓApi, jq{hnq floating around (since it is a network
15σ2n and αn are defined just prior to equation (G.1) and δn in (G.3). In our setting, a slight
modification is that we replace px,rn everywhere with cx,rn, the latter defined in our §SA.5.2.
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HAC). We need to show that the leading term is consistent for the desired target,
namely Ern´1ři,jpψi ´ Erψ1sqpψj ´ Erψ1sq1s, which is just the expectation of the
leading term without the kernel or indicator weights. This is done by (1) showing that
the leading term is close to its analog under a Poissonized model where the number
of agent is N „ Poissonpnq, and (2) doing mean-variance calculations under the
Poissonized model. The interesting aspect of this argument is showing that the mean
converges to the target. This is usually straightforward in proofs of the consistency of
HAC estimators because under weak conditions, the kernel converges to 1 a.s. as the
bandwidth diverges. In our context, this is easy to establish for the indicator part of
the kernel 1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu, since bn Ñ8. However, without additional conditions,
KpℓApi, jq{hnq does not a.s. converge to one for any i, j. This is because with positive
probability, i and j can be disconnected in the limit, meaning limnÑ8 ℓApi, jq “ 8.
For such agents, KpℓApi, jq{hnq “ 0 by Assumption 4.2, which creates a bias.
This is where Assumptions 4.3 and 4.5 are needed; they are used to establish that
Covpψi, ψj | X,Aq “ 0 if ℓApi, jq “ 8, so disconnected agents are dropped from the
covariance, eliminating this bias. This sheds light on the difficulty of allowing for
an endogenous network. Without Assumption 4.5, the unobservables ε can have a
complicated dependence structure conditional on A, so the conditional covariance is
not typically zero.
The consistency proof in Kojevnikov et al. (2019) is much more straightforward
than ours due to the notion of weak dependence used, which essentially implies that
Covpψi, ψj | Aq Ñ 0 at a fast rate as ℓApi, jq Ñ 8. We use a fundamentally different
weak dependence property (stabilization) proposed by Leung and Moon (2019), which
is unconditional in nature. It lends itself more easily to establishing consistency of
Σˆρ rather than ΣˆA, so for this reason, our strategy is to essentially to approximate
the latter with a version of the former.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. The second claim of the theorem is shown in the exact
same way as Theorem 4.1, so we only focus on the first claim. Define σˆ2, αˆ, δˆ, σ2n, αn, δn
as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, and recall from that proof that |δˆ ´ δn| pÝÑ 0. It
suffices to show that
|ΣˆA ´
`
σ2n ´ αnα1n ` δnδ1n
˘
|
pÝÑ 0,
since, as discussed in that proof, |Σn ´ pσ2n ´ αnα1nq| Ñ 0. Note that the notation
here is the same for both the static and dynamic models. Let tbnunPN be a sequence
59
Michael P. Leung
of positive numbers such that
bn “ opn1{p16dqq. (SA.3.3)
Decompose
ΣˆA “ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
ÿ
j‰i
pψi ´ ψ¯qpψj ´ ψ¯q1K pℓApi, jq{hnq1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu
` 1
n
nÿ
i“1
ÿ
j‰i
pψi ´ ψ¯qpψj ´ ψ¯q1K pℓApi, jq{hnq 1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ą bnu. (SA.3.4)
Lemma SA.3.1 shows that the first term on the right-hand side is consistent for Σn`
δnδ
1
n, and Lemma SA.3.3 shows that the second term is opp1q, which completes the
proof.
Detailed proof sketch. The remainder of the proof provides a high-level sketch
of the lemmas. The first term on the right-hand side is almost the same as the first
term on the right-hand side of (SA.3.1). We can effectively think of
K˜pρi ´ ρjq{bnq ” K pℓApi, jq{hnq 1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu
as the kernel of a spatial HAC estimator, except for the unusual feature that this
kernel also depends on A. Following the algebra for (SA.3.1), we have
1
n
nÿ
i“1
ÿ
j‰i
pψi ´ ψ¯qpψj ´ ψ¯q1K pℓApi, jq{hnq1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu “ σ˜2 ´ α˜α˜1 ` δ˜δ˜1,
where σ˜2, α˜, and δ˜ are analogs of σˆ2, αˆ, and δˆ with Kppρi ´ ρjq{hnq replaced with
K˜ppρi ´ ρjq{bnq.
If it weren’t for the presence of K pℓApi, jq{hnq, we would directly apply Theorem
G.1 of Leung and Moon (2019) to obtain
|σ˜2 ´ α˜α˜1 ` δ˜δ˜1 ´ `σ2n ´ αnα1n ` δnδ1n˘| pÝÑ 0,
which is the desired result. The presence of the kernel, however, creates a number of
complications. To understand them, we first recall the broad outlines of the proof of
Theorem G.1. It proceeds through three steps. Step (1) shows that these quantities
are consistent for their “Poissonized” analogs. By Poissonized analogs we mean the
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same estimators except we change the underlying data-generating process by replacing
the vector of positions pρiqni“1 with pρiqNni“1, where Nn „ Poissonpnq is independent of
all other primitives, ρi “ ωnρ˜i for all i, and ρ˜1, ρ˜2, . . . are i.i.d. with density f . Then
the Poissonized analogs are shown to have (2) vanishing variances and (3) expectations
that tend to the target estimands, namely σ2n, αn, δn. This is easier to show for the
Poissonized analogs as opposed to the original estimators because pρiqNni“1 has the
distribution of a Poisson point process, which has a convenient spatial independence
property.
We need to modify these arguments to account for the presence of K pℓApi, jq{hnq.
Step (2) in the previous paragraph proceeds almost exactly the same. The only
difference is that we use the upper bound
∣
∣K pℓApi, jq{hnq1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu
∣
∣ ď K˚1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu (SA.3.5)
due to Assumption 4.2. Since the proof of step (2) consists of a series of upper bounds,
this inequality enables us to basically ignore the presence of K pℓApi, jq{hnq.
Next we turn to step (1). This also uses (SA.3.5), as well as Assumption 4.4. The
argument here is mostly technical, so we will not summarize it. However, recall the
discussion of the importance of Assumption 4.4 following its statement in §4.
Finally we turn to step (3). Recall that this step involves showing that the ex-
pectations of the Poissonized estimators converge to their target estimands. Let us
decompose this into two smaller steps. (3a) We show that expectations of the Pois-
sonized estimators converge to analogs that replace K˜ppρi´ρjq{bnq with 1. Call these
analogs their target means (as opposed to target estimands). (3b) We show that the
target means converge to the target estimands. Step (3b) follows from step 1 of the
proof of Theorem G.1. The more interesting complication is step (3a).
Step (3a) is usually straightforward in proofs of HAC estimator consistency be-
cause under weak conditions, the kernel converges to 1 a.s. as the bandwidth di-
verges. In our context, this is easy to establish for the indicator part of the ker-
nel 1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu (see Leung and Moon, 2019). However, without additional
conditions, K pℓApi, jq{hnq does not a.s. converge to one for any i, j. This is be-
cause with positive probability, i and j can be disconnected in the limit, meaning
limnÑ8 ℓApi, jq “ 8. For such agents, K˜ppρi´ ρjq{bnq “ 0 by Assumption 4.2, which
creates a bias in σ˜2. This is where Assumptions 4.3 and 4.5 are needed; they en-
61
Michael P. Leung
sure that Covpψi, ψj | X,Aq “ 0 if limnÑ8 ℓApi, jq “ 8, so disconnected agents are
dropped from the covariance, eliminating this bias.
Lemma SA.3.1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.2 (see the definitions made
in the proof of that theorem),
ˇˇˇ
ˇ 1n
nÿ
i“1
ÿ
j‰i
pψi ´ ψ¯qpψj ´ ψ¯q1K pℓApi, jq{hnq 1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu ´ pΣn ` δnδ1nq
ˇˇˇ
ˇ pÝÑ 0.
Proof. We formalize the argument sketched in the proof of Theorem 4.2, in partic-
ular steps (1) and (3a).
Step (1). The parts of the proof of Theorem G.1 of Leung and Moon (2019) that
need to be modified are steps 1 and 2 of the proofs of Lemmas G.3 and G.6. We first
consider G.3. Note that both proofs for simplicity only consider the case where ψi is
scalar, as we do next.
The only modification of step 1 needed is to account for the fact that our mean
estimator is ψ¯ rather than θˆpρ1q, so we need to show that the former uniformly
converges to Erψ1 | ρ1s. We claim that
ψ¯
pÝÑ Erψ1s, and Erψ1s “ Erψ1 |X,As “ Erψ1 | ρ1s,
where convergence occurs at a n´1{2 rate by our CLT (Theorem 5.1 for the static
model, Theorem 6.1 for the dynamic model). The first equality is direct from Assumption 4.3.
The second equality follows because by the first equality,
E rErψ1s | ρ1s “ E rErψ1 |X,As | ρ1s “ E rErψ1 |X,A, ρ1s | ρ1s “ Erψ1 | ρ1s.
(SA.3.6)
The second equality above holds because conditional on X,A, the randomness in
the agent statistic only results from ε, and this is conditionally independent of ρ by
Assumption 4.5.
Now we turn to step 2. Let ψmi , K˜mp¨q be analogs of ψi, K˜p¨q except we change
the underlying data-generating process by changing the number of agents to m rather
than n but keep ωn defined as before. Define θmppq “ Erψmi | ρi “ ps. The term ρm
62
Inference on Social Interactions
in the proof of step 2 in Lemma G.3 is given in our context by
ρm ”
nÿ
i“1
ÿ
j‰i
pψmi ψmj ´ θmpρiqθmpρjqqK˜mp‖ρi ´ ρj‖{bnq.
We need to show that
n´1|ρNn ´ ρn| pÝÑ 0,
where Nn „ Poissonpnq is independent of all other model primitives.
Fix ε ą 0. We show that the following quantity is opp1q:
E
“
1
 
n´1|ρNn ´ ρn| ą ε
(
1 t|Nn ´ n| ď n{2u
‰looooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
rIs
` E “1  n´1|ρNn ´ ρn| ą ε(1 t|Nn ´ n| ą n{2u‰looooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
rIIs
.
By Lemma 1.4 of Penrose (2003),
P p|Nn ´ n| ą n{2q Ñ 0,
and therefore rIIs Ñ 0. On the other hand,
rIs “
ÿ
m : |m´n|ďn{2
P
`
n´1|ρm ´ ρn| ą ε
˘
PpNn “ mq
“
ÿ
m : |m´n|ďn{2
P
˜
n´1
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
m´1ÿ
k“n
pρk`1 ´ ρkq
ˇˇˇ
ˇ ą ε
¸
PpNn “ mq
ď P
˜ˇˇˇ
ˇNn ´ 1´ n?n
ˇˇˇ
ˇ sup
m : |m´n|ďn{2
sup
kPrn,m´1s
n´1{2|ρk`1 ´ ρk
∣
∣ ą ε
¸
.
The term in the absolute value on the last line is Opp1q by the CLT. It then suffices
to show that the term multiplying it is opp1q.
Observe that for any sequence tknunPN such that kn P rn,m ´ 1s and m satisfies
|m´ n| ď n{2, we have kn{nÑ c P p0,8q. Therefore it is enough to show that
n´1{2
`
ρk`1 ´ ρk
˘ “ opp1q
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for any k ” kn satisfying k{nÑ c P p0,8q.
Decompose
n´1{2 pρk`1 ´ ρkq “ rA1s ` rA2s ` rBs ` rCs,
where
rA1s “ n´1{2
kÿ
i“1
`
ψk`1i ψ
k`1
k`1 ´ θk`1pρiqθk`1pρk`1q
˘
K˜k`1 p‖ρi ´ ρk`1‖{bnq ,
rA2s “ n´1{2
kÿ
j“1
`
ψk`1k`1ψ
k`1
j ´ θk`1pρk`1qθk`1pρjq
˘
K˜k`1 p‖ρk`1 ´ ρj‖{bnq ,
rBs “ n´1{2
kÿ
i“1
kÿ
j‰i,j“1
`
ψk`1i ψ
k`1
j KpℓAk`1pi, jq{hnq
´ψki ψkjKpℓAkpi, jq{hnq
˘
1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu,
rCs “ n´1{2
kÿ
i“1
kÿ
j‰i,j“1
pθk`1pρiqθk`1pρjqKpℓAk`1pi, jq{hnq
´θkpρiqθkpρjqKpℓAkpi, jq{hnqq 1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu,
where ℓAmpi, jq is the path distance between agents i and j in the network consisting
of agents 1, . . . , m. We show that these three terms converge in L1 to zero. The
argument for rA1s and rA2s is identical to that in Lemma G.3 of Leung and Moon
(2019), since using the upper bound (SA.3.5) allows us to ignore KpℓApi, jq{hnq in
the kernel.
We only consider rBs here, as the modification of rCs is very similar. Let Rmi
be the radius of stabilization of agent i in the model with m agents. For the static
model, this is defined in (SA.5.8) for the case X “ Xm and for the dynamic model in
(SA.6.4). Define the event
En “
 
Rk`1i ď ‖ρi ´ ρk`1‖{2XRk`1j ď ‖ρj ´ ρk`1‖{2
XRki ď ‖ρi ´ ρk`1‖{2XRkj ď ‖ρj ´ ρk`1‖{2( .
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Then
Er|rBs|s ď n´1{2k2E “|ψk`1i ψk`1j KpℓAk`1pi, jq{hnq ´ ψki ψkjKpℓAkpi, jq{hnq|
ˆ1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu1tE cnus
` n´1{2k2E “|ψk`1i ψk`1j KpℓAk`1pi, jq{hnq ´ ψki ψkjKpℓAkpi, jq{hnq|
ˆ1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu1tEnus . (SA.3.7)
The first term on the right-hand side of (SA.3.7) is opp1q following the original ar-
gument in the proof of Lemma G.3 (the same lemma being modified here), where
we use (SA.3.5) on occasion to ignore the network kernel. So consider the second
term. Under the event En, ψ
k`1
i “ ψki (and likewise for j), as argued in the proof of
Lemma G.3. In brief, the event says that the position of agent k ` 1 lies outside the
cube centered at i with radius equal to maxtRk`1i ,Rki u. The radius of stabilization
has the property that the removal of agents with positions outside of this ball has no
effect on the realization of i’s agent statistic, and hence, ψk`1i “ ψki . This property is
established under the static model in Lemma SA.5.2 and under the dynamic model
in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
We have therefore established that the second term on the right-hand side of
(SA.3.7) equals
n´1{2k2E
“
|ψk`1i ψ
k`1
j
`
KpℓAk`1pi, jq{hnq´KpℓAkpi, jq{hnq
˘
|
ˆ1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu1tEnus .
This is bounded above by
n´1{2k2E
“
1tagent k`1 lies on the shortest path connecting i, j in Ak`1u
ˆ 1tℓAk`1pi, jq ă 8u|ψk`1i ψk`1j |1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu
‰
.
The reason is that (1) if k ` 1 does not lie on the shortest path, then ℓAk`1pi, jq “
ℓAkpi, jq, and (2) if ℓAk`1pi, jq “ 8, then ℓAk`1pi, jq “ ℓAkpi, jq “ 8. Then for
Cn “ n´1{2k2{pk ´ 1q, the previous equation equals
CnE
“
ℓAk`1pi, jq |ψk`1i ψk`1j | 1tℓAk`1pi, jq ă 8u1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu
‰
. (SA.3.8)
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Split this into to expectations, one with the term in the expectation multiplied by
1tℓAk`1pi, jq ď c‖ρi ´ ρj‖u and the other by 1tℓAk`1pi, jq ą c‖ρi ´ ρj‖u, where c is
the constant in Assumption 4.4. Call these two terms rIs and rIIs, respectively. We
have
rIs ď c bnCnE
“
|ψk`1i ψ
k`1
j |1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu
‰
ď c bnCnP p‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnqloooooooooomoooooooooon
Opn´1bdnq
sup
p,p1
E
“
|ψk`1i ψ
k`1
j | | ρi “ ωnp, ρj “ ωnp1
‰
looooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooon
Op1q
,
where the supremum term is Op1q by Assumption SA.7.3. Then by (SA.3.3),
rIs “ Opbnn´1{2nn´1bdnq “ opn1{4n´1{2n1{16q “ op1q (SA.3.9)
On the other hand, by Hölder’s inequality,
rIIs ” CnE
“
|ψk`1i ψ
k`1
j | ℓAk`1pi, jq1tc‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ă ℓAk`1pi, jq ă 8, ‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu
‰
ď CnE
“
ℓAk`1pi, jq4{31tc‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ă ℓAk`1pi, jq ă 8, ‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu
‰3{4
ˆ E “|ψk`1i ψk`1j |41t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu‰1{4 .
Since ℓAk`1pi, jq ď k ` 1, this is bounded above by
Cnpk ` 1qloooomoooon
Opn3{2q
P p‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bn | c‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ă ℓAk`1pi, jq ă 8q3{4looooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
Oppn´1bdnq
3{4q
ˆP pc‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ă ℓAk`1pi, jq ă 8q3{4P p‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnq1{4loooooooooooomoooooooooooon
Oppn´1bdnq
1{4q
ˆ sup
p,p1
E
“
|ψk`1i ψ
k`1
j |
4 | ρi “ ωnp, ρj “ ωnp1
‰1{4
loooooooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
Op1q
,
noting that k “ Opnq. The supremum term is Op1q by Assumption SA.7.3. By
Assumption 4.4(a), P pc‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ă ℓAk`1pi, jq ă 8q “ Opn´3{4q. Hence, the previous
equation is Opn3{2n´9{16n´1bdnq “ op1q by (SA.3.3). We have therefore established that
rIIs “ op1q, which together with (SA.3.9), implies pSA.3.8q “ op1q. Consequently,
the second term on the right-hand side of (SA.3.7) is op1q, as desired.
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This completes the modification of step 2 of Lemma G.3. The argument for step
2 of Lemma G.6 is the same.
Step (3a). The arguments in the proof of Theorem G.1 that need to be modified
are step 2 of the proof of Lemma G.4 and step 1 of the proof of Lemma G.7 (both
in Leung and Moon, 2019). We first consider the former. We will need the following
definitions.
• Let ρ˜´1, ρ˜0, ρ˜1, . . . be i.i.d. with density f . Define ρi “ ωnρ˜i for all i. Let
Nn „ Poissonpnq be independent of ρ˜1, ρ˜2, . . . and all other primitives.
• Let ψNi be the analog of ψi under the Poissonized model. By this we mean that
we compute i’s agent statistic under a modified data-generating process that
replaces the original the set of positions pρiqni“1 with pρiqNni“1. Let AN be the
network realized under this Poissonized model.
• Let ψN`i be the analog of ψi under the i-specific Poissonized model, which is
almost the same as the Poissonized model in the previous paragraph, except
the set of positions is given by tρi, ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρi´1, ρi`1, . . . , ρNnu. Let θN pρiq “
ErψN`i | ρis. For i ą 1, this is the same as the Poissonized model, but for i ă 1,
it is not (although they produce the same distribution of outcomes).
• Let ψN`ji be the analog of ψi under the pi, jq-specific Poissonized model, which
is almost the same as the Poissonized model, except the set of positions is given
by tρi, ρj , ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρi´1, ρi`1, . . . , . . . , ρj´1, ρj`1, . . . , ρNnu.
Our goal is to show Ern´1ρNns ´ cn “ op1q, where
cn ” E
«
1
n
Nnÿ
i“1
Nnÿ
j‰i,j“1
pψNi ψNj ´ θN pρiqθN pρjqq
ff
,
and
ρNn ”
Nnÿ
i“1
Nnÿ
j‰i,j“1
pψNi ψNj ´ θN pρiqθN pρjqqK pℓAN pi, jq{hnq1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu.
In the terminology of the proof sketch in the proof of Theorem 4.2, cn is the “target
mean.” Let Aij be the network under the pi, jq-specific Poissonized model. Decom-
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pose
cn “ E
«
1
n
Nnÿ
i“1
Nnÿ
j‰i,j“1
pψNi ψNj ´ θNpρiqθNpρjqq1tℓAN pi, jq ă 8u
ff
` E
«
1
n
Nnÿ
i“1
Nnÿ
j‰i,j“1
pψNi ψNj ´ θNpρiqθNpρjqq1tℓAN pi, jq “ 8u
ff
.
We first show that the second term is zero. Indeed this term equals
nE
”
E
”
ψN`0´1 ψ
N`p´1q
0 | tpXk, ρkquNnk“´1, tζkℓuNnk,ℓ“´1, Nn
ı
1tℓA´1,0p´1, 0q “ 8u
ı
(SA.3.10)
by the Slivnyak-Mecke formula (e.g Leung and Moon, 2019, Lemma H.2) and the fact
that agent types are identically distributed. (Recall the definition of the Poissonized
models at the start of step (3a) above which introduced agents ´1 and 0.) By
Lemma SA.3.2 below,
pSA.3.10q “ E “E “ψN`´1 | tpXk, ρkquNnk“´1, tζkℓuNnk,ℓ“´1, Nn‰
ˆE “ψN`
0
| tpXk, ρkquNnk“´1, tζkℓuNnk,ℓ“´1, Nn
‰
1tℓA´1,0p´1, 0q “ 8u
‰
. (SA.3.11)
Let A0 denote the network under the 0-specific Poissonized model. By the network
formation model and Assumption 4.5,
E
“
ψN`0 | tpXk, ρkquNnk“´1, tζkℓuNnk,ℓ“´1, Nn
‰ “ E “ψN`0 | tXkuNnk“0,A0, Nn‰
“ E “ψN`
0
| tXkuNnk“0,A0, Nn, ρ0
‰
.
By Assumption 4.3, ErψN`0 s equals the second term and hence also the third term.
Taking expectations conditional on ρ0 then yields
E
“
ψN`
0
| tpXk, ρkquNnk“´1, tζkℓuNnk,ℓ“´1, Nn
‰ “ E “ψN`
0
‰ “ θN pρ0q, (SA.3.12)
since Nn K ρ0. Using (SA.3.12),
pSA.3.11q “ E rθN pρ´1qθN pρ0q1tℓA´1,0p´1, 0q “ 8us .
Since agent types are identically distributed, we can replace ´1 with i and 0 with j
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in this expression. We have therefore shown that
pSA.3.10q “ E rθNpρiqθNpρjq1tℓAij pi, jq “ 8us .
Consequently,
cn “ E
«
1
n
Nnÿ
i“1
Nnÿ
j‰i,j“1
pψNi ψNj ´ θNpρiqθNpρjqq1tℓAN pi, jq ă 8u
ff
.
Next, notice that under the event ℓAN pi, jq “ 8, we have K pℓAN pi, jq{hnq “ 0 by
Assumption 4.2. Hence,
Ern´1ρNns “ E
„
1
n
Nnÿ
i“1
Nnÿ
j‰i,j“1
pψNi ψNj ´ θNpρiqθNpρjqq
ˆK pℓAN pi, jq{hnq 1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu1tℓAN pi, jq ă 8u

,
The previous two equations yield
Ern´1ρNns ´ cn
“ E
„
1
n
Nnÿ
i“1
Nnÿ
j‰i,j“1
pψNi ψNj ´ θN pρiqθN pρjqq
ˆ `K pℓAN pi, jq{hnq1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu ´ 1˘1tℓAN pi, jq ă 8u

“n
ż
Rd
ż
Rd
E
„´
ψ
N`j
i ψ
N`j
j ´ θNpρiqθNpρjq
¯ `
K pℓAij pi, jq{hnq1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ď bnu
´ 1˘1tℓAij pi, jq ă 8u
ˇˇˇ
ˇ ρi “ ωnp, ρj “ ωnp1

fppqfpp1q dp dp1
where the last line follows from the Slivnyak-Mecke formula (e.g Leung and Moon,
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2019, Lemma H.2). By a change of variables p2 “ p` ωnpp1 ´ pq, the last line equals
κ
ż
Rd
ż
Rd
E
„
pψNi ψNj ´ θN pωnρ˜iqθN pωnρ˜jqq
`
K pℓAij pi, jq{hnq1t‖p ´ p2‖ ď bnu ´ 1
˘
ˆ 1tℓAij pi, jq ă 8u
ˇˇˇ
ˇ ρ˜i “ p, ρ˜j “ p` ω´1n pp2 ´ pq

fppqfpp` ω´1n pp2 ´ pqq dp dp2.
(SA.3.13)
We next show that the term in the conditional expectation is opp1q and then apply
dominated convergence. First, by Assumption SA.7.3, pψNi ψNj ´θNpωnρ˜iqθNpωnρ˜jqq “
Op1q. Second, 1t‖p ´ p2‖ ď bnu Ñ 1 by definition of bn in (SA.3.3). Third, we claim
K pℓAij pi, jq{hnq pÝÑ 1.
To prove the third claim, by Assumption 4.2, it suffices to show that ℓAij pi, jq{hn “
opp1q conditional on ρ˜i “ p, ρ˜j “ p ` ω´1n pp2 ´ pq. Under this conditioning event,
‖ρi ´ ρj‖ “ ‖p ´ p2‖, which is a finite constant. We would then like to apply
Assumption 4.4(b) to obtain the desired conclusion; the only hindrance is that the
assumption is stated for the model with n rather than Nn` 2 agents. It thus suffices
to establish the assumption under the pi, jq-specific Poissonized model. Recall that
Aij denotes the network this model. Let Am denote the network under the model
with m agents tρiumi“1. Then
PpℓAij pi, jq ą ǫ | ‖ρi ´ ρj‖q ď Pp|Nn ´ n| ą n{2 | ‖ρi ´ ρj‖q
`
ÿ
m : |m´n|ďn{2
PpℓAm`2pi, jq ą ǫ | ‖ρi ´ ρj‖, Nn “ mqPpNn “ mq.
By independence ofNn, the first probability equalsPp|Nn´n| ą n{2q ď 4{n2VarpNnq “
op1q. The second probability is also op1q because, for any sequence m “ mn with
m{nÑ α P p0, 1q,
PpℓAm`2pi, jq ą ǫ | ‖ρi ´ ρj‖, Nn “ mq “ op1q
given ‖ρi ´ ρj‖ “ ‖p´ p2‖ by Assumption 4.4(b). Then since hn Ñ8, ℓApi, jq{hn “
opp1q, as desired.
Finally, to apply dominated convergence, we need to show that the integrand
in (SA.3.13) is uniformly bounded by an integrable function of p, p2 that does not
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depend on n. By Assumption 4.2, the integrand is bounded above by
K˚E
“
|ψNi ψ
N
j ´ θN pωnρ˜iqθNpωnρ˜jq| | ρ˜i “ p, ρ˜j “ p` ω´1n pp2 ´ pq
‰
fppq sup
x
fpxq.
As argued in step 2 of the proof of Lemma G.4 of Leung and Moon (2019) (the
lemma being modified here), the right-hand side is uniformly bounded by c exptc1‖p´
p2‖ufppq for some c, c1 ą 0, which is integrable.
This completes the modification of step 2 of Lemma G.4. The argument for step
1 of Lemma G.7 is the same.
Lemma SA.3.2. Under Assumption 4.5 and Assumption SA.1.1, (SA.3.11) holds.
Proof. We prove this in two steps. First we argue that agent i’s statistic only
depends on agents within her own component and likewise for j. Second, since i
and j are not connected, their agent statistics are conditionally independent under
Assumption 4.5.
Step 1. Let i, j P t´1, 0u with i ‰ j. LetRni be the radius of stabilization of agent
i. For the static model, this is defined in (SA.5.8) (here the case is X “ tρ´1, . . . , ρNnu)
and for the dynamic model in (SA.6.4). Let N piq Ď Nn be the subset of agents k
whose positions ρ˜k lie in Qpρ˜i,Rni ω´1n q, which is the cube centered at ρ˜i with radius
Rni ω
´1
n . The radius of stabilization has the property that the realization ψ
N`j
i is the
same whether under the original n-agent model or under the restricted model where
the set of agents is only N piq. This property is formally established under the static
model in Lemma SA.5.2 and under the dynamic model in the proof of Theorem 6.1;
both use Assumption SA.1.1. By construction of Rni , we have N piq Ď CipA´1,0q, the
component of i in the network A´1,0. Then under the event ℓA´1,0p´1, 0q “ 8,
ψ
N`j
i “ ψNi , (SA.3.14)
recalling that the latter is i’s agent statistic under the i-specific Poissonized model
(rather than the pi, jq-specific model as in the former).
Step 2. As previously established, N piq Ď CipA´1,0q. This implies that, when
conditioning on B “ tpXk, ρkquNnk“´1, tζkℓuNnk,ℓ“´1, Nn, the only randomness in ψN`0´1 and
ψ
N`p´1q
0
are due to tεk : k P CipA´1,0qu. Thus, under the event ℓA´1,0p´1, 0q “ 8,
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Assumption 4.5 implies
tεk : k P C´1pA´1,0qu K tεℓ : ℓ P C0pA´1,0qu | tpXk, ρkquNnk“´1, tζkℓuNnk,ℓ“´1, Nn,
from which conditional independence of ψN´1 and ψ
N
0 follows. Then (SA.3.14) estab-
lishes the result.
Lemma SA.3.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.2 (see the definitions made
in the proof of that theorem),
1
n
nÿ
i“1
ÿ
j‰i
pψi ´ ψ¯qpψj ´ ψ¯q1K pℓApi, jq{hnq1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ą bnu “ opp1q.
Proof. The mean of the absolute value of left-hand side is bounded above by
nEr|pψiψ1j ´ ψ¯2qK pℓApi, jq{hnq 1t‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ą bnu|s
ď Erpψiψ1j ´ ψ¯2q2s1{2K˚nPpℓApi, jq ď hnX ‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ą bnq1{2
ď CnP
ˆ
max
jPNApi,hnq
‖ρi ´ ρj‖ ą bn
˙1{2
ď Cn `3hnpc1κf¯qhnpbn{hnqhnde´c2bn˘1{2 .
The constant C ą 0 exists by Assumption SA.5.1. The last line follows from Lemma SA.8.5.
Since bn grows at a polynomial rate by (SA.3.3) and hn grows at a sub-polynomial
rate, this tends to zero, as desired.
SA.4 Proof of Theorem 4.3
To prove the result, we need to introduce “Poissonized” models where the number
of agents is random and possibly countably infinite. This is in order to derive the
large-n limit of the mean of agent statistics, which we can show does not depend on
p.
Step 1: Notation Recall from §2.4 and §5.4 that the (static or dynamic) model is
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given by the tuple
pU, λ, V,ρ,Z, ζq.
It will be helpful to think of simulating the data-generating process in the following
order. First, draw positions. In this case, they are given by ωnρ˜, where ρ˜1, . . . , ρ˜n are
i.i.d. draws from f . Then conditional on the set of positions, draw Z and ζ. Given
these primitives, draw the network A according to §2.3, and finally draw outcomes
Y . We call this model the binomial model. We write the agent statistic of agent 1 as
ψpωnρ˜1, ωnρ˜,Z, ζ,Y ,Aq,
what we had previously called simply ψ1.
We next define a Poissonized model where the number of agents is given by Nn`1,
rather than n, where Nn „ Poissonpnq is independent of all other primitives. By
Lemma 1.5 of Penrose (2003), ρ˜1, . . . , ρ˜Nn`1 has the same distribution as Pnf Y tρ˜1u,
where Pnf is an inhomogeneous Poisson point process on Rd with intensity nfp¨q and
independent of ρ˜1 „ f . Thus, define the Poissonized model
pU, λ, V, ωnpPnf Y tρ˜1uq,Z, ζq.
As in the binomial model, we first draw positions ωnpPnf Y tρ˜1uq, and then for each
element i of this set, we draw Zi’s independently across elements to obtain Z and
likewise with ζ. In fact, under Assumption 4.6(a), Zi’s are drawn i.i.d.; note that
ζij’s are always drawn i.i.d. by definition of the network formation model. Then the
network and outcomes are realized in the same way, and the agent statistic of the
agent positioned at ωnρ˜1 is
ψpωnρ˜1, ωnpPnf Y tρ˜1uq,Z, ζ,Y ,Aq.
Finally, we define a restricted Poissonized model that simply replaces ωnpPnf Y
tρ˜1uq with the subset ωnpPnf XQpρ˜1, Rω´1n q Y tρ˜1uq, where Qpi, Rq Ď Rd is the cube
centered at i P Rd with side length R.
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We can then define the conditional expectations
θnppq “ E rψpωnρ˜1, ωnρ˜,Z, ζ,Y ,Aq | ρ˜1 “ ps ,
θNppq “ E rψpωnp, ωnpPnf Y tpuq,Z, ζ,Y ,Aqs ,
θRppq “ E
“
ψpωnp, ωnpPnf XQpp, Rω´1n q Y tpuq,Z, ζ,Y ,Aq
‰
.
Step 2: Limit Approximation By Lemma G.8 of Leung and Moon (2019),
sup
p
|θnppq ´ θNppq| “ opn´1{3q.
Lemma SA.4.1 below shows that
sup
p
|θNppq ´ θRppq| “ opn´1{3q (SA.4.1)
for R “ Cplog nq1{ǫ for large enough C, ǫ ą 0. Thus it suffices to show that θRppq does
not vary with p.
Step 3: Asymptotic Stationarity Let X ” ωnpPnf XQpp, Rω´1n q Y tpuq. Observe
that positions X only enter the model directly through differences ‖p1´p2‖ for p1, p2 P
X (in particular through the first argument of V p¨q) and indirectly through Z, ζ.
Assumption 4.6(a) shuts off the indirect channel, so
ψpωnp, ωnpPnf XQpp, Rω´1n q Y tpuq,Z, ζ,Y ,Aq
d“ ψ p0, ωnpPnf ´ pq XQp0, Rq Y t0uq,Z, ζ,Y ,Aq .
Since the origin is an interior point of supppfq, for n large enough, Qp0, Rq is contained
in the set ωnpsupppfq ´ pq. This claim uses the fact that ωn diverges faster than
R “ Cplog nq1{ǫ. Furthermore, because f is uniform, ωnpPnf ´ pq X Qp0, Rq has the
same distribution as a homogeneous Poisson point process on Bp0, Rq with intensity
n. In particular, this process does not depend on p. Therefore, the expectation of the
right-hand side of the previous equation does not depend on p, as desired.
Lemma SA.4.1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.3, (SA.4.1) holds for R “
Cplognq1{ǫ for large enough C, ǫ ą 0.
74
Inference on Social Interactions
Proof. Let Rnpρ˜1q be the radius of stabilization (Definition SA.7.1) of the agent
positioned at ωnρ˜1 in the Poissonized model. For the static model, this is defined in
(SA.5.8) for the case X “ Pnf Y tρ˜1u and for the dynamic model in (SA.6.4).
Fix any R ą 0. Trivially,
sup
x
n1{3|θNppq ´ θRppq| ď sup
p
n1{3E
“
|ψpωnp, ωnpPnf Y tpuq,Z, ζ,Y ,Aq
´ ψpωnp, ωnpPnf XQpp, Rω´1n q Y tpuq,Z, ζ,Y ,Aq| | ρ˜1 “ p
‰
By definition of the radius of stabilization, if R ą Rnppq, then the term in the
expectation on the right-hand is identically zero. Hence, the right-hand side equals
sup
p
n1{3E r|ψpωnp, ωnpPnf Y tpuq,Z, ζ,Y ,Aq
´ψpωnp, ωnpPnf XQpp, Rω´1n q Y tpuq,Z, ζ,Y ,Aq|1tR ď Rnppqu
‰
ď C 1n1{3 sup
p
PpRnppq ě Rq1{2,
by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, where C 1 ą 0 does not depend on n and ex-
ists by Assumption SA.5.1. Under the given assumptions, exponential stabilization
(Assumption SA.7.2) holds (established in Lemma SA.5.3 and the proof of Theorem 6.1
for the static and dynamic models, respectively). Choosing R “ Cplog nq1{ǫ for large
enough C, ǫ ą 0, exponential stabilization implies the last line is op1q, as desired.
SA.5 Proof of Static CLT
SA.5.1 Main Idea
As discussed at the start of §5, the proof consists of verifying high-level conditions for a
general CLT stated in Theorem SA.7.1. The main ones are “stabilization” conditions,
and their basic idea is discussed at length in §4 of Leung and Moon (2019). Here we
give a brief summary.
An agent statistic ψi is stabilizing essentially if we can establish the following two
conditions. (i) We can find some i-specific subset of agents Ji such that the value
of ψi does not change if we were to counterfactually remove all agents NnzJi from
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the game and rerun the model using only agents in Ji. (ii) We can show that |Ji|
has exponential tails. Note that the index i is arbitrary because agent types are
identically distributed.
Consider the simple case where ψi “ Yi, so the network moment is just the
empirical choice probability. Recall the definition of i’s strategic neighborhood C`i
from (SA.1.1). For this case, we can verify the stabilization requirements by taking
Ji “ C`i . For requirement (i), we use property (SA.1.2) of strategic neighborhoods,
which holds under Assumption 3.1. It states that, to find the set of i’s possible equi-
librium outcomes, we only need to look at EpAC`i , τC`i q, the set of Nash equilibria
in the counterfactual game consisting solely of agents in C`i , rather than the entire
equilibrium set EpA, τ q. Furthermore, under Assumption SA.1.1, the selection mech-
anism λ1 that picks from this set of candidate equilibria is entirely determined by
inputs AC`i
, τC`i
. This means that, if we were to remove NnzC`i from the game, λ1
still picks the same equilibrium subvector of outcomes for C`i . Therefore, the real-
ization of Yi is only a function of agents in C
`
i , which establishes requirement (i) of
stabilization.
Under Assumption 5.1, it can be established that |Ji| “ Opp1q. Intuitively,
when strategic interactions are properly restricted, the impact of one agent’s choice
will not affect the choices of too many other agents. Under regularity conditions
given in Appendix SA.1, in particular the exponential decay on linking probabilities
(Assumption 5.2), this can be strengthened to |Ji| having exponential tails, which
establishes requirement (ii) of stabilization. The technique is to stochastically bound
|Ji| by a certain multi-type branching process (see Appendix SA.8) and use standard
arguments in branching process theory to show that the total offspring count of the
process has exponential tails.
SA.5.2 Generalized Setup
To prove Theorem 5.1, we verify the assumptions of Theorem SA.7.1. To conform
with the setup of that theorem, we need to change notation in order to generalize the
model to accommodate a random number of agents, e.g. as in Assumption 4.3.
To work toward the required notation, let us first restate the original model (2.4)
as the tuple
pU, λ, V, r´1n ρ˜,W q, (SA.5.1)
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where Up¨q is the payoff function, λp¨q the selection mechanism, V p¨q the latent index in
the network formation model, rn “ ω´1n , ρ˜ “ pρ˜iqni“1 for tρ˜iuiPN iid„ f , andW “ pZ, ζq.
We generalize this by replacing the fourth element of the tuple with any random set
whose size is finite a.s. Note that in the sequel we will be using rn, the inverse of ωn,
in order to maintain consistency with the setup of Leung and Moon (2019).
Let X “ tρ˜iuNi“1YG for some a.s. finite random variable N that may depend on n
and finite set G Ď Rd. We will be interested in cases where N is some deterministic
function of n or N „ Poissonpnq. Fix an arbitrary x P Rd. For r P R`, let τx,r : Rd Ñ
R
d be the map y ÞÑ x` r´1py ´ xq. We write τx,rX to mean tτx,ry : y P X u. In what
follows, we will take τx,rnX as the set of positions. We think of each element of τx,rnX
not only as a position p but also as an agent associated with that position. That is,
following the convention in spatial econometrics (e.g. Jenish and Prucha, 2009), we
also view τx,rnX as the set of agent labels, which is well-defined since the elements
are a.s. unique due to ρ˜i be continuously distributed.
Next, we define the attributes of agents, previously given by Z and ζ. These are
originally defined as arrays of n and npn´1q{2 elements respectively, but we can think
of them as mappings from agent labels i, j P Nn to attributes pZi, Zj, ζijq. Motivated
by this second interpretation, we replace these sets with stochastic processes that
map positions to attributes. Formally, let Zp¨q be a stochastic process on Rd with
range Rdz and ζp¨, ¨q a stochastic process on Rd ˆ Rd with range Rdζ . Suppose these
processes each have i.i.d. marginals, are mutually independent, and are generated
independently of positions X .
Define the “attribute process” W : pp, p1q ÞÑ pZppq,Zpp1q, ζpp, p1qq. For x P Rd, r P
R`, let cx,r : R
d Ñ Rd be the map y ÞÑ r´1px` rpy ´ xqq. This inverts the operation
of τx,r and then scales up the result by r
´1. LetWcx,r denote the composition of the
random function W and cx,r, i.e.
Wcx,rpy, y1q “
`
Zpcx,ryq,Zpcx,ry1q, ζpcx,ry, cx,ry1q
˘
for any y, y1 P Rd.
We can finally state the general static model, which is given by the tuple
pU, λ, V, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq. (SA.5.2)
Here we think of Wcx,rn as taking τx,rnX as its input to generate attributes condi-
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tional on agents’ positions. Thus, in the case where N “ n and x “ 0, this model is
equivalent to (SA.5.1). Note that when x “ 0, cx,rn is simply the identity map; for
technical reasons, it is convenient in the proof of Theorem SA.7.1 to consider x ‰ 0.
The purpose of cx,rn is to undo the transformation τx,rn and scale the result up by
r´1n . Thus, cx,rnpτx,rnpρ˜qq equals r´1n ρ˜ for any x. This is important because under
model (SA.5.1), we interpret r´1n ρ˜ as the underlying set of positions, so attributesW
need to take this set as its input and not a modification of the set like τx,rnρ˜.
The remainder of this subsection clarifies how the network and equilibrium out-
comes are generated under model (SA.5.2). Rather than an nˆn matrix as in model
(SA.5.1), we view the network A ” Apτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq as a function or random map-
ping from pairs of agents p, p1 P τx,rnX to t0, 1u. Denote by Ap,p1 the potential link
between p, p1 P τx,rnX in Apτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq. We assume
Ap,p1 “ 1tV p‖p´ p1‖,Wcx,rnpp, p1qq ą 0u,
which is the analog of (2.3).
Next we define the outcomes Y under (SA.5.2). Rather than an n ˆ 1 vector of
outcomes, we view Y ” Y pτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq as a mapping from τx,rnX to t0, 1u. Let
Yp denote the outcome of agent p P τx,rnX according to Y and Zp “ pp,Zpcx,rnpqq,
which corresponds in the finite model to p’s type τi. We assume
Yp “ 1tUpSp, Zpq ą 0u,
where
Sp ” SpY´p, Zp, Z´p, Ap, A´pq.
The first, third, and fourth arguments of the right-hand side are random functions
with domain τx,rnX ztpu such that Y´p : p1 ÞÑ Yp1, Z´p : p1 ÞÑ Zp1, and Ap : p1 ÞÑ Ap,p1.
The last argument is a random function with domain τx,rnX ztpu ˆ τx,rnX ztpu such
that A´p : pp1, p2q ÞÑ Ap1,p2. Thus, Sp simply generalizes the original definition of Si
in (3.1).
Finally, we define the selection mechanism λp¨q in (SA.5.2). Let
EpA, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq ” EpApτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq
be the set of Nash equilibria, i.e. the set of outcome mappings Y such that for
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each Y P EpA, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq, Yp satisfies (3.1) for each p P τx,rnX . The selection
mechanism λp¨q is a mapping pA, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq ÞÑ EpA, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq, and the
realized outcome satisfies Y “ λpA, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq. This is just a restatement of
Assumption 3.2(b) for model (SA.5.2).
Network Moments. Our goal is to prove a CLT for network moments of the form
Λpτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq ”
ÿ
pPτx,rnX
ψpp, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn,Y pτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq,Apτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnqq
”
ÿ
pPτx,rnX
ψpp, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn,Y ,Aq,
where the last line abbreviates by suppressing the dependence of Y and A on their
arguments. Note that, by construction, Y and A are deterministic functions of the
first two arguments of ψp¨q. Thus we can absorb them into the agent statistic, writing
ξpp, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq ” ψpp, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn,Y ,Aq. (SA.5.3)
This falls within the setup of Appendix SA.7.
Strategic Neighborhoods. We need to generalize some notation in Appendix SA.1
to the setup of (SA.5.2). For p P τx,rnX , define
Rcp “ 1
 
inf
s
Ups, Zpq ď 0X sup
s
Ups, Zpq ą 0
(
.
For p, p1 P τx,rnX , define
Dp,p1 “ Ap,p1Rcp1 ,
where Ap,p1 is the potential link for agents p, p
1 in the network Apτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq. Let
D be the mapping pp, p1q ÞÑ Dp,p1, which is a network function on τx,rnX . For any
p P τx,rnX , define Cpp, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn,Dq Ď τx,rnX as the set of agents (i.e. agent
positions) in the component of D that contains p, or for short, the D-component of
p. Define the strategic neighborhood of p as
C`p “ Cpp, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn,DqY  y P τx,rnX : Dy1 P Cpy, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn,Dq
s.t. Ay,y1 “ 1X inf
s
Ups, Zy1q ą 0X sup
s
Ups, Zy1q ď 0
(
. (SA.5.4)
79
Michael P. Leung
Let C`pτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq be the set of all strategic neighborhoods.
Finally, we restate Assumption 5.4 under the new setup.
Assumption SA.5.1 (Bounded Moments).
(a) There exists C ă 8 such that
E
“
|ψ px, τx,rnpXm Y tyuq XHn,Wcx,rn,Y ,Aq|8
‰ ă C
for any n sufficiently large, m P rn{2, 3n{2s, sequence of subsets of Rd tHnunPN,
x P Rd, y P Rd Y t8u.
(b) For any a.s. finite set X Ď Rd, x P Rd, n P N,
|ψpx, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn,Y ,Aq| ď c|X |c
a.s., for some positive constant c.
SA.5.3 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We apply Theorem SA.7.1 by verifying Assumptions
SA.7.1–SA.7.4. Assumptions SA.7.3 and SA.7.4 hold under Assumption 5.4 (or equiv-
alently Assumption SA.5.1). The challenging conditions to verify are Assumptions
SA.7.1 and SA.7.2. These hold by Lemmas SA.5.2 and SA.5.3 that follow next.
For an agent p P τx,rnX , let NApp,Kq be the set of agents in the K-neighborhood
of p under network A. Recall that agents are labeled according to their positions,
so NApp,Kq Ď τx,rnX . Also recall the definition of C`p from the previous subsection.
Define the relevant set of agent p as
Jp ” Jppτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq “
ď 
C`y : y P NApp,Kq
(
, (SA.5.5)
which is also a subset of τx,rnX . The next lemma shows that any K-local agent
statistic is entirely determined by the positions and attributes of agents in Jp.
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Lemma SA.5.1. Under Assumptions 2.2, 3.1, and SA.1.1, for any p P τx,rnX ,
ψpp, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn,Y ,Aq “ ψpp, Jp,Wcx,rn,Y ,Aq. (SA.5.6)
Proof. Recall from the previous subsection that EpA, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq is the set
of Nash equilibria under model (SA.5.2). For any Y in that set, recall that Yp
is the outcome for agent p P τx,rnX according to Y , and for C Ď τx,rnX , define
YC “ tYp : p P Cu. By Lemma B.2 of Leung (2019a), under Assumption 3.1, for any
strategic neighborhood C` P C`pτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq,
EpA, C`,Wcx,rnq “ tYC` : Y P EpA, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rnqu. (SA.5.7)
That is, the set of Nash equilibria in the restricted model with agents given by C`
is equivalent to the set of equilibrium outcomes for agents in C` in the full model
with agents given by τx,rnX . By Assumption 2.2, ψpp, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn,Y ,Aq function-
ally depends on its arguments only through the positions, attributes, random-utility
shocks, potential links, and equilibrium outcomes of agents in NApp,Kq. Consider an
arbitrary agent w P NApp,Kq. By (SA.5.7) and Assumption SA.1.1, the realization
of Yw is determined by the positions, attributes, and random-utility shocks of agents
in C`w . Hence, the value of ψpp, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn,Y ,Aq would remain the same if we
were to counterfactually remove all agents not in S ” YwPNApp,KqC`w from the model
and draw new equilibrium outcomes for the remaining subgame. That is, (SA.5.6)
holds for S in place of Jp. But by definition Jp “ S, so the result follows.
For p P τx,rnX , let
Rnppq ” Rpp, τx,rnX ,W q “ max
p1PJp
‖p´ p1‖. (SA.5.8)
be its radius of stabilization.
Lemma SA.5.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 5.1, Assumption SA.7.1(a) and
(c) hold for each component ξ defined in (SA.5.3) for Rξ given in (SA.5.8).
Proof. The proof follows the line of argument in Lemma D.2 of Leung and Moon
(2019), which verifies the assumptions for a static model of network formation with
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strategic interactions. We first prove Assumption SA.7.1(c). For any H Ď Rd and
p P τx,rnX XH ,
Jppτx,rnX XH,Wcx,rnq Ď Jppτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq, (SA.5.9)
since removing agents only shrinks the size of the relevant set. Then Assumption SA.7.1(c)
is immediate for radius of stabilization (SA.5.8).
The remainder of the proof concerns Assumption SA.7.1(a). We show that (SA.5.8)
is bounded in probability under model (SA.5.2) with
X “ X˜n Y tx1, ynu,
where x1 P Rd, yn “ τx,r´1n pyq for y P Rd, X˜n “ tρ˜iuNi“1, and either N “ νpnq or
N „ Poissonpnq independent of all other primitives.
Step 1. We first prove that for any z P τx,rnpX˜n Y tx1, ynuq,
|Jzpτx,rnpX˜n Y tx1, ynuq,Wcx,rnq| “ Opp1q. (SA.5.10)
By Lemma SA.5.4 below, the relevant set of z is contained in the union of z’s relevant
set when another agent z1 is removed from the model and the relevant set of z1 when
z is removed from the model. Therefore, for any z P τx,rnX˜n,
Jzpτx,rnpX˜n Y tx1, ynuq,Wcx,rnq Ď Jzpτx,rnpX˜n Y tynuq,Wcx,rnq
Y Jτx,rnx1pτx,rnpX˜n Y tx1, ynuqztzu,Wcx,rnq
Ď Jτx,rnynpτx,rnpX˜n Y tynuqztzu,Wcx,rnqY Jzpτx,rnX˜n,Wcx,rnq
Y Jτx,rnx1pτx,rnpX˜n Y tx1uqztzu,Wcx,rnq. (SA.5.11)
It suffices to show that each of the sets on the right-hand side has asymptotically
bounded size. Observe that for any x1 P Rd,
Jτx,rnx1pτx,rnpX˜n Y tx1uq,Wcx,rnq “ Jx1pτx1,rnpX˜n Y tx1uq,Wcx1,rnq.
This follows because positions enter the model either directly through differences,
e.g. ||τx,rnX ´ τx,rnX 1|| “ ||τy,rnX ´ τy,rnX 1|| for X,X 1 P X˜n, or indirectly through
the attribute process. Thus, the rescaled model (SA.5.2) generates the same network
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outcome regardless of the centering value x. Therefore, to show (SA.5.10), it is enough
show that
|Jypτx,rnX˜n Y tyu,Wcx,rnq| “ Opp1q (SA.5.12)
for any x, y P Rd.
Step 2. The next two steps make use of the branching process notation in
Appendix SA.8. By Lemma SA.8.1, for n sufficiently large, the left-hand side of
(SA.5.12) is stochastically dominated by the branching process size XˆKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq
defined in §SA.8.1. Hence, we only need to show that the size of this process is Opp1q.
Recall from that section that this process is generated through the following
three steps: first generate the K-depth branching process BKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq defined in
(SA.8.6); second, using the notation defined prior to Lemma SA.8.1 in §SA.8.2, gener-
ate independent branching processes starting at each particle of the fixed-depth pro-
cess: tXrnpx1, z1q : px1, z1q P BKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqqu, constructed independently conditional
on BKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq; and third, conditional on the set of particles Ψn generated from
the second step, draw independent 1-depth branching processes for each such particle
tX˜1rnpx2, z2q : px2, z2q P Ψnu, where X˜1rnpx2, z2q is again defined in Appendix SA.8.
We next show that XˆKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq is asymptotically bounded. For economy of
notation, we make some new definitions that lump together some of the processes
introduced in the previous paragraph. Take any Xrnpx1, z1q generated in the sec-
ond step and add all particles generated by this process to a set Trnpx1, z1q. (So
|Trnpx1, z1q| “ Xrnpx1, z1q.) Define
X
23
rn
px1, z1q “ Xrnpx1, z1q `
ÿ
px2,z2qPTrn px
1,z1q
X˜
1
rn
px2, z2q.
That is, we add to Xrnpx1, z1q the size of each 1-depth branching process generated in
step 3 that is initialized at a particle in Trnpx1, z1q. Then
P
´
Xˆ
K
rn
py,Zpcx,rnyqq ą B
¯
“ P
¨
˝ ÿ
px1,z1qPBKrn py,Zpcx,rnyqq
X
23
rn
px1, z1q ą B
˛
‚
ď P
¨
˝ ÿ
px1,z1qPBKrn py,Zpcx,rnyqq
X
23
rn
px1, z1q ą BX |BKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq| ď B1
˛
‚
`P `|BKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq| ą B1˘ .
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Since |BKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq|
d“ X˜Krnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq, it is Opp1q by Lemma SA.8.3. Then for
any ε ą 0, we can choose B1 large enough such that
lim sup
nÑ8
P
`
|BKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq| ą B1
˘ ă ε{2.
On the other hand, by the union bound,
P
ˆ ÿ
px1,z1qPBKrn py,Zpcx,rnyqq
X
23
rn
px1, z1q ą BX |BKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq| ď B1
˙
“ E
„
P
ˆ ÿ
px1,z1qPBKrn py,Zpcx,rnyqq
X
23
rn
px1, z1q ą B
ˇˇˇ
ˇBKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq
˙
ˆ 1t|BKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq| ď B1u

ď E
„ ÿ
px1,z1qPBKrn py,Zpcx,rnyqq
P
`
X
23
rn
px1, z1q ą B{B1 | BKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq
˘
ˆ 1t|BKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq| ď B1u

. (SA.5.13)
Given the way in which X23rnpx1, z1q is generated above, we have
X
23
rn
px1, z1q K BKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq | px1, z1q.
Hence (SA.5.13) is bounded above by
B1E
„
max
px1,z1qPBKrn py,Zpcx,rnyqq
P
`
X
23
rn
px1, z1q ą B{B1 | x1, z1˘1t|BKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq| ď B1u

.
(SA.5.14)
For n sufficiently large, rn ď r1 for some r1 P p0, κs. Thus, |BKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq| d“
X˜
K
rn
py,Zpcx,rnyqq is stochastically dominated by X˜Kr1 py,Zpcx,rnyqq, by inspection of
the intensity measure (SA.8.4), since a higher value r1 only changes the process by
increasing the expected number of generated offspring. Hence, (SA.5.14) is bounded
above by
E
«
max
px1,z1qPBK
r1
py,Zpcx,rnyqq
P
`
X
23
rn
px1, z1q ą B{B1 | x1, z1˘ 1t|BKr1 py,Zpcx,rnyqq| ď B1u
ff
.
(SA.5.15)
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Let S “ tpx, zq : x P Rd, z P supppΦp¨ | xqqu. Assume for the moment that
lim
BÑ8
lim sup
nÑ8
sup
py,zqPS
P
`
X
23
rn
py, zq ą B˘ “ 0 (SA.5.16)
for any x1 P Rd and r1 sufficiently small. (We will prove this claim in step 3 below.)
Then
lim
BÑ8
lim sup
nÑ8
max
px1,z1qPBK
r1
py,Zpcx,rnyqq
P
`
X
23
rn
px1, z1q ą B{B1 | x1, z1˘
ˆ 1t|BKr1 py,Zpcx,rnyqq| ď B1u a.s.“ 0.
Hence, by the bounded convergence theorem, for any ε, B1 ą 0, we can choose B large
enough such that
lim sup
nÑ8
pSA.5.14q ď lim sup
nÑ8
pSA.5.15q ă ε{2.
We have therefore shown that for any ε ą 0, we can choose B large enough such that
lim sup
nÑ8
P
´
|Jypτx,rnX˜n Y tyu,W q| ą B
¯
ă ε, (SA.5.17)
which is (SA.5.12), as desired.
Step 3. We prove (SA.5.16). As in step 1,
P
`
X
23
rn
py, zqq ą B˘ “ P
¨
˝ ÿ
px1,z1qPTrn py,zq
X˜
1
rn
px1, z1q ą B
˛
‚
ď P
¨
˝ ÿ
px1,z1qPTrn py,zq
X˜
1
rn
px1, z1q ą BX Xrnpy, zq ď B1
˛
‚
`P pXrnpy, zqq ą B1q .
By Lemma SA.8.2, for any ε ą 0, we can choose B1 large enough such that
lim sup
nÑ8
sup
py,zqPS
P pXrnpy, zq ą B1q ă ε{2. (SA.5.18)
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On the other hand, by the union bound,
P
ˆ ÿ
px1,z1qPTrn py,zq
X˜rnpx1, z1; 1q ą BX Xrnpy, zq ď B1
˙
“ E
„
P
ˆ ÿ
px1,z1qPTrn py,zq
X˜rnpx1, z1; 1q ą B
ˇˇˇ
ˇ Trnpy, zq
˙
ˆ 1t|Trnpy, zq| ď B1u

ď E
„ ÿ
px1,z1qPTrn py,zq
P
´
X˜rnpx1, z1; 1q ą B{B1 | Trnpy, zq
¯
ˆ 1t|Trnpy, zq| ď B1u

.
Since X˜1rnpx1, z1q K Trnpy, zq | px1, z1q, the right-hand side is bounded above by
B1E
„
max
px1,z1qPTrn py,zq
P
´
X˜
1
rn
px1, z1q ą B{B1 | x1, z1
¯
1t|Trnpy, zq| ď B1u

. (SA.5.19)
Note that for n sufficiently large, |Trnpy, zq| d“ Xrnpy, zq is stochastically dominated by
Xr1py, zq for some r1 P p0, κs by inspection of the intensity measure (SA.8.1). Hence,
pSA.5.19q ď B1E
„
max
px1,z1qPTr1py,zq
P
´
X˜
1
rn
px1, z1q ą B{B1 | x1, z1
¯
1t|Tr1py, zq| ď B1u

.
(SA.5.20)
By Lemma SA.8.3,
lim
BÑ8
lim sup
nÑ8
sup
px1,z1qPS
P
´
X˜
1
rn
px1, z1q ą B{B1
¯
“ 0.
Hence, by the bounded convergence theorem, for any ε, B1 ą 0, we can choose B large
enough such that
lim sup
nÑ8
sup
py,zqPS
pSA.5.19q ď lim sup
nÑ8
sup
py,zqPS
pSA.5.20q ă ε{2.
Combined with (SA.5.18), this proves (SA.5.16).
Step 4. Having shown asymptotic boundedness of the relevant set (SA.5.12), we
can finally establish that the induced radius of stabilization for p P τx,rnpX˜nYtx1, ynuq
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satisfies
Rpp, τx,rnpX˜n Y tx1, yuq,Wcx,rnq “ Opp1q. (SA.5.21)
In the remainder of the proof, we abbreviate the relevant set of p as
Jp “ Jppτx,rnpX˜n Y tx1, ynuq,Wcx,rnq.
By the law of total probability,
P
ˆ
max
yPJp
‖p´ y‖ ą C
˙
ď P p|Jp| ą Bq `P
ˆ
max
yPJp
‖p´ y‖ ą CX |Jp| ď B
˙
.
(SA.5.22)
By steps 1–3, (SA.5.10) holds, so for ε ą 0, we can choose B such that
lim sup
nÑ8
P p|Jp| ą Bq ă ε{2. (SA.5.23)
Consider the second probability on the right-hand side of (SA.5.22). Under the
event |Jp| ď B, it follows that Jp Ď NApp, Bq. This is because Jp contains agents
indirectly connected to p through either D or A. Since D is a subnetwork of A, if
Jp has at most B agents, then every agent in the set must be no more than path
distance B away from p in A. We therefore have
P
ˆ
max
yPJp
‖p´ y‖ ą CX |Jp| ď B
˙
ď P
ˆ
max
yPNApp,Bq
‖p´ y‖ ą C
˙
.
As noted in the previous steps, the size ofNApp, Bq is stochastically dominated by that
of the fixed-depth branching process BBrnpp,Zpcx,rnpqq (see Lemma SA.8.1). Thus,
the right-hand side of the previous equation is bounded above by
P
ˆ
max
py,zqPBBrn pp,Zpcx,rnpqq
‖p´ y‖ ą C
˙
ď P
ˆ
max
py,zqPBBκ pp,Zpcx,rnpqq
‖p´ y‖ ą C
˙
.
By Lemma SA.8.4, the last line converges to zero as C Ñ8. Therefore, for any ε ą 0
and B ą 0, we can choose C large enough such that
lim sup
nÑ8
P
ˆ
max
yPJp
‖p´ y‖ ą CX |Jp| ď B
˙
ă ε{2. (SA.5.24)
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Combining (SA.5.22), (SA.5.23), and (SA.5.24), we have
lim
CÑ8
lim sup
nÑ8
P
ˆ
max
yPJp
‖p´ y‖ ą C
˙
“ 0,
which establishes (SA.5.21).
Lemma SA.5.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 5.1, Assumptions SA.7.1(b)
and SA.7.2 hold for each component ξ defined in (SA.5.3) for Rξ given in (SA.5.8).
Proof. We first prove Assumption SA.7.2. Consider model (SA.5.2) with X “
tρ˜iuNi“1 Y tx, τx,r´1n yu, where either N “ m ´ 1 with m P rn{2, 3n{2s for all n or
N „ Poissonpnq independent of all other primitives. We need to show that under
this model, Rnpxq, defined in (SA.5.8), has exponential tails, uniformly over n ą n˜,
m P rn{2, 3n{2s, and x, y P Rd. By Lemma SA.8.6, this holds if |Jxpτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq|
has uniformly exponential tails. This property follows from Lemma SA.8.7.
We next prove Assumption SA.7.1(b). Consider model (SA.5.2) with X “ tρ˜iuNi“1Y
txu. In (SA.5.8), we construct a radius of stabilization using the relevant set Jx. Re-
call from (SA.5.5) that this set is defined as the union of the strategic neighborhoods
of agents in x’s K-neighborhood in the network A. It delineates the set of agents such
that their removal from the model could potentially change x’s agent statistic. The
radius of external stabilization Renpxq in Definition SA.7.4 is sort of the opposite; it
delineates the set of agents whose agent statistics could change due to the removal of
x from the model. We therefore build the relevant set in “reverse” to construct Renpxq.
Then we show it is asymptotically bounded. This follows the line of argument used in
Lemma D.3 of Leung and Moon (2019) to verify the assumptions for a static model
of network formation with strategic interactions.
We define a relevant set Jex for external stabilization as follows. First initialize
Jex as NApx, 1q. For each x1 in this set, add to Jex the set Cpx1, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn,Dq.
Finally, for each x2 P Cpx1, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn,Dq, add to Jex the agents in NApx2, Kq.
By construction,
y P Jex implies x P Jy. (SA.5.25)
Now, recall that Rnpyq is the radius of stabilization for y given in (SA.5.8). Let
Qpx, rq be the cube in Rd centered at x with side length r. Define the radius of
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external stabilization
Renpxq “ max
#
‖x´ y‖ : y P
ď
y1PJex
Qpy1,Rnpy1qq
+
.
By (SA.5.25), Qpx,Renpxqq contains Qpy,Rnpyqq for all y P τx,rnX such that x P Jy.
Hence, if
ψ
`
y, τx,rnpX˜n Y txuq XQpy,Rnpyqq,Wcx,rn,Y ,A
˘
‰ ψ`y, τx,rnX˜n XQpy,Rnpyqq,Wcx,rn,Y ,A˘ a.s.,
(which implies x P Jy), this in turn implies that Qpx,Renpxqq contains Qpy,Rnpyqq.
Then the only requirements of Definition SA.7.4 left to show are (a) and (c). Re-
quirement (c), that the radius of external stabilization is increasing, follows trivially
from the fact that removing agents from the network can only shrink the sizes of Jex
and Jy1 for any y
1.
The remainder of the proof establishes requirement (a) of Definition SA.7.4, i.e.
Renpxq “ Opp1q uniformly over x P Rd. Under the event |Jex| ď B, note that Jex Ď
NApx,Bq. Hence,
PpRenpxq ą Cq ď Pp|Jex| ą Bq `PpEnq, (SA.5.26)
where
En “
"
|Jex| ď BXmax
"
‖x´ y‖; y PYy1PNApx,BqQ`y1, max
y2PJy1
‖y1 ´ y2‖˘ ą C**
Consider PpEnq. By the triangle inequality,
max
"
‖x´ y‖; y PYy1PNApx,BqQ`y1, max
y2PJy1
‖y1 ´ y2‖˘*
ď max t2‖x´ y1‖` ‖x´ y‖; y1 P NApx,Bq, y P Jy1u
ď 2max  ‖x´ y1‖; y1 P NApx,Bq(`max  ‖x´ y‖; y P Jy1, y1 P NApx,Bq(.
Define Jx “ Yy1PNApx,BqJy1 . Under the event that Jx has size at most B1 ą B,
we have trivially NApx,Bq Ď NApx,B1q. Furthermore, Jx Ď NApx,B1q. Therefore,
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PpEnq is bounded above by
PpJx ą B1q ` 2P
ˆ
max
yPNApx,B1q
2‖x´ y‖ ą C
˙
. (SA.5.27)
By Lemma SA.8.5, for any ε, B1 ą 0, there exists C ą 0 such that
lim sup
nÑ8
sup
x
P
ˆ
max
yPNApx,B1q
2‖x´ y‖ ą C
˙
ă ε{4. (SA.5.28)
Turning to the first part of (SA.5.27), note that
Jx “
ď
y1PNApx,B`Kq
C`y1 .
This is just the relevant set Jx with K replaced with B ` K. Then by the proof of
Lemma SA.5.2, for any ε, B ą 0 and B1 large enough,
lim sup
nÑ8
sup
x
PpJx ą B1q ă ε{4. (SA.5.29)
Combining (SA.5.27), (SA.5.28), and (SA.5.29), we have
lim sup
nÑ8
sup
x
PpEnq ă ε{2. (SA.5.30)
To complete the proof, in light of (SA.5.26) and (SA.5.30), it suffices to show that
for B large enough,
lim sup
nÑ8
sup
x
Pp|Jex| ą Bq ă ε{2. (SA.5.31)
This step of the argument is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma SA.5.2,
so we only sketch the argument. First, we construct a branching process whose
size stochastically dominates |Jex|. This is done by replacing each NApx1, Kq with
BKrnpx1,Zpcx,rnx1qq defined in (SA.8.6) and replacing each Cpx1, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn,Dq
with the set of particles Trnpx1,Zpcx,rnx1qq defined in step 2 of the proof of Lemma SA.5.2.
The sizes of the original sets are dominated by the sizes of their replacements by the
proof of Lemma SA.8.1. Second, the sizes of the replacements have exponential tails
uniformly over x1 by Lemmas SA.8.2 and SA.8.3. Then (SA.5.31) follows.
The following lemma is used in Lemma SA.5.2 to verify internal stabilization. It
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follows the notation of part (a) of that proof.
Lemma SA.5.4. For any z, z1 P τx,rnX˜n,
Jzpτx,rnpX˜n Y tx1, ynuq,Wcx,rnqlooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooon
JzpX q
Ď Jzpτx,rnpX˜n Y tx1, ynuqztz1u,Wcx,rnqlooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooon
JzpX´z1q
Y Jz1pτx,rnpX˜n Y tx1, ynuqztzu,Wcx,rnqlooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooon
Jz1pX´zq
.
Proof. Let A˚ be defined as the network A with agent z removed. Suppose y P
JzpX q. If y “ z1, then clearly y P Jz1pX ´ zq, so suppose y ‰ z1. Then either
(a) y P NApz,Kq or (b) y P C`w for some w P NApz,Kq. Consider case (a). If
y R JzpX ´ z1q, then it means that z1 lies on the path of length K in A connecting
y and z. This implies y P NA˚pz1, Kq. Therefore y P Jz1pX ´ zq. Consider case (b).
If y R JzpX ´ z1q, then there are two possibilities. The first is that z1 lies on some
directed path in D connecting y and some agent w, and z is not on this path.16 The
second is that Az1yRcy “ 1. In the second case, clearly y P NA˚pz1, Kq. In the first
case, there is a directed path from z1 to y in D˚. Thus, in either case, y P Jz1pX ´ zq.
SA.6 Proof of Dynamic CLT
The proof technique is the same as that discussed in Appendix SA.5. We only need
to define the relevant set Ji differently.
SA.6.1 Generalized Setup
As in §SA.5.2, in order to apply Theorem SA.7.1, we need to generalize our setup to
allow for a random number of agents. The generalization is essentially the same as
the static model (SA.5.2), except we need to define attribute processes for each time
period.
For x P Rd, define X , rn, τx,r, cx,r as in §SA.5.2. In place of Zp¨q and ζp¨, ¨q given
in that section, we define Zp¨q “ pZtp¨qqTt“0, where Ztp¨q is a stochastic process on Rd
16By directed path we mean a sequence of directed links Ay,a1 , Aa1,a2 , . . . , Aak´1,ak , Aak,w.
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with range Rdz and ζp¨, ¨q “ pζtp¨, ¨qqTt“0, where ζtp¨, ¨q is a stochastic process on RdˆRd
with range Rdζ . Suppose the marginals of Zp¨q and ζp¨, ¨q are i.i.d., tζtp¨, ¨quTt“0 are
independent, and Z,K ζ K X . Define the “attribute process” W p¨, ¨q “ pW tp¨, ¨qqTt“0
forW t : pp, p1q ÞÑ pZtppq,Ztpp1q, ζtpp, p1qq. LetW tcx,r denote the composition of the
random function W t and cx,r, i.e.
W tcx,rpy, y1q “
`
Ztpcx,ryq,Ztpcx,ry1q, ζtpcx,ry, cx,ry1q
˘
for any y, y1 P Rd. Let Wcx,r “ pW tcx,rqTt“0.
We can finally state the generalized dynamic model, which is given by the tuple
pU, U0, λ, V, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq, (SA.6.1)
Compared to (SA.5.2), the only difference is the addition of U0p¨q, which determines
the initial condition, and the redefinition ofW .
The remainder of this subsection clarifies how the network and equilibrium out-
comes are generated under this model. Define the network A ” Apτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq in
the same way as §SA.5.2; it is a random mapping pp, p1q ÞÑ Ap,p1, where Ap,p1 denotes
the potential link between p, p1 P τx,rnX . For period-t outcomes Y t under (SA.6.1),
rather than an n ˆ 1 vector of outcomes, we view Y t as a mapping from τx,rnX to
t0, 1u. Let Y tp denote the outcome of agent p P τx,rnX at time t according to Y t. Let
Ztp “ pp,Ztpcx,rnpqq, which is just p’s type at period t. We assume
Y tp “ 1tUpStp, Ztpq ą 0u,
where
Stp ” SpY t´1´p , Zt´1p , Zt´1´p , Ap, A´pq.
The first, third, and fourth arguments of the right-hand side are random functions
with domain τx,rnX ztpu such that Y t´1´p : p1 ÞÑ Y t´1p1 , Zt´1´p : p1 ÞÑ Zt´1p , and Ap : p1 ÞÑ
Ap,p1. The last argument is a random function with domain τx,rnX ztpu ˆ τx,rnX ztpu
such that A´p : pp1, p2q ÞÑ Ap1,p2. Thus, this just generalizes the definition of Sp¨q in
model (3.1) to model (SA.6.1). To emphasize its dependence on the primitives, we
write Y tpτx,rnX ,W tcx,rnq for the period-t outcome mapping, suppressing the implicit
dependence on the network function Apτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq.
This defines the evolution of the outcome time series from period 1 onwards. The
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initial conditions model for Y 0 in model (SA.6.1) is the static model of §SA.5.2 with
period-0 attributes. Recalling the definition of λp¨q from that section, we assume the
initial condition satisfies Y 0 “ λpA, τx,rnX ,W 0cx,rnq. This is just a restatement of
Assumption 6.1(b).
Network Moments. Define
Y pτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq “ pY tpτx,rnX ,W tcx,rnqqTt“0. (SA.6.2)
Our goal is to prove a CLT for network moments of the form
Λpτx,rX ,Wcx,rnq ”
ÿ
pPτx,rX
ψpp, τx,rX ,Wcx,rn,Y pτx,rX ,Wcx,rnq,Apτx,rX ,Wcx,rnqq
”
ÿ
pPτx,rX
ψpp, τx,rX ,Wcx,rn,Y ,Aq,
where the last line abbreviates by suppressing the dependence of Y and A on their
arguments. Note that, by construction, Y and A are deterministic functions of the
first two arguments of ψp¨q. Thus we can absorb them into the agent statistic, writing
ξpp, τx,rX ,Wcx,rnq ” ψpp, τx,rX ,Wcx,rn,Y ,Aq.
This falls within the setup of Appendix SA.7.
SA.6.2 Proofs
In the proof of Theorem 5.1, we construct a “relevant set” Jx such that agent x’s agent
statistic only depends on its arguments through Jx in the sense of (SA.5.6). To prove
Theorem 6.1, we need to define an analogous set. We first need some new notation.
For p, p1 P τx,rnX define
Dtp,p1 “ 1
 
sup
s
V p‖p´ p1‖, s,W tcx,rnpp, p1qq ą 0
X inf
s
V p‖p´ p1‖, s,W tcx,rnpp, p1qq ď 0
(
.
Let Dt network function on τx,rn mapping pp, p1q ÞÑ Dtp,p1. Define agent x’s strategic
neighborhood in Dt as in §SA.5.3, now with the notation C`tx.
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ForM given in Assumption 2.1 andK given in Assumption 2.2, define the relevant
set as
JxT ” JxT pτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq “
ď 
C`
0y : y P NApx1, K `MpT ´ 1qq
(
. (SA.6.3)
Lemma SA.6.1. Suppose ψp¨q satisfies Assumption 2.2 and the initial conditions
model satisfies Assumptions 3.1 and SA.1.1. For any x1 P τx,rnX ,
ψpx1, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn,Y ,Aq “ ψpx1, Jx1T ,Wcx,rn,Y ,Aq.
Proof. The agent statistic of x1 is a function of its arguments through tY tp : p P
NApx1, Kq, t “ 0, . . . , T u by Assumption 2.2. By Assumption 2.1, Y Tp is a function
of outcomes and attributes only through the period T ´ 1 outcomes and attributes
of agents in NApp,Mq. Hence, the agent statistic of x1 is a function of agents in
NApx1, K `Mq. Now, these period T ´ 1 outcomes of agents p1 P NApp,Mq, in turn,
are functions of period T ´2 outcomes of agents in NApp1,Mq, and so on. Repeat this
argument until we hit period 0. At this point, we have found that the agent statistic of
x1 is a function of agents in NApx1, K`MpT´1qq, and we are considering the period-0
outcome of some agent ℓ, Y 0ℓ . By the initial conditions model and Lemma SA.5.1, Y
0
ℓ
is fully determined by the attributes of agents in C`
0ℓ. The result follows.
Define
RnT px1q ” RT px1, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq “ max
yPJx1T
‖x1 ´ y‖, (SA.6.4)
the radius of stabilization of x1 P τx,rnX .
Proof of Theorem 6.1. We apply Theorem SA.7.1 by verifying Assumptions
SA.7.1–SA.7.4. Assumptions SA.7.3 and SA.7.4 hold under Assumption 5.4 (or equiv-
alently Assumption SA.5.1). The argument for verifying Assumptions SA.7.1 and
SA.7.2 is the same as the static case (Lemmas SA.5.2 and SA.5.3). Observe that the
radius of stabilization in the static case (SA.5.8) is virtually the same as (SA.6.4). The
only differences are that we use the K `MpT ´ 1q rather than the K-neighborhood
(but this does not matter because bothK and T are fixed constants) and the period-0
strategic neighborhood C`0y instead of the strategic neighborhood C
`
y . The only dif-
ference between the latter two objects is that C`y is defined using the attribute process
Wcx,rn (since there are no time periods), whereas C
`
0y is defined using the period-0 at-
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tribute processW 0cx,rn. Thus, in following the proofs of Lemmas SA.5.2 and SA.5.3,
we only need to modify the definition of the branching process XˆKrnpy,Zpcx,rnyqq in
two ways. First, replace K with K`MpT ´1q. Second, change the intensity measure
of Xrnpx1, z1q given in (SA.8.1) by using period-0 attributesW 0cx,rn instead. (Recall
from the proof of Lemma SA.5.2 that this branching process is used to stochastically
bound |C`y |.)
SA.7 CLT for Stabilizing Functionals
The proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 6.1 consist of verifying high-level conditions for a gen-
eral CLT stated next. This is a minor modification of Theorem C.2 of Leung and Moon
(2019). There are two main differences relative to their setup. The first is that
positions are given by ρ˜1, ρ˜2, . . . , which are i.i.d. draws from f , and attributes are
drawn conditional on these positions. In our setup, positions are given instead by
ωnρ˜1, ωnρ˜2, . . . , which is directly an increasing domain asymptotics setup. For this
reason, we use the projection cx,rn (defined in §SA.5.2) in place of the projection px,rn
used by Leung and Moon (2019); §SA.5.2 illustrates the purpose of cx,rn. The second
difference is that we do not derive a closed-form expression for the limiting variance,
which allows us to simplify the conditions and avoid a high-level continuity condition.
SA.7.1 Definitions
As in the main text, define tρ˜iuni“1 iid„ f , a density on Rd bounded away from zero
and infinity. Let X “ tρ˜iuNi“1 Y G for some a.s. finite random variable N that may
depend on n and finite set G Ď Rd. Recall from §SA.5.2 the definitions of W p¨, ¨q,
Zp¨q, ζp¨, ¨q, rn, τx,r, and cx,r. The first three are assumed to be independent of N .
Define Qpx, rq as the cube in Rd centered at x with side length r.
For x, y P Rd and r P R`, we prove a central limit theorem for functionals of the
form
Λpτy,rX ,Wcy,rq “
ÿ
xPτy,rX
ξpx, τy,rX ,Wcy,rq,
where ξp¨q has range Rm and satisfies
ξpτy,rx, τy,rX ,Wcy,rq “ ξpτy1,rx, τy1,rX ,Wcy1,rq
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for any y1 P Rd. This last property holds trivially in the static and dynamic models.
Definition SA.7.1. Rξpx,X ,Wcx,rq17 is a radius of stabilization of ξ if
ξpx,X ,W q “ ξpx,X XH,Wcx,rq (SA.7.1)
for any r P R`, and H Ě Qpx,Rξpx,X ,Wcx,rqq, and
Rξpx, τx,rX ,Wcx,rq “ Rξpτy,rx, τy,rX ,Wcx,rq (SA.7.2)
for any y P Rd.
Definition SA.7.2. A radius of stabilization Rξp¨q is increasing on tX unPN if for all
x P Rd, n sufficiently large, and H Ď Rd,
Rξpx, τx,rnX XH,Wcx,rq ď Rξpx, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rq.
Definition SA.7.3. LetRξp¨q be a radius of stabilization and G ” Gp¨q ” tGnp¨qunPN
be a set-valued functions, where for any x P Rd, Gnpxq Ď Rd. We say ξ is pRξ, Gq-
stabilizing on tX unPN if for any x P Rd and x1 P τx,rnpX YGnpxqq,
Rξpx1, τx,rnpX YGnpxqq,Wcx,rq “ Opp1q.
Definition SA.7.4. ξ is Rξ-externally stabilizing on tX unPN if for all n and x P Rd,
there exists Renpxq ” Renpx, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rq ě 0 such that the following properties
hold.
(a) Renpxq “ Opp1q uniformly in x, i.e.
lim
RÑ8
lim
nÑ8
sup
xPRd
PpRenpxq ą Rq “ 0.
(b) Define RX ” RξpX, τX,rnpX Y txuq,Wcx,rq and QX ” QpX,RXrnq. For any
X P X , if
ξ
`
X, τX,rn
`pX Y txuq XQX˘,Wcx,r˘ ‰ ξ`X, τX,rn`X XQX˘,Wcx,r˘ a.s.,
17If x R X , we abbreviate Rξpx,X ,Wcx,rq ” Rξpx,X Y txu,Wcx,rq.
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then Qpτx,rnX,RXq Ď Qpx,Renpxqq for any n sufficiently large.
(c) For all x P Rd, n sufficiently large, and H Ď Rd,
Renpx, τx,rnX XH,Wcx,rq ď Renpx, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rq.
Definition SA.7.5. ξ is Rξ-binomial exponentially stabilizing if for some n˜, c, ǫ ą 0,
sup
nąn˜
sup
mPrn{2,3n{2s
sup
HĎRd
sup
x,yPRd
P pRξpx, τx,rnpXm´1 XHq Y tyu,Wcx,rq ě rq ď c exp t´crǫu .
It is Rξ-Poisson exponentially stabilizing if for N „ Poissonpnq and some n˜, c, ǫ ą 0,
sup
nąn˜
sup
x,yPRd
P pRξpx, τx,rnX Y tyu,Wcx,rq ě rq ď c exp t´crǫu .
SA.7.2 Assumptions
We state high-level conditions required for a CLT.
Assumption SA.7.1 (Stabilization). There exists a radius of stabilization Rξ such
that the following statements hold.
(a) For νpnq P rn{2, 3n{2s for all n, ξ is pRξ, Gq-stabilizing on tXNunPN for N “ νpnq
and N „ Poissonpnq for any G “ tGnpxqunPN such that Gnpxq Ď tx1, yu for some
x1, y P Rd and all n P N, x P Rd.
(b) For νpnq ă n and νpnq{n Ñ 1, ξ is Rξ-externally stabilizing on tXNunPN for
N “ νpnq and N „ Poissonpnq.
(c) Rξ is increasing on tXNunPN for N “ νpnq and N „ Poissonpnq with νpnq defined
as in either (a) or (b).
Assumption SA.7.2 (Exponential Stabilization). There exists a radius of stabiliza-
tion Rξ such that ξ is Rξ-binomial exponentially stabilizing and Rξ-Poisson exponen-
tially stabilizing.
Assumption SA.7.3 (Bounded Moments). There exists C ă 8 such that
E
“
|ξ px, τx,rnpXm YGq XHn,Wcx,rnq|8
‰ ă C
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for all n P N, m P rn{2, 3n{2s, tHnunPN with Hn Ď Rd, G P ttyu,∅u, and x, y P Rd.
Assumption SA.7.4 (Polynomial Bound). For any a.s. finite set X Ď Rd, x P Rd,
r P R`,
|ξpx,X ,Wcx,rq| ď c|X |c (SA.7.3)
a.s., for some positive constant c.
SA.7.3 Main Result
Let Xn “ tρ˜iuni“1 and x P Rd. Define the add-one cost
Ξxpr´1n Xn,W q “ Λ
`
r´1n Xn Y txuq,W
˘´ Λ `r´1n Xn,W ˘ (SA.7.4)
and variance Σn “ Varpn´1{2Λpr´1n Xn,W qq. Recall that λminpΣnq is the smallest
eigenvalue of Σn and Im the mˆm identity matrix.
Theorem SA.7.1. Suppose that, for each component of the vector ξpr´1n X, r´1n Xn,W q,
Assumptions SA.7.1 and SA.7.2 hold for the same radius of stabilization Rξ (the ra-
dius may be component-specific). Further suppose that c1Ξr´1n Xpr´1n Xn,W q is asymp-
totically non-degenerate for all c P Rmzt0u. Then under Assumptions SA.7.3 and
SA.7.4, lim infnÑ8 λminpΣnq ą 0, and
n´1{2Σ´1{2n
`
Λpr´1n Xn,W q ´ E
“
Λpr´1n Xn,W q
‰˘ dÝÑ N p0, Imq .
Proof. The proof is almost the same as Theorem C.2 of Leung and Moon (2019)
with the following minor modifications. First, in place of the composition Wpx,r
used everywhere in their proof, we useWcx,r. This replacement has no effect on the
original arguments, since the assumptions are also modified in the same way.
Second, whereas several parts of the proof of Theorem C.2 are concerned with the
derivation of a closed-form expression for limnÑ8Σn, we do not derive it for our set-
ting. This has two minor effects on the proof. First, the proof of the Poissonized CLT
(Theorem H.1) is simpler and does not require Lemma H.4, which derives the limit
variance under the Poissonized model. We state the simplified proof in Lemma SA.7.1
below. Second, the de-Poissonization argument needs some minor modification to
avoid the use of certain limit quantities that are used to characterize limnÑ8Σn.
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These modifications are given after the statements of Lemmas SA.7.1–SA.7.4 below.
Note that the lemmas below all consider the case where the dimension m of ξ
is one, so they only establish a univariate CLT, However, with this result, we can
extend to m ą 1 as follows. Let t P Rm. Under the assumptions of the theorem,
t1Λpr´1n Xn,W q satisfies the assumptions of the CLT for the case m “ 1. Then the
result follows from the Cramér-Wold device.
The following lemmas make use of the add-one cost Ξx defined in (SA.7.4). For
an R`-valued function λp¨q, let Pλ be an inhomogeneous Poisson point process with
intensity function λp¨q. Note that for N „ Poissonpnq, tρ˜iuNi“1 d“ Pnf .
Lemma SA.7.1 (Poissonized CLT). Let m “ 1. Suppose Assumptions SA.7.1–
SA.7.4 hold,
sup
nPN
sup
HĎRd
sup
xPRd
E
”
Ξx
`
τx,rnPnf XH,Wcx,rn
˘4ı ă 8, (SA.7.5)
and lim infnÑ8 σ
2
n ą 0, where σ2n “ Varpn´1{2Λpr´1n Pnf ,W qq. Then
n´1{2σ´1n
`
Λpr´1n Pnf ,W q ´ E
“
Λpr´1n Pnf ,W q
‰˘ dÝÑ N p0, 1q.
Proof. This is a minor modification of the proof of Theorem H.1 in Leung and Moon
(2019). We will rewrite Λpr´1n Pnf ,W q´ErΛpr´1n Pnf ,W qs as the sum of a martingale
difference sequence. Partition Rd into cubes with side length rn. Label those that
intersect the support of f as Q1, . . . , Qkn, with respective centers x1, . . . , xkn labeled
in increasing lexicographic order. For each ℓ “ 1, . . . , kn, define Fℓ as the σ-field
generated by the points of
P1X
# ď
1ďmďℓ
tQm ˆ r0,8qu
+
.
We can then define the martingale differences δℓ “ E r∆xℓ | Fℓs, where
∆xℓ “ σ´1n Λ
`
r´1n Pnf ,W
˘´ σ´1n Λ `r´1n `pPnfzQℓq Y pP 1nf XQℓq˘ ,W ˘ .
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Notice σnδℓ “ E rΛ pr´1n Pnf ,W q | Fℓs ´ E rΛ pr´1n Pnf ,W q | Fℓ´1s, and
Λpr´1n Pnf ,W q ´ E
“
Λpr´1n Pnf ,W q
‰ “ σn knÿ
ℓ“1
δℓ.
Furthermore, tδℓuknℓ“1 is a martingale difference sequence with filtration tFℓuknℓ“0, where
F0 is the trivial σ-algebra. By orthogonality of martingale differences,
Var
`
Λpr´1n Pnf ,W q
˘ “ σn knÿ
ℓ“1
Erδ2ℓ s. (SA.7.6)
We complete the proof by verifying the conditions for a CLT for martingale difference
arrays (Hall and Heyde, 2014, Theorem 3.2). There are three such conditions, the
first of which is
sup
nPN
E
„
max
1ďℓďkn
1
n
δ2ℓ

ă 8. (SA.7.7)
The left-hand side is bounded above by
sup
nPN
1
n
knÿ
ℓ“1
Erδ2ℓ s ď sup
nPN
kn
n
max
1ďℓďkn
σ´1n E
“
∆2xℓ
‰
. (SA.7.8)
This is finite by (SA.7.5), the assumption that σn is asymptotically non-degenerate,
and the fact that kn “ Opnq, thereby establishing (SA.7.7).
The second condition needed for a martingale difference CLT is
n´1{2 max
1ďℓďkn
|δℓ|
pÝÑ 0. (SA.7.9)
By Markov’s inequality,
P
ˆ
n´1{2 max
1ďℓďkn
|δℓ| ě ǫ
˙
ď
knÿ
ℓ“1
1
n2ǫ4
Erδ4ℓ s,
which tends to zero by the arguments for finiteness of (SA.7.8). This proves (SA.7.9).
The last condition required for a martingale difference CLT is n´1
řkn
ℓ“1 δ
2
ℓ
pÝÑ 1,
which holds trivially by (SA.7.6).
The next three lemmas are restatements of de-Poissonization lemmas given in §H.4
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of Leung and Moon (2019). In what follows, let X be a draw from f independent of
ρ˜1, ρ˜2, . . . .
Lemma SA.7.2. Let m “ 1. Suppose that the conclusion of Lemma SA.7.1 holds.
Further suppose there exist γ ą 0.5 and a sequence of constants tαnunPN such that
lim
nÑ8
ˆ
sup
n´nγďmďn`nγ
ˇˇ
E rΞXpτX,rnXm,WcX,rnqs ´ αn
ˇˇ˙ “ 0, (SA.7.10)
lim
nÑ8
ˆ
sup
n´nγďmăm1ďn`nγ
ˇˇ
E rΞXpτX,rnXm,WcX,rnqΞXpτX,rnXm1,WcX,rnqs ´ α2n
ˇˇ˙ “ 0,
(SA.7.11)
lim
nÑ8
ˆ
sup
n´nγďmăm1ďn`nγ
n´1{2E
“
ΞXpτX,rnXm,WcX,rnq2
‰˙ “ 0. (SA.7.12)
If Assumption SA.7.4 holds, then for σn defined in Lemma SA.7.1, α
2
n ď σ2n. If
additionally lim infnÑ8pσn ´ αnq ą 0, then
n´1{2pσ2n ´ α2nq´1{2
`
Λpr´1n Xn,W q ´ E
“
Λpr´1n Xn,W q
‰˘ dÝÑ N p0, 1q.
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Lemma H.8 of Leung and Moon (2019).
Lemma SA.7.3. Let m “ 1. Suppose there exists a sequence of pairs of i.i.d. random
variables tp∆n,∆1nqunPN such that for any sequence tνpnq, ν 1pnqunPN satisfying νpnq ă
ν 1pnq and νpnq{n, ν 1pnq{nÑ 1, we have
max
 
|ΞXpτX,rnXνpnq,WcX,rnq ´∆n|, |ΞXpτX,rnXν1pnq,WcX,rnq ´∆1n|
( pÝÑ 0.
(SA.7.13)
If Assumption SA.7.3 holds, then supnEr∆ns ă 8, and (SA.7.10)–(SA.7.12) hold
with αn “ Er∆ns and γ “ 0.75.
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Lemma H.9 of Leung and Moon (2019),
except that we do not need a limit for Er∆ns.
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For the next lemma, define
Ξ˜i,n “ Λpr´1n Xn,W q ´ Λpr´1n pXnztρ˜iuq,W q,
Ξ˜´i,n “ Λpr´1n pXn`1ztρ˜iuq,W q ´ Λpr´1n pXnztρ˜iuq,W q.
Lemma SA.7.4. Let m “ 1. Suppose there exists a sequence of random variables
t∆nunPN such that (a) if ∆1n denotes an independent copy of ∆n, then for any sequence
tνpnqunPN satisfying νpnq ď n and νpnq{nÑ 1,
max
!
|ΞXpτX,rnXνpnq´1,WcX,rnq ´∆n|, |Ξ˜´νpnq,n ´∆1n|
)
pÝÑ 0, (SA.7.14)
(b) ∆n is asymptotically non-degenerate, and (c)
P
´
ΞXpτX,rnXνpnq´1,WcX,rnq ‰ Ξ˜νpnq,n
¯
Ñ 0. (SA.7.15)
If Assumption SA.7.3 holds, then
lim inf
nÑ8
Var
`
n´1{2Λpr´1n Xn,W q
˘ ą 0.
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Lemma H.10 of Leung and Moon (2019)
Proof of Theorem SA.7.1. Let m “ 1. The arguments that follow are mi-
nor modifications of the proof of Theorem H.2 of Leung and Moon (2019). We
verify the conditions of Lemma SA.7.3 and SA.7.4. Then Lemma SA.7.2 estab-
lishes the result. It suffices to verify assumption (b) of Lemma SA.7.4 and to prove
that if tpνpnq, ν 1pnqqunPN is a sequence satisfying νpnq ă ν 1pnq, νpnq ă n, and
νpnq{n, ν 1pnq{nÑ 1, that (SA.7.13), (SA.7.14), and (SA.7.15) hold.
Following the coupling construction in the proof of Theorem H.2 of Leung and Moon
(2019), we can construct independent draws X, Y from f and inhomogeneous Poisson
processes on Rd labeled Panf and P
b
nf on the same probability space
18 such that
WcX,rnpPanf Y tXuq K WcY,rnpPbnf Y tY uq.
18Replace the set FX ˆ r0, nfpXqs in their coupling construction with tpx, tq P FX ˆ r0,8q : t ď
nfpxqu and likewise with FY ˆ r0, nfpY qs.
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Therefore, the following two random variables are independent:
∆n ” ΞXpτx,rnPanf ,WcX,rnq and ∆1n ” ΞY pτx,rnPbnf ,WcY,rnq.
The coupling also constructs ΞXpτX,rnXνpnq,WcX,rnq,ΞY pτY,rnXν1pnq,WcY,rnq on the
same probability space.
We now prove (SA.7.13) and assumption (b) of Lemma SA.7.4, which require some
definitions. For any R ą 0, define the event
EnXpRq “
 
τX,rnXνpnq XQpX,Rq “ τX,rnPanf XQpX,Rq
(
.
Also define
RΛpXq “ maxtRΛpX, τX,rnXνpnq,WcX,rnq,RΛpX, τX,rnPanf ,WcX,rnqu,
where RΛpX, τX,rnXνpnq,WcX,rnq satisfies
ΞXpτX,rnXνpnq,WcX,rnq “ ΞXpτX,rnXνpnq XQpX,Rq,WcX,rnq
for any R ą RΛpX, τX,rnXνpnq,WcX,rnq and similarly for RΛpX, τX,rnPanf ,WcX,rnq.
For states of the world in the event EnXpRq X tR ą RΛpXqu, by definition of
RΛpXq,
ΞXpτX,rnXνpnq,WcX,rnq “ ΞXpτX,rnXνpnq XQpX,Rq,WcX,rnq
“ ΞXpτX,rnPanf XQpX,Rq,WcX,rnq “ ΞXpτX,rnPanf ,WcX,rnq.
Therefore, for any ǫ ą 0,
P
`ˇˇ
ΞXpτX,rnXνpnq,WcX,rnq ´ ΞXpτX,rnPanf ,WcX,rnq
ˇˇ ą ǫ˘
ď PpEnXpRqcq `PpRΛpXq ą Rq, (SA.7.16)
where EnXpRqc is the complement of EnXpRq. Under Assumption SA.7.1, Λ is RΛ-
stabilizing in the sense of Definition H.2 of Leung and Moon (2019) by Lemma H.11
of that paper. Hence, RΛpX, τX,rnXνpnq,WcX,rnq and RΛpX, τX,rnPanf ,WcX,rnq can
be constructed such that RΛpXq “ Opp1q. For such RΛpXq, we can choose R ą 0
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large enough such that for all n sufficiently large and any ε ą 0, PpRΛpXq ą
Rq ă ε{2. By Lemma H.1 of Leung and Moon (2019), for any such R, we can
choose n large enough such that PpEnXpRqcq ă ε{2. Combining these facts with
(SA.7.16), we have |ΞXpτX,rnXνpnq,WcX,rnq ´ ∆n| pÝÑ 0, and by an identical argu-
ment, |ΞY pτY,rnXν1pnq,WcY,rnq ´∆1n| pÝÑ 0. This establishes (SA.7.13).
To show assumption (b) of Lemma SA.7.4, note that, following the argument
above, c1Ξr´1n Xpr´1n Xn,W q converges to ∆n, so the latter is asymptotically non-
degenerate.
Finally, the proof of (SA.7.14) and (SA.7.15) is similar to that of (SA.7.13).
SA.8 Branching Process Lemmas
This section restates branching process results due to Leung and Moon (2019), which
are used to prove the CLTs. There is only some slight modification in notation relative
to their case due to differences outlined at the start of Appendix SA.7. We first define
a branching process used to bound the sizes of components in D defined in §SA.5.2.
Let dz be the dimension of Zi, x P Rd, z P Rdz and r ě 0. Recall the definition of
ϕpp, z; p1, z1q from (5.4) and rn “ ω´1n . Let f¯ “ suppPRd fppq. Define Xrpp, zq as the
size of the branching process on Rd`dz starting at a particle of type pp, zq, where the
offspring of a type pp1, z1q particle is given by a Poisson point process on Rd ˆ Rdz
with intensity
dπrpp1, z1; p2, z2q ” κf¯p1` rqϕpp1, z1; p2, z2q dΦ˚pz2q dp2, (SA.8.1)
where Φ˚ is defined in Assumption 5.1. In brief, this branching process is generated
as follows. We initialize the process at the “first generation,” which consists of a
single particle pp, zq P Rd ˆ Rdz . The second generation consists of the “offspring”
of pp, zq, which is the Poisson point process described above. We refer to each point
of this process as a particle. The third generation consists of the offspring of the
second-generation particles, which are realized according to a Poisson point process
distributed as above. Being elements of RdˆRdz , particles can be interpreted as types
τi. These processes are drawn independently conditional on the second-generation
“parent” particles. This process is repeated indefinitely. The number of particles
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ultimately generated is Xrpp, zq.
This process is of interest because the expected number of offspring of a particle
of type pp, zq is
κf¯p1` rq
ż
Rd
ż
Rdz
ϕpp, z; p1, z1q dΦ˚pz1q dp1, (SA.8.2)
which is an upper bound on the expected conditional degree of an agent in D by
(5.5). Lemma SA.8.1 below clarifies the relation between Xrnpp, zq and the size of the
component in D of an agent with type pp, zq.
We next define a fixed-depth branching process used to bound the sizes of K-
neighborhoods in A. Recalling the definitions in Assumption 5.2, let
p˜1pp, z; p1, z1q “ Φ˜ζ
´
V˜ ´1p‖p´ p1‖, 0q
¯
. (SA.8.3)
This is an upper bound on the conditional linking probability for a pair of agents
in the network A. Let X˜Kr pp1, z1q denote the size of the branching process on the
type space RdˆRdz that terminates after K ` 1 generations, starting at a particle of
type pp1, z1q, whose the offspring distribution is given by a Poisson point process on
R
d ˆ Rdz with intensity
dπ˜rpp1, z1; p2, z2q “ κf¯p1` rqp˜1pp1, z1; p2, z2q dΦ˚pz2q dp2. (SA.8.4)
This is generated the same way as Xrpp, zq, except the intensity measure is different,
and once the pK ` 1q-th generation is born, no further offspring are generated. As
with Xrpp, zq, this process is of interest because the expected number of offspring of
a particle of type pp, zq is an upper bound on the conditional expected degree of an
agent pp, zq in A by calculations similar to (5.5). Lemma SA.8.1 below clarifies the
relation between X˜Krnpp, zq and the size of the K-neighborhood in A of an agent with
pp, zq.
SA.8.1 Stochastic Dominance
We state a lemma used in Appendix SA.5 to verify Assumption SA.7.1. It shows
that sizes of relevant sets (SA.5.5) are stochastically dominated by the sizes of certain
branching processes. It follows that strategic neighborhoods and K-neighborhoods
in A are also stochastically dominated. Then using results from the next subsection,
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we can establish that the sizes of relevant sets are asymptotically bounded or have
exponential tails.
Let x, y P Rd, and νpnq satisfy νpnq ă n, νpnq{n Ñ 1. We assume the network is
realized according to model (SA.5.2)19 with
X “ tρ˜iuNi“1 Y tτx,r´1n pu (SA.8.5)
for any x, p P Rd (these quantities are defined in §SA.7.1). Note that τx,rnτx,r´1n p “ p.
Let A and D be defined under this model as in §SA.5.3. Also recall from that
section the definition of the D-component of an agent positioned at p P τx,rnX ,
denoted Cp ” Cpp, τx,rnX ,Wcx,rn, Dq and strategic neighborhood C`p . Recall from
Appendix SA.5 the definition of the K-neighborhood NApp,Kq, relevant set Jp, and
radius of stabilization Rnppq.
Let Jppτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq be the relevant set of the agent positioned at p under
model in part (a) of the proof of Lemma SA.5.2. The next lemma shows that this set
is stochastically bounded by the following branching process. For an initial particle
pp,Zpcx,rnpqq, let
BKr pp,Zpcx,rnpqq (SA.8.6)
be the set of particles in a branching process after K generations with intensity given
by (SA.8.4). This is our branching-process approximation of the K-neighborhood of
an agent in A. Then to approximate D-component sizes, for each particle pp, zq P
BKr pp,Zpcx,rnpqq, initiate independent branching processes with intensities given by
(SA.8.1) whose sizes consequently have the same distribution as Xrpp, zq. Lastly, for
each particle generated by the latter process, initiate a branching process that runs
for only one generation with intensity given by (SA.8.4). Let XˆKr pp,Zpcx,rnpqq denote
the size of the overall process.
Lemma SA.8.1. For any ǫ ą 0 and n sufficiently large,
Pp|Jppτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq| ą ǫq ď PpXˆKrnpp,Zpcx,rnpqq ą ǫq.
19For model (SA.6.1), everything is the same except we use period-0 attributes W 0cx,rn .
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Proof. Lemma C.1 of Leung (2019a) shows that
Pp|C`p | ą ǫq ď PpXrnpp,Zpcx,rnpqq ą ǫq
for N “ n, which easily generalizes to N „ Poissonpnq. A similar argument yields
Pp|NApp,Kq| ą ǫq ď PpX˜Krnpp,Zpcx,rnpqq ą ǫq
for any K. Then the result follows from construction of Jppτx,rnX ,Wcx,rnq and
Xˆ
K
rn
pp,Zpcx,rnpqq.
SA.8.2 Tail Bounds
The lemmas below are used to show that the sizes of the branching processes defined
in the previous subsection have exponential tails, following a line of argument due to
Turova (2012). Let gαr pp, zq “ ErαXrpp,zqs, and let Tr be the functional satisfying
pTr ˝ hqpp, zq “
ż
Rd
ż
Rdz
hpp1, z1qdπrpp1, z1; p, zq.
The next lemma is one of our main results in this section, establishing that the
size of the branching process has exponential tails. Define
ψrpp, zq “ κf¯p1` rq
ż
Rd
ˆż
Rdz
ϕpp, z; p1, z1q2 dΦ˚pz2q
˙1{2
dp1,
and recall the definition of T from (5.8).
Lemma SA.8.2. Fix x P Rd. Suppose f is bounded away from zero and infinity, and
Assumptions 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 hold. Then for some α ą 1,
sup
pp,zqPT
gαr pp, zq ă 8,
for r sufficiently small.
Proof. This is a special case of Lemma C.3 of Leung (2019a).
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Lemma SA.8.3. Define g˜α,Kr pp, zq “ ErαX˜Kr pp,zqs. If Assumption 5.2 holds, then
there exists α ě 1 such that suprďκ suppp,zqPT Erg˜α,Kr pp, zqs ă 8 for any K, with T
defined in (5.8).
Proof. This is Lemma I.8 of Leung and Moon (2019).
Lemma SA.8.4. For any x, y P Rd and K ą 0,
lim
CÑ8
lim sup
nÑ8
P
ˆ
max
pp1,z1qPBKκ pp,Zpcx,rnpqq
‖p´ p1‖ ą C
˙
“ 0.
Proof. This follows from the proof of Lemma I.10 of Leung and Moon (2019). Just
replace px,rn with cx,rn.
SA.8.3 Distance Bounds
We use the branching process results to show that sizes of K-neighborhoods, sizes of
relevant sets, and radii of stabilization have exponential tails. These results are used
to verify Assumption SA.7.2. We assume the network is realized according to model
(SA.5.2) with
X “ tρ˜iuNi“1 Y tx, yu,
where x, y P Rd and either N “ m, a constant in rn{2, 3n{2s for every n, or
N „ Poissonpnq, independent of all other primitives. Recall from Appendix SA.5
the definitions of Dp,p1 and Mp,p1, D-components Cp, strategic neighborhoods C
`
p ,
K-neighborhoods NApp,Kq, and relevant sets Jp.
The first lemma shows that the distance between the ego and any alter in her
K-neighborhood in A has exponential tails.
Lemma SA.8.5 (K-Neighborhoods). Under Assumption 5.2, there exists n˜ ą 0 such
that
sup
nąn˜
sup
mPrn{2,3n{2s
sup
x,yPRd
P
ˆ
max
pPNApx,Kq
r´1n ‖x´ p‖ ą r
˙
ď 3Kpc1κf¯pr{Kqde´c2r{KqK
for K, r sufficiently large.
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Proof. This follows from the proofs of Lemmas I.11 and I.12 in Leung and Moon
(2019).
Lemma SA.8.6. Suppose there exist constants n˜, b1, b2, ǫ1 ą 0 such that
sup
nąn˜
sup
mPrn{2,3n{2s
sup
x,yPRd
P p|Jx| ą rq ď b1e´b2rǫ1 . (SA.8.7)
Then under Assumption 5.2, there exist constants a1, a2, ǫ2 ą 0 such that
sup
nąn˜
sup
mPrn{2,3n{2s
sup
x,yPRd
P
ˆ
max
pPJx
r´1n ‖x´ p‖ ą r
˙
ď a1e´a2rǫ2 .
Proof. This is Lemma I.13 of Leung and Moon (2019).
Lemma SA.8.7. Under Assumptions 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, there exist positive constants
n˜, b1, b2, ǫ such that
sup
nąn˜
sup
mPrn{2,3n{2s
sup
x,yPRd
P
´
|Jxpτx,rnX˜n Y tx, yu,Wcx,rnq| ą r
¯
ď b1e´b2rǫ .
Proof. This is Lemma I.14 of Leung and Moon (2019).
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